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Articles

I

The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of
Isomorphism Through Institutionalization
Douglas Yam*
I.
A.

Introduction
A Tale of Capitulatingto Routine

Once upon a time, people sought to avoid the courts and turned to
an alternative to litigation. Third parties selected by the disputants
would bring the principals together and urge them to reconcile. The
disputants mutually shaped the process and agreed to the ultimate
outcome. Peoplefar and wide spoke of the wisdom of this process, how
it reduced hostility, reconciled adversaries, promoted community, and
produced efficient outcomes. The government supported it because it
was more effective in promoting peaceful relations than what the

* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. J.D., University of
Georgia; M. Litt., University of Cambridge; B.A., Duke University. Professor Yam is
the Executive Director of the Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, a
multi-disciplinary, inter-institutional, theory-building program, which focuses on the
problems of institutionalizing conflict resolution mechanisms.
Portions of this Article are part of a more extensive work in progress on the death of
ADR.
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government could provide. The commercial community, who found the
courts to be inefficient and inattentive to their specific needs, began to
adopt and adaptthis alternative. Before too long, the courts got involved
and began using the process to divert cases it couldn't or didn't want to
handle. The alternative thrived in its newfound role as an efficient
means to resolve commercial disputes and as a legitimate
institutionalizedpartner of the legal system, but there was trouble on the
horizon. Observers began to question the fairness of its use. Some
lawyers found the alternative threatening because it seemed antithetical
to the accepted role of the adversarialsystem, and others began to view
this alternative as an opportunity to gain tactical advantages in
litigation. Courts and policy makers began exercising more oversight
and control over the process. Eventually, disputants found that the
alternative was growing more and more similar to, if not sometimes
indistinguishablefrom, the adjudication for which it was meant to
substitute. While its use had become pervasive in society, the alternative
was dead as an alternative. Disputants had lost control over the process,
which no longer seemed as effective in reducing hostility, reconciling
adversaries,promoting community, and producing efficient outcomes as
it was once upon a time.
This tale sounds as if it is about the state and possible fate of
mediation in the United States at the end of the twentieth and beginning
of the twenty-first centuries, but it is not. It describes what happened to
arbitration in England from the tenth to the late nineteenth centuries.
This Article tells an historic tale of a dispute resolution process
capitulating to routine. It is the story of how arbitration evolved from
conciliatory into adjudicative, as it became increasingly institutionalized
within the English legal system over a thousand year period.' It does not
purport to discuss comprehensively English arbitration law and practice,
but rather to review through the lens of legal history how various dispute
processing traditions shaped the arbitral process. As such, it provides a
unique perspective from which to analyze how the ethos of a conciliatory
process can be lost in a relationship with an adversarial process promoted
by a powerful legal system. It is a story of cultures and traditions in
collision, one emphasizing compromise and private norms, the other
emphasizing rights and law.
It serves as a cautionary tale of
isomorphism through institutionalization that deserves
some
consideration.

1. I stumbled upon the tale while traveling to Long Melford, Suffolk, England, in
1988, on an ancestral tour. The brass on an ancestor's tomb, dated 1446 A.D., translated
from the Latin: "He delighted to bind the quarrelsome with the love of peace." I was
intrigued by the notion of fifteenth century mediators, so I set out to unearth the story.
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The Article is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the
use of arbitration in England as a conciliatory process and its decline.
The second part describes the transformation and rise of arbitration as an
adjudicative process and the consequent effects on arbitral practice.
Although analogies to the current trends of institutionalizing Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR") in American courts will be painfully
obvious to many readers, the conclusion in the form of a post-mortem
briefly recaps some of those analogous themes as they apply to modern
mediation. The remainder of this introduction provides some important
definitions and distinctions as well as the historical perspectives that
define a starting point for analysis.
B. Definitions and Distinctions
Some definitions and distinctions are essential to understanding the
tale and its contemporary implications. When I refer to the "death of
ADR," I mean the death of "alternative dispute resolution" as opposed to
"appropriate dispute resolution." The emphasis is on "alternative."
While the distinction may seem obvious now, it is likely to become less
so in subsequent years. Many leaders in the ADR movement have
encouraged using the term "appropriate dispute resolution," which
encompasses litigation, thereby putting all the primary dispute
processing' mechanisms on an equal footing rather than having them
distinguished from litigation, a distinction that may risk their being
labeled as second-class or undesirable.3 Most importantly for purposes
of this Article, "alternative" implies choice, not only a choice between
litigation and another dispute resolution process, but also choice to the
extent the word connotes voluntary participation and party control
independent of the dictates of the judicial system.
In this Article, ADR includes "ways in which a society with a

2. In this Article, variations of the phrase "dispute processing" are generally
favored over "dispute resolution" or "dispute settlement." The term "dispute processing"
is borrowed from William Felsteiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute
Processing, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 63 (1974). As Felsteiner points out, settlement or
resolution is often not the object of the exercise, nor is it always clear whether or not a
dispute has been settled; the dispute itself may never be clearly defined.
3. DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999)
[hereinafter DICTIONARY]. In her address to the 1996 annual meeting of the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) in Anaheim, California, Attorney General
Janet Reno announced that "ADR" today means "appropriate dispute resolution."
Ironically, this statement and the accompanying trend encouraged by SPIDR leadership
of substituting "appropriate" for "alternative" is symptomatic, as well as symbolic, of the
general assault on the independent ethos of ADR.
The notion of "appropriate" also raises the proposition that a crucial challenge in
dispute resolution is matching the appropriate process to a particular problem.
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formal, state-sponsored adjudicative process prevents, manages, and
resolves disputes without using that process."4 Generally, the term
encompasses any conflict-handling procedure that has as its goal
avoiding the cost and delay of litigation, relieving court congestion,
providing a more "effective" or constructive resolution between
disputants, enhancing community involvement in the process of
resolving disputes, and facilitating access to justice.5 In order to advance
these goals, ADR procedures usually are characterized as voluntary,
informal, private, fast, and inexpensive. They tend to de-emphasize the
adversarial method by discouraging lawyer participation, judicial
involvement, and the application of substantive law, and by encouraging
party participation.6 Of course, the best known examples of ADR
mechanisms or processes are negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
The latter two involve third-party intervention.
For purposes of this Article, an important distinction between
processes in which third parties intervene is whether the process is
"conciliatory" or "adjudicative." 7 A critical factor in making such a
classification is whether or not the third party has the power to impose a
solution. If so, the process is adjudicative; if not, the process is
conciliatory. Mediation is a conciliatory process. Its aim is to achieve
the settlement of disputes by adjustment or compromise among the
claims, interests, and demands of the parties. "Compromise" implies
participation and choice in the resolution, which by implication will
provide something for both disputants-a "bicentric" solution. The role
of the third party is not to decide the dispute and thereby impose a
settlement, but rather to bring the parties to an arrangement which they
will accept. As a result, the third party has no authority over the
proceedings or the outcome other than that granted to him by the
disputants, either expressly or by implication. Such authority can be
effectively revoked by the withdrawal of either disputant from the
process at any time. Conciliatory processes, therefore, are characterized
by: voluntary, consensual participation; private, usually informa,
proceedings under party control; the application of norms selected by the

4. Id. at 17.
5. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG,
RESOLUTION 5-7 (1985).

E.D. GREEN,

& FRANK E.A. SANDER, DISPUTE

6. Id. See generally Bryant Garth, The Movement Toward ProceduralInformalism
in North America and Western Europe: A Critical Survey, in 2 THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE 183, 185 (Richard Abel ed., 1982). The author distinguishes three sets
of goals: (1) "making rights effective," (2) "conciliation," and (3) "diversion." Id.
7. See DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 6 (adjudicative processes) and 108
(conciliatory processes). Much of the following paragraphs in the text describing the
distinction are drawn from the Dictionary.
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parties, or the creation of relevant norms for the situation; and a
bicentric solution.
Litigation is part of an adjudicative process in which the third party
has the power to impose a solution. Litigation is the determination of a
dispute by a court, the aim of which is to impose settlement by a binding
declaration of the respective rights and duties of the parties. 9 A binding
decision necessitates some form of social control, usually the state,
which enforces the result. It is not surprising that in order for a decision
to be enforced by the state, it must have been reached through a process
which conforms to norms acceptable to the state. Litigation has many
characteristics which legitimate state enforcement, including the rational
application of a consistent set of known substantive and procedural rules
to achieve a predictable result, an outcome insulated from bias and
circumstances deemed "irrelevant," and the opportunity for the
disputants to present their cases and respond to each other's arguments.'
In the English (and American) tradition, the proceedings are formal and
public, with an adversarial presentation often accomplished through the
use of legal professionals, as the basis of the decision making. Decisions
do not require party participation nor do they have to be mutually
acceptable; therefore, adjudicative solutions are "either/or," with clear
winners and losers-"unicentric" solutions.
When classifying arbitration as an adjudicative process, Lon Fuller
defined adjudicative processes as those "in which opposing parties
whose interests are affected present proofs and arguments to an impartial
third party, who then decides in favor of one side on the basis of this
presentation."" In Fuller's model, the decision maker is passive and
impartial and does not initiate the process. The parties present their
proofs and arguments in an adversarial manner, thereby forcing a
refinement and narrowing of the issues that separate them. The decision
maker suspends his decision until all is heard, bases the decision on the
presentation only, and states the decision in terms of applicable rules or
8. Mediation differs from adjudication not only in the different role for the third
party (judge orders, mediator persuades), but also in that adjudication is oriented toward
achieving conformity to norms while mediation seeks to create the relevant norms
themselves for the disputants.
Therefore, mediation can cement and terminate
relationships more efficiently. Lon Fuller, Mediaion-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 305, 308 (1971). This sets up an inherent conflict between the enforcement
and administration of legal rules and the mediation process. Central to the very notion of
law is the concept of rules. Id. at 328.
9. For a more detailed definition, see DICTIONARY, supra note 3,at 260-61.
10. See PETER STEIN, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE
SETrLEMENT 14 (1984); see also MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1-37 (1981).
1I. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, [ON L. FULLER 90-91 (1984) (summarizing LON L. FULLER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 706-07 (1949)).
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standards, giving the parties criteria of relevance and a principled and
reasoned decision.12
Another factor distinguishing conciliatory from adjudicative
processes is how the third party frames the conflict. A third party in an
adjudicative process will look backward over time to reconstruct events
and classify them in terms of applicable rules or standards, i.e., norms.
When this happens, a conflict of interest tends to be formulated as a
dissensus, a conflict of value or belief. In litigation, for example, the
issues must be framed within the normative structure of the law before
the court can make a determination. 13 In contrast, the third party in a
conciliatory process will seek consensus by urging the parties to come to
an agreement by appealing to their own interests. A conflict of value or
belief, therefore, would have to be de-ideologized and reframed as a
conflict of interests.
Finally, an important observation regarding the distinction between
adjudicative and conciliatory is that a dispute processing mechanism can
have a combination of conciliatory and adjudicative characteristics.
Usually, it will have some or all of the characteristics typical of the
category it is in; for example, most court adjudication has strict formal
procedure, adversarial presentation, a recognized set of applicable legal
rules, professional judges and lawyers, and reasoned unicentric awards.
It is possible, however, for a process to have many of the characteristics
of one category, yet not belong in that category. A good example is that
of the so-called "mini-trial," which typically starts with an abbreviated
adversarial presentation for the purpose of stimulating settlement
negotiations.14 Because of the flexibility of the arbitral process, a given
arbitration can display characteristics of various other processes, thereby
making it difficult to distinguish from other processes. Arbitration can
be extremely informal or highly formal. It can be non-binding, employ
12. Id.
13. See Torstein Eckhoff, The Mediator, the Judge, and the Administrator in
Conflict Resolution, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 145 (B.M. Blegvad
ed., 1966). See also Vilhelm Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict
and Conflict Resolution, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 26 (1963), in which the author suggests
that an adjudicator cannot handle a pure conflict of interests and requires a normative
framework in order to be freed from having to stay "middle-of-the-road" or to ally
himself with one of the parties. A similar argument is presented in SHAPIRO, supra note
10, at 5-13.
14. DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 295-99. The primary purpose of the adjudicative
aspects of hybridized ADR processes such as the mini-trial is to overcome negotiation
impasses by providing some reality testing through an evaluation of the legal case.
Consequently, some authorities classify such processes as "evaluative" rather than
conciliatory or adjudicative.
NANCY H.

See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER &

ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

PROCESSES 103-240 (2d ed. 1992).

NEGOTIATION,

MEDIATION,

AND OTHER
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informal procedures, and apply customary norms or intuitive notions of
justice. It can resemble a court proceeding with formal adversarial
presentations and the application of substantive rules of law to achieve a
binding judgment.
As recognized in English law, arbitration is an adjudicative
mechanism in which the third party, the arbitrator, makes a binding
determination of the dispute as a final settlement which can be enforced
by the state.' 5 If the decision had no binding effect, then it would be
15. This is my definition. "Unfortunately," as one modem treatise observes,
"English law does not provide a comprehensive answer to the question, 'What is an
arbitration?.' MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 41 (1982). None of the many statutes concerning
arbitration have attempted to define the process. Few judicial decisions attempt a definition
more complicated than "[a] reference to the decision of one or more persons of some matter
or matters in difference between the parties." Collins v. Collins, 53 Eng. Rep. 916, 918
(M.R. 1858). This definition, however, fails to distinguish arbitration from the decision of a
court on one hand, and the elicited opinion of a neutral expert or a conciliator on the other.
An etymological inquiry proves equally uninformative. "Arbitration" is a variant of the Old
French "arbitracion" whose root is in the Latin "arbitrar" meaning "to examine or give
judgment." OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 426 (2000). It is difficult to determine when
"arbitration" came into use as a legal term in England. It may have been used in non-legal
contexts prior to its use in a legal context; for example, "That a man... putte hym al outrely
in the arbitracion and luggement... of hise enemys." Id. By the end of the thirteenth
century, however, the phrase, "put themselves upon," is found combined with "arbitrium"
meaning "judgment." For example, "Et pares petuni diem ad concordandum usque in
crastinum et ponunt se in omnibus in arbitrio Bartholomei de Acre." (And the parties crave
a day on which to make concord on the morrow, and they submit themselves in all things to
the judgment of Bartholomew of Acre.) Records of the Fair Court of St. Ives (1287 a.d.), in
I SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT 1270-1638, at 18 (Seldon Society No.
23, Charles Gross ed., 1908). It is possible that the phrase was adapted from the then
common formula "ponunt se super patriam" (put themselves upon the state) to signify
joiner of issue and submittal of the dispute to determination by the state. See 2 FREDERICK
POLLOCK, SIR & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 624 (1 st
ed. 1895). Whatever the source, it quickly evolved that parties would "submit to an
arbitrement." "Arbitrement," or the latinized "arbitrament," is defined in the earliest
English legal dictionaries as the award or judgment itself. Les Tennes de la Ley (1533)
defines "Arbitrement" as:
an Award, Determination, or Judgement, which one or more makes at the
request of two parties at the least, for and upon some Debt, Trespass, or other
Controversie had between them. And it is called in Latin Arbitratus, and
Arbitriuni; and they that make the Award or Arbitrement are called Arbitri, in
English Arbitrators.
See LES TERMES DE LA LEY 54 (abr. ed. London 1533) (ascribed to William Rastell by
Lord Coke in his preface to his Tenth Report according to page A3 of the 1671 ed.);
accord JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER (London 1672). By its tenth edition, Jacob's
Law Dictionary did not even bother to define "arbitrement," being content to lump the
matter under "Award." JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY (T.E. Tomlins ed., 10th ed. London
1797). These old definitions, however, provide little clue as to the process which yielded
the award other than that it was a form of judgment. Early legal commentators tended to
define and distinguish the process by focussing either on the "submission" (the agreement
to submit to and abide by the judgment of another) or on the award itself. One of the
oldest treatises, West's Synboleography (1601), provides quite simply: "A Compromise
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merely advisory and thus in the nature of conciliation. Although
arbitration as used in England today is not a conciliatory process,
historically it was conciliatory and continues to reflect characteristics of
such processes. The imposition of law and the ingrained societal habits
of disputing practice, however, have imposed upon arbitration most of
the characteristics found in English litigation, leading one court to
observe, "the whole difference [between judicial determination and
arbitration] is that [arbitration] is a tribunal chosen by the parties
themselves."' 6
Consent to and choice of tribunal may distinguish arbitration from
litigation, but even so there may be varying degrees of consent and free
choice that blur the distinction. This distinction is blurred further by the
indiscriminate use of the term "arbitration" to describe any simple and
speedy determination of a cause without reference to a formal procedure.
English law labels as "arbitration" an entire class of dispute processing
mechanisms that are compulsory rather than consensual. There are
statutes which mandate the arbitration of specified classes of disputes;
or Submission, Arbitrium, Compromissum, Submissio, is the faciltie or power of
pronouncing Sentence betweene persons at controversie, given to Arbitrators by the
parties mutuall private consent, without publike authoritie." WILLIAM WEST, THE SECOND
PART OF THE SYMBOLEOGRAPHY 163 (London 1601) (citing Y.B. 8 Eliz. 4, pl. 2.). The first
modem treatise on the subject also defines the process by its elements:
That act, by which parties refer any matter in dispute between them to the
decision of a third person, is called a submission; the person to whom the
reference is made, an arbitrator; when the reference is made to more than one,
and provision made, that in case they shall disagree, another shall decide, that
one is called an umpire; the judgment pronounced by an arbitrator, or
arbitrators, an award; that by an umpire, an umpirage, or, less properly, an
award.
STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AWARDS 4-5 (London 1791). More recently,

Mustill and Boyd (1982) devoted twenty-two pages to the definition of arbitration and
identified seven attributes that must be present in order for a given process to qualify as
an arbitration recognized under English law. See MUSTILL & BOYD, supra, at 32-54.
Briefly, the seven attributes are:
(i) The decision is intended to be binding;
(ii) Parties whose substantive rights are affected are participants in the process;
(iii)Jurisdiction derives either from consent of the parties, order of a court, or
from a statute which specifies the use of arbitration;
(iv)The parties either chose the tribunal or the method by which the tribunal is
selected;
(v) The procedure must be impartial and fair;
(vi)The arbitration agreement must be intended to be enforceable; and
(vii)The contemplated process envisions the appointment of a tribunal after the
dispute has been formulated.
Id. at 43. These parameters certainly narrow the field, but are Mustill and Boyd
describing the same process described by West almost four centuries earlier? Clearly, it
is difficult to precisely define the arbitral process.
16. Doe d. Lloyd v. Evans, 172 Eng. Rep. 394, 395 (N.P. 1827) ("[A] matter comes
as adversely before arbitrators as before any another tribunal.").
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courts can compel the arbitration of certain matters before them; and
membership in certain professional or trade associations, or control by a
regulatory body, may require arbitration of certain disputes. These
"arbitrations" may even be governed by current, general arbitration
statutes; but for purposes of this Article, such "arbitrations" are not ADR
processes because "alternative" implies choice and "compulsory
arbitration" is thus a misnomer. In actuality, this form of dispute
processing is part of the state judicial machinery. The use of informal,
arbitration-like, judicial procedure by public 7 tribunals is judicial
informalism or informal litigation, not arbitration.'
One notable feature of arbitration is that the tribunal cannot directly
enforce its award, unlike much of judicial informalism. In many cases,
however, the state has allowed private organizations to use arbitration as
a form of self-government and self-regulation by sanctioning compulsory
arbitration among the organization's membership and by approving the
use of internal discipline by these tribunals as a mode of enforcing their
own awards.
The line between informal litigation and arbitration has been, and
often remains, obscure.
On one hand, courts have incorporated
consensual arbitration in their procedures and have adopted "arbitrationlike" informality, while on the other hand, arbitration proceedings can
take place before court judges, be more coercive than consensual, and
reflect all the formality of classical litigation. As discussed herein, the
distinctions, or the lack thereof, have important implications.
C. HistoricalPerspectives
The history of arbitration in England has been largely ignored.' 8 It
is a matter that seems to fall in the gap between social and legal
historians. Of the very few historical approaches to arbitration, the social
historical focus seems to be: What does arbitration tell us about English
society at a certain point in time?; while the legal historical approach is:
What does arbitration tell us about the history and development of law or
17. For this distinction, see generally Richard Abel, lnformnalism: A Tactical
Equivalent to Law, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 375 (1985). In judicial informalism,
officials of the court or government make binding determinations while imposing their
own, usually informal, procedure. In contrast, the essence of private arbitration is nonjudicial third party judgment in which the parties choose the tribunal, mode of procedure,
and the extent to which they are bound by the solution. In arbitration, the parties
determine the jurisdiction of the tribunal, while in judicial informalism, tribunal
jurisdiction is predetermined frequently by statute.
18. As illustrated by the dearth of material on arbitration in such authoritative legal
histories as: POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 15; THEODORE PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (4th ed. 1948) (5th ed. 1956); and JOHN HAMILTON
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (2d ed. 1979).
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the law pertaining to arbitration? The obvious but much ignored
question is: What does the history of arbitration tell us about arbitration
itself as a dispute resolution process?
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is made all the more
difficult by one of the primary characteristics of the arbitral process. For
most of their history, arbitral tribunals, unlike the courts, did not rely on
and therefore did not produce written records of their operation. This
alone is instructive, for unlike the courts, arbitration did not require
permanent tribunals, nor did it produce or rely upon a body of precedent
unique to its function. It was up to the courts and Parliament to provide
substantive law and permanence, and it is upon these same legal
institutions that one must generally rely for written evidence about the
arbitral process. Much of this evidence is not about the process; instead,
it is about the legal conceptualization of the process. As a result, any
conclusions about the nature of arbitral proceedings prior to the twentieth
century are necessarily speculative,' 9 but the historical role of law and
the legal system in institutionalizing arbitration is fairly clear.
The orthodox legal historical view is that arbitration was and is
merely a primitive form of adjudication that declined as regular courts
were established by the state. The source of this view can be traced to
Henry Maine, who like so many intellectuals in the late nineteenth
century, was greatly influenced by evolutionary theory. He noted that in
early courts "the magistrate carefully simulated the demeanor of a private
arbitrator casually called in." 20 This notion was adopted by Holdsworth,
who opined that early courts were tribunals of arbitration dependent on
consent; therefore, the "practice of arbitration.., comes, so to speak,
naturally to primitive bodies of law.'
Some social historians have
echoed this view by using evidence of the increased use of arbitration as
symptomatic of breakdowns in the social order and in the diminished
efficacy of the courts.2 2
Orthodoxy further insists that common law and the courts were
relentlessly hostile to this extrajudicial process until they effectively
subjugated or absorbed it as a lower tribunal, and that the continuous use

19. Institutions providing arbitration as a service emerged only toward the end of the
nineteenth century, thereby producing more documentation on procedural rules and
practices within their own tribunals.
20.

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, SIR, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY

HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 374 (10th ed. London 1861).
21. 14 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, SIR, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (A.L. Goodhart

& H.G. Hanbury eds., 1964).
22. See R.L. STORY, THE END OF THE HOUSE OF LANCASTER 155 (1966); see also
JoHN G. BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

114 (1972); RALPH ALAN GRIFFITHS, THE REIGN OF HENRY VI 596 (1981).

2004]

THE DEATH OF ADR

of arbitration merely reflects a desire to avoid courts.23
Some
commentators view arbitration primarily as a commercial tradition
descending virtually undisturbed since ancient times. 24 Understandably,
all the legal historical approaches are dominated by the predilection 25
to
trace the development of legal principles governing modem arbitration.
The development of arbitration law is generally described as a
progressive movement to correct a historically primitive and defective
adjudicative process.
Recently, this orthodoxy has been tempered by legal anthropologists
who have questioned the origins of arbitration 26 and been contradicted by
legal and social historians who have acknowledged a cooperative and
symbiotic relationship between arbitration and courts.
The ethos of
arbitration as a process, however, can only be understood through tracing
the way in which it was primarily used and institutionalized over time as
the next two sections of this Article attempt to do.
11.

Arbitration as a Conciliatory Process

A. Love Versus Law: Arbitration in the Communal Tradition
1.

Legal Recognition of the Value of Reconciliation

For highly interdependent communities, processes that encourage
reconciliation have an undeniable social logic. Disputants are either
23. See, e.g., 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 187; W. SUMMERFIELD, THE LAW OF
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS I (1929); Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial
Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928). Typical are the comments of Lord Hailsham in
his Forward, in which he notes the "remarkable" growth of arbitration and the equally
"remarkable" change in attitude of the courts from "jealousy and aversion" to providing
"valuable assistance ...in the provision of speedy justice," from a fear of being "ousted" to
"lending sanction and assistance." Q.M. HOGG (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM), THE LAW OF
ARBITRATION (1935).
24. See PARKER OF WADDINGTON, LORD, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Jerusalem 1959); see also Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial

Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-56 (1961). But see Earl S. Wolaver, The
HistoricalBackground of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PENN. L. REV. 132 (1934-35)
(finding no evidence of arbitration among the commercial communities of England's
medieval period).
25. See, e.g.. 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2 1, at 187-95.
26. See Richard Abel, Mediation in Pre-Capitalist Societies, 3 WINDSOR Y.B. OF
ACCESS TO JUST. 175 (1983).
27. See STEIN, supra note 10, at 16. For a social historical perceptive and thoughtful
approach, see Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century
England, 2 L. & HIST. REV. 21 (1984) [hereinafter Powell (1984)], and Edward Powell,
Arbitration and the Law in England in the Late Middle Ages, 33 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
HIST. Soc'Y 49 (5th Series 1983) [hereinafter Powell (1983)].
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"brought together by love or separated by judgment." 28 This statement,
attributed to Henry I (circa 1100 A.D.), contrasts the divisive forces of
legal judgment with the conciliatory forces of amicable settlement. In
the feudal agrarian village, survival depended on cooperative
relationships among the inhabitants and on community cohesion.
Disputants could easily resort to violence, while the policing powers of
the state often were directed elsewhere and were too weak to contain
such violence, much less impose the decisions of courts. 29 Legal
judgment, particularly from outside the community, imposed a solution
without necessarily resolving the underlying conflict between the
disputants. Law courts could make judgments, but they could not make
peace between the parties. 30 Norms external to the community and
unicentric solutions deduced from adversarial proceedings were likely to
breed resentment and exacerbate conflict, particularly in ongoing
relationships. Amicable settlement, on the other hand, was, and is by
definition today, a process in which the parties had to compromise their
competing interests and reconcile their underlying conflicts in order to
reach a lasting solution. 3 1 Reconciliation allowed for continued
cooperation and contributed to survival.
Thus, in the stateless conditions of the early Middle Ages, love and
law were recognized as opposite ways to resolve disputes, and love was
equal to or more powerful than law. 32 The Anglo-Saxon king, Ethelred,
decreed that in resolving a dispute "a thane has two choices, lufu (love)
or lagu (law), and he that chooses love is as much bound by that as he
would be by a judgment. ' ' 3 3 Lufu in this context refers to amicable
28. LEGES HENRICI PRIMI 100 (L.J. Downer ed., 1972).
29. The Crown lacked sufficient resources to enforce a primarily punitive and
coercive system of justice. With no standing army or salaried police force, the state
depended on the cooperation of local society for the administration of justice. With a
weak coercive apparatus to serve the courts and an influential local community, "it is
inevitable that the mediatory, restitutive functions of justice would prevail over the
punitive." Powell (1983), supra note 27, at 50.
30. Stephen D. White, "Pactunm ...Legum Vincit et Arnor Judiciun" The Settlement
of Disputes by Compromise in Eleventh-Century France,22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 281, 308
(1978).
31. For the traditional anthropological explanation of the advantages inherent in
conciliatory modes, see generally MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955), and P. H. GULLIVER, SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN
AFRICAN SOCIETY (1963).

32.

Michael Clanchy, Law and Love in the Middle Ages, in DISPUTES AND

SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND HUMAN RELATIONS INTHE WEST 48 (John Bossy ed., 1983).

33.

King Ethelred's Code Issued at Wantage (circa 978-1008 A.D.), 3 Ethelred 13.3,

as translated in I ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 402, 405 (1955), translatedalso in
THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMOUND TO HENRY 1, at 70-71 (1925)

("where a thegn has a choice of two things, amicable settlement or legal process, and he
chooses settlement, that is to be as binding as a legal sentence.") A "thane" denotes a
free person in the realm.
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settlement, 34 which for many presented a better alternative than the other
processes available: violent self-help or trial, the latter of which may
have included ordeal or formal battle leading to possible death, maiming,
immediate imprisonment, or outlawry. 35 To pursue a cause at law was to
relinquish control over the outcome and submit to "incerta penitus alea
placitorum" (the utterly uncertain dice of pleas).36 Accordingly, Henry I
emphasized the distinction between law and love by recognizing the
supremacy of love:
"Pactum legem vincit et amor iudicium..."
(agreement prevails over law and love over judgment), 37 a principle
echoed later by Glanvill: "generaliterverum est quod conventio legum
vincit. . ." (it is generally true that agreement prevails over law). 38
Religious institutions reinforced secular law in this regard. The
concept of Christian love and the efforts of the Church to secure peace
among fellow Christians influenced amicable settlement.
Biblical
references are numerous, including: "love thy neighbor," "love thy
enemies," "agree with thine adversary quickly" or he may deliver you to
the judge and jail, and the advice of Paul to avoid lawsuits because they
must be heard before non-Christian courts.39 Clerics were instructed to
encourage and not to impede peaceful extrajudicial dispute resolution.40
The gloss on one thirteenth century English canon states that it is the
"duty of prelates to coerce both clerics and laymen to peace (pacem)
rather than to Judgment (Iudicium)."4'
Reconciliation makes sense in other forms of community, not just
villages.
Trade and parish guilds provided extrajudicial dispute
resolution "[flor rest unity and peace.., and for a more convenient
remedy, and more profitable, than process and rigour of the law.' ' 2 A
regulation in one small parish provided: "If any brother or sister offend
34.
35.

ANGLO-SAXON DICTIONARY 648 (T.

Northcote Toler ed., 1882).

See generally Stein, supra note 10, at 30-3 1; see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 21, at 60, 310-11; 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 170, 195.
36. LEGES HENRICI PRIM], supra note 28, at 156.

37. Id. at 164.
38. THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 129 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965).
39. Matthew 22:39; Mark 12:31; Matthew 5:44; Matthew 5:25; 1 Cor. 6.
40. For several examples of restrictions on church officials from exacting fees or
fines after disputants reached an agreement, see J.W. Bennett, The Medieval Loveday, 33
SPECULUM 351, 358 (1955).

41.

Id. (citing the canon of Stephen as recorded in

WILLIAM

LYNDWOOD,

PROVINCIALE 72 n.i (Oxford 1679)).
42. J.B. Post, Equitable Resorts Before 1450, in LAW, LITIGANTS, AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE FOURTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE AT

THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM, 10-13 JULY 1979, at 68, 73 n. 17 (E.W. Ives & A.H.
Manchester eds., Royal Historical Society Studies in History Series No. 36, London
1983) (citing LONDON MERCERS' HALL, BOOK OF ORDINANCES C. 1465, no. xl (circa

1391-1464)).
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another in word or deed, let him not implead him until the alderman,
dean, and brothers have tried to make accord."'4 3 Or again: "If any men
of the company be wrath, they shall take two men of the brothers to
accord them, and if they may not accord them they pay a penny to the
light [presumably an offering
as a penalty] and pursue to the common
4
law wheresoever they will."
The superior social utility of amicable settlement over legal
judgment was recognized by the courts, which promoted the former and
were empowered by Henry I to proceed by love as well as law: ". . . all
disputes which are brought to the notice of the shire court shall be settled
thereat, either by amicable arrangement or by the rigour of judgment. 45
In addition, there was a widespread judicial acceptance of charters, or
placitum, to create legal record of settlements.46 Thus in practice, love
dominated law, and courts recognized and promoted compromise more
often than granting judgment.
2.

Lovedays and the Institutionalization of Arbitration as a
Conciliatory Process

With reconciliation as a highly valued function of dispute
resolution, it is not surprising that there was a recognized social
institution for the amicable settlement of disputes. A "Loveday" (jour
d'amour, dies amoris, dies ad concordandum, and dies concordandi)
referred to any day on which disputants sought reconciliation.4 7 Derived
perhaps from the same alliterative phrase, law and love, is the contrast
between the "lawday," the day on which the courts met to determine
43.
44.

Id. at 73.
Id.

45. Alleged Laws of Henry I, at VII, in 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 459
(1953). In describing eleventh to twelfth century judicial conduct, one legal historian
notes:
What was usually expected of a law court was not a clear cut decision, of right
or wrong ... but much more something in the nature of an effort to bring about
settlement of the litigation by an acceptable, honourable compromise. This
might be brought about by the mediation of the court ...or jurors from the
neighborhood or arbiters, accepted or even elected by the parties ..... The
feeling seems to have been that a real court decision of right or wrong,
excluding anything that looked like a compromise, was a harsh and extreme
measure.
ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 41-42 (R.C. van
Caenegem ed., Seldon Society No. 77, 1959).
46. See generally Wormald, Charters,Law and the Settlement of Disputes in AngloSaxon England, in THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 149
(Wendy Davies & Paul Fouracre eds., 1986).
47. These terms appear to be synonymous; however, "loveday" appears to have been
more common in the records of the lowest civil courts such as those of the manor,
borough, and fair, while a "day of concord" conforms to the usage in the higher courts.
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controversies, and the "loveday," the day on which parties met to
peacefully resolve their disputes outside of the courts.48 It appears to
have been an institution unique to England. 49 The loveday was common
in the Anglo-Norman period 50 and persisted into the late Middle Ages.
Courts recognized lovedays by suspending cases at the disputants'
request. 5'
What occurred during a loveday was simply not a concern of the
courts. Although the procedure for requesting and granting a loveday in
court appears quite formalized in the early Middle Ages, there is no
record of court intervention in procedural aspects of the loveday
processes themselves. Of lovedays generally, the minimal procedural
requirements were perhaps a kiss between the disputants and an offering
to the church accompanied by an oath.52 If the dispute had been a case
pending in court, a successful loveday was recorded simply as having
53
resolved the case and a party was left responsible for the amercements.
As long as the courts got their share, the manner in which a case was
resolved was irrelevant.
Although the loveday did not require the intervention of third
parties as arbitrators to help the disputants resolve the matter, such
methods were commonly employed from the Anglo-Saxon period to the
late Middle Ages. 54 A review of thirty-five Anglo-Saxon court cases
reveals that almost half were "compromised" or the parties were
48. See generally Bennett, supra note 40, at 359. For a list of printed editions of
local court rolls from this period with references to lovedays, see Clanchy, supra note 32,
at 66-67.
49. See generally Bennett, supra note 40; compare J.W. Spargo, Chaucer's LoveDays, 15 SPECULUM 36 (1940). Spargo argued that the loveday was specifically a day for
which a court gave license for the parties to arbitrate. Bennett, however, attacked
Spargo's position and presented an argument supporting the proposition that "loveday"
referred to any day for reconciliation whether a court was involved or not.
50. See THE COURT BARON 20, 47, 57, 74 (Frederic Maitland & William Baildon
eds., Seldon Society No. 4, 189 1).
51. See id. at 74 for an example of the recommended legal formula for requesting a
loveday and suspending the cause.
52. Bennett, supra note 40, at 352-53, 359.
53. As suggested in the example proffered in THE COURT BARON, supra note 50, at
20.
54. As evidenced by a Middle English poem on lovedays which consists of 200 lines
of precepts for lords acting as arbitrators. See John M. Bowers, A Middle English Poem
on Lovedays, 47 MOD. LANGUAGE REV. 374 (1952); see also Murray, Arbitration in the
Anglo-Saxvon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARB. J. 193 (1961). Compare Sayre, supra
note 23, at 597 ("There is apparently no germ of arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon
law .. "). Sayre also said there is authority for arbitration in the canon law dating back
to the seventh century, but he provided no reference to sources. He assumed, along with
the author of one of the earliest treatises on the subject, Stewart Kyd, that English
arbitration has its roots in canon law and ultimately in Roman law, both classical and
Justinian. See KYD, supra note 15.
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"reconciled" by the intervention of the then King or by "friends" of the
parties.5 5 One modem observer of this period notes: "how rarely the
parties were allowed to push their differences to a final judgment. A
compromise was almost always affected where compromise was
possible. Arbitration was, perhaps, the habitual mode of settling disputes
among the Anglo-Saxons. 56 Likewise during the Norman period,
disputants may have initiated lawsuits, but they avoided legal judgment,
as evidenced by the fact that comparatively few cases reported in the
early Year Books ever came to any definitive conclusion.
To some extent, the use of arbitration as a conciliatory rather than
adjudicative process may account for the settlement rate. 57 Bearing in
mind that it is difficult to speculate on the exact nature of the arbitral
process because written evidence of early medieval English arbitration is
so meager, arbitration during this period appears to have been more
conciliatory than adjudicative. During the era of lovedays, the arbitral
process reflected the values inherent in the concept of love and served
the communal interest by reconciling disputants and allowing the
application of community norms. Reconciliation was the raison d'tre
of loveday arbitration. For example, the earliest written evidence of
secular loveday arbitration in England, found in a letter from a neutral
appointed at the instruction of King Alfred to resolve a land dispute,
hints at a conciliatory process. The correspondent says that upon
"reconciling them at Wardour," the neutrals proffered their opinion, to
which one party agreed to assent after the neutrals explained to the King
how they reached their decision. 58 The arbitrators appear to have
55.

Murray, supra note 54, at 196 (construing cases from ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON

LAW (1876), at 311, 313, 314, 320, 324, 335, 338, 347, 355, 360, 363, 368, 377).
56. Henry Adams, The Anglo-Saxon Courts of Law, in ESSAYS IN ANGLO-SAXON
LAW 26, 53 (1876). It was certainly preferable to the existing legal system. Adams notes
that under the crude legal system of Edward the Confessor, parties would compromise to
avoid delays, consequences, and uncertainties of strict law, and that:
arbitration was a more attractive resort... than the ordinary judgment of a
regular tribunal. In a society which had no confidence either in its judges, its
judicial process, or its very law itself,-which could devise no system of
reform in the practice, nor of equitable protection against the evils of that
law,-it was certainly not surprising that men should seek a remedy outside the
public tribunals .....
Id. at 26-27.
57. "Most judicial suits proceeded openly at this time by way of arbitration. That
the same principle was continuously at work probably explains why so few cases seem to
come to any conclusion in the Middle Ages." SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S
BENCH UNDER EDWARD 1,at xvii n.4 (G.O. Sayles ed., Seldon Society No. 55, 1936). It
should be noted, however, that the courts in the time of Henry III
were allowing the filing
of chirographs as a legal record of the terms of a settlement in a suit. Many parties were
filing suit in order to record a chirograph. See CIVIL PLEAS OF THE WILTSHIRE EYRE 1249,
at 21-27 (M.T. Clanchy ed., 1971).
58. Letter from Ordlaf (circa 800 A.D.), in I ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 501
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provided good offices, acted as mediators, and given an award; however,
the award in this case was non-binding and did not settle the matter until
the defendant accepted it and swore to obey it.
Using evidence of contemporary dispute processing in the Church
and in France, and evidence of later medieval arbitration in England, it is
possible to conclude that early "loveday arbitration" was hardly
distinguishable from mediation. Before the revival of Roman law in the
twelfth century, the Church utilized an extra-curial informal process akin
to the Roman law "amicable agreement." This was more in the nature of
mediation than judging.59 After Roman law pervaded the system, this
conciliatory process was assimilated by associating it with the Roman
legal concept of transaction, in which the litigants were encouraged to
transact, i.e., find the solution themselves, rather than to seek legal
judgment. 60 No writing was required so there are no records of the
procedural aspects of such cases.
In contrast, Roman law also contained a sophisticated system of
arbitration, 61 aspects of which were adapted to Church use during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. At the very least, some of the
terminology for arbitration used by canonists found its way into the
secular courts. The submission, or compromissum, and the award, or
arbitrium, were the two stages of the process in early usage that were
clearly recognized and usually committed to writing. Procedure was
usually at the discretion of the arbitrators and came to be loosely based
on the main principles of trial procedure at canon law. 62 With the
involvement of and domination by canonists in these proceedings, it is
not surprising that ecclesiastical arbitration procedure imitated canon law
trial procedure. This, however, did not displace the preexisting form of
informal arbitration akin to mediation.
During the Roman law revival, the existing conciliatory practice of
a third party helping disputants transact an agreement or compose an
accord conflicted with the formal Roman law arbitral concepts described
in the Corpus Iuris Civilis.6 3 In the twelfth century, this conflict led to
(1955).
59. Linda Fowler, Forms of Arbitration, 5 MONUMENTA IURIS CANONICI, SERIES C:
SUBSIDIA 133, 134-35 (Proceedings of the Fourth Int'l Congress of Medieval Canon Law,

1976).
60. Id.
61. See I TIlE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 149, Book Four, Chapter VIII, para. I (T.
Mommsen et al. eds., 1985). "Compromissum ad similitudinem iudiciorum redigitur et
ad finiendas lites pertinet." Translation: "Arbitration resembles an action at law and is
intended to end litigation."
62. Powell (1983), supra note 27, at 54 (citing Janeau, L 'Arbitrageen Dauphin au
Moyen Age, REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANQAIS ET ETRANGER, 4th ser., xxiv-xxv, at

255-57 (1946-47)).
63. Fowler, supra note 59, at 134. Arbitration in the Corpus luris Civilis differed from
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many interesting and confusing distinctions between arbiters and
64
arbitrators. In an attempt to imbue the law with notions of conciliation
and charity advocated by the Church, canonists merged the Roman law
notion of an arbitrator with the amicabiliscompositor. An arbitrator was
expected to function in a conciliatory capacity and reestablish harmony
between the litigants.6 5 As in the amicable agreement, the arbitrator
relied on notions of equity to estimate how much one person might owe
another and to suggest solutions to the dispute, but he could not give
sentence; the outcome was an arbitratus,or transaction, facilitated by the
arbitrator,not an arbitrium given by the arbiter,who followed formality
in imitation of court judgment. 66 The secular loveday arbitration at
Wardour is illustrative of a process that is conceptually identical to the
amicable transaction and arbitratusin canon law.
Initially, both types of ecclesiastical arbitration appear to have been
limited to disputes between different ecclesiastical bodies. An early
English example is the 1173 A.D. dispute between the bishop of
Worcester and Oseney Abbey, referred to arbitration by the bishop of
Exeter acting as papal judge-delegate in the case. 67 The extension of
arbitral procedures by the Church to some of its disputes with the laity
may have influenced the use of arbitration in secular society. 68 Certainly,
evidence of secular arbitration increases in the late Middle Ages;
nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty
which, if any, Roman or canon law concepts directly or indirectly
influenced the principles and practice of arbitration in secular England.6 9
the practice of composing or reaching an accord in the twelfth century; according to the
Roman Jurist Paul, arbitration is in imitation of iudicia, Dig. 4.8.1, and according to Ulpian,
arbiters accept the role of judges in bringing trials to an end, Dig. 4.8.13..2. Arbitration as

Justinian described it disappeared with the iudicia after which it was modeled.
64. Under Roman law, an arbitrator acted on submissions to arbitrate contained
within a consensual contract as one of the terms, an arbitriumboni viri, while an arbiter
acted on submissions outside contracts, ex compromisso. See R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 85-86 (1985); see generallv Fowler, supra note 59, at 130-47 (a
discussion of various distinctions under canon law).
65. DAVID, supra note 64, at 86.
66. Other distinctions relating to relief from awards show that a parallel system of a
conciliatory process by arbitrators and a pseudo-judicial process by arbiters persisted in
the Church throughout the early Middle Ages. See generally Fowler, supra note 59.
Eventually, however, the distinctions between arbiters and arbitrators disappeared as
arbitrators were recognized gradually as having the same powers as arbiters. DAVID,
supra note 64, at 87.
67. Powell, supra note 27, at 54 (citing Chartulary of Oseney Abbey v. 3-4 (H.E.
Salter ed., Oxford Hist. Society, 1929-36)).

68. As implied by id.
69. No decisions on arbitration by the secular courts were based expressly on the
adoption of Roman law principles. It was not until Kyd's treatise in 1791 that the
parallels were documented and then only as an academic interest. See KYD, supra note
15. It is as likely that Roman law had minimal effect on actual arbitrations. Many
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The better-documented dispute resolution practices of fcudal
societies in France may provide some insight into arbitration in early
medieval England. Prior to the mid-thirteenth century, most disputes
among the upper classes in France, 70 if not resolved by violence, were
resolved by compromise agreement worked out by informal arbitrators or
mediators. 7'
The evidence from southern France indicates that
arbitrators were usually friends, relatives, or at least frequent associates
who because of their relationships with the disputants could apply
pressure on them to accept their awards or recognize their claims as
unjust or capable of compromise.72 In a society where resort to violent
self-help was common, and in which it was cowardly to retreat unless
convinced to do so by the "wisdom of others," arbitrators had to coax the
parties to a peaceful solution.7 3 Accordingly, the awards were almost
inevitably compromises, a division of the object in litigation; even when
the property went to one side, the other was paid off, and no one left
empty-handed.74 Compromise was so prevalent that it is impossible to
find a set of impersonal rational rules being applied. 75 Formal judicial
institutions, which could issue unicentric judgments, were more common
in western France; nevertheless, most disputes in that region also were
resolved through compromise agreement worked out with the help of
third parties and then later witnessed by the court.76
Because
compromises were not reached through a limited set of a few rules
deemed legally relevant, they took into account social concerns as well
as strict legal
concerns and helped reconcile parties, thereby reinforcing
77
ties.
social
Roman law concepts had been rejected in England by the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. See THOMAS EDWARD SCRUTTON, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN LAW ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND 194 (1885). As early as the twelfth century, laymen rather than clergy
constituted easily half of the judges. See generally RALPH V. TURNER, THE ENGLISH
JUDICIARY INTHE AGE OF GRANVILL AND BRACTON, C. 1176-1239 (1985).

70. It is important to note that disputes among or affecting the upper-classes
probably comprised the majority of disputes on record.
71. For southern France, see Fredric Cheyette, Suum Cuique Tribuere, 6 FRENCH
HIST. STUD. 287 (1970). For western France, see White, supra note 30.
72. Cheyette, supra note 71, at 292.
73. Id. at 295.
74. Id. at 293.
75. Id. The replacement of compromise settlements by decisions reached through
the application of fixed legal rules can only be explained by the break-up of social
groupings that gave individuals the persuasive power to mediate. Id. at 297.
76. White, supra note 30, at 307.
77. Although there is no evidence that English arbitration practices were adopted
directly from the French, many of the social, economic, and cultural factors were similar
in both France and England during the Middle Ages. Most disputes involved real
property or acts of violence resulting in bodily injury. It is likely that there were
similarities in arbitration practice that reflected the dispute processing needs of different
societies with similar requirements. I do not wish to belittle the differences. For a
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Even as legal recordkeeping improved in England, evidence about
loveday arbitration procedure remained obscure.
Court recorders
focused on the disposition of cases and were rarely interested in the outof-court events that may have promoted their resolution. There is,
however, a simple, consistent, procedural model exemplified by the
somewhat formulaic record of dePomeray v. Upton (1206 A.D.).78 In
this action on account, the plaintiff "put himself upon" two persons
whom he named and upon two others unnamed. The defendant did
likewise, and then both "put themselves upon" William de Neketon,79
who was apparently experienced in such matters, and "when the truth on
both sides had been heard," they promised to acquiesce in their
judgment. 8°
In a fifteenth century example, Richard Asser, a barber, accused
Nicholas Bradmor, "leech," of malpractice. Asser injured his thumb,
which Bradmor undertook to heal.
Asser accused Bradmore of
negligence after the thumb festered and had to be removed. In the
related arbitration, each chose one arbitrator and agreed to abide by their
award. The award directed that the disputants "were to kiss each other"
and that8 1Bradmor give Asser a gallon of wine, which they drank
together.
In an earlier medical malpractice dispute, the abbot of Bourne
complained that Robert Loke "undertook to cure and remove a sore
called a wen which had arisen and grown on the face of the abbot....
Apparently, Loke's treatment failed, and "their friends having
intervened," the parties chose one arbitrator each who "having heard the
complaints and defenses of the parties ... with diligent examination"
awarded the abbot "ten marks, and that they should amicably embrace
without thereafter having any action on either side.... ,,83
discussion of medieval arbitration practices which differ from those in France, see
William Ian Miller, Avoiding Legal Judgment: The Submission of Disputes to Arbitration
in Medieval Iceland, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1984), discussing arbitration in medieval
Iceland.
78. 1206 a.d. Easter Term, 7-8 John, 5 CURIA REGIS ROLL 42, 145 (H.M.S.O. 1931).
79. The jointly appointed arbitrator in this case could have been someone who was
familiar with accounts and therefore an expert on the panel, or he could have been an
umpire acceptable to both sides chosen to decide the matter if the party appointed
arbitrators failed in their efforts. We do know that Neketon was a lawyer who was
sufficiently skilled to represent the archbishop of Canterbury. See 4 CURIA REGIS ROLLS
15 (H.M.S.O. 193 1).
80. For a brief discussion of this case, see CYRIL FLOWER, INTRODUCTION TO THE
CURIA REGIS ROLLS 292 (Seldon Society No. 62, 1945).
81. 7 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH 162-63 (G.O. Sayles ed.,
Seldon Society No. 88, 1971).
82. 2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS FROM THE KING'S COURTS 1307-1399, at 53-54
(M.S. Arnold ed., Seldon Society No. 103, 1987).
83. Id.
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In the later part of the fifteenth century, two rival ancient guilds, the
Skinners and the Taylors, after fighting over seniority during the Lord
Mayor's procession on the Thames, agreed to abide by the judgment of
the mayor, Robert Billesdon. The award provided that the guilds
alternate precedence each year, and as their barges approached
Westminster, lash them together and drink a toast.8 4
Extrapolating from these examples and the evidence of arbitration
practices in the medieval Church and in France, the typical loveday
arbitration had four elements. First, there was the agreement, usually
oral, between the disputants to "put themselves upon friends." These
agreements occurred after a dispute arose and often after the intervention
of mediators. Second, and usually simultaneously with the agreement,
the disputants chose and empowered arbitrators, each side choosing an
equal number of friends or representatives. Third, the arbitrators would
meet to determine the matter. There appeared to be no set procedure or
manner of hearing, and the hearing that evidently took place in the case
of the abbott's wen sounds more inquisitorial than adversarial. Fourth,
the arbitrators would issue an award, which would have no binding force
at law.
The entire process was completely voluntary and controlled by the
parties. A disputant could impede the proceedings by refusing to appoint
arbitrators or merely revoking the arbitrator's authority at any time
before the award.85 Neither submissions nor awards were specifically
enforceable through the courts. In fact, the courts were not available
either to apply coercion or to otherwise intervene in the arbitral process.
The courts supported the process, however, to the extent that they treated
an executed or satisfied award as an accord and satisfaction, barring
subsequent legal actions on the same matter. 86 A modern commentator
describes such arbitration as "natural" or "free will" arbitration, free
from the coercive powers of the courts and proceeding solely on good
87
faith and the willingness of the disputants to compromise.
It would have been rare for the disputants to have been strangers,
and the involvement of mediators and "friends" as arbitrators reflects the
community's interest in restoring peace between the parties. With an
equal number of arbitrators on each side and lacking a "tie-breaker," the

84. For an abbreviated account, see Martin Hunter, Arbitration Procedure in
England: Past, Presentand Future, 1 ARB. INT'L 82 (1985). The commercial side of the

dispute was that both guilds were engaged in the making of fur-lined gowns. Today, the
masters and wardens of the two guilds dine with each other twice a year. Id.
85. See Y.B. 21 Hen. 6, Hil. fl. 14; see also Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 59899 (K.B. 1610).
86.
87.

14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 193.
FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (1952).
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determination of the award must have been more akin to negotiation
through representatives. The award could be arrived at through the
application of community norms or intuitive notions of justice without
reference to substantive or procedural law. The award could cover any
and all disputes between the parties, not just those for which there was a
writ or technical "joiner" of issues. Consequently, it is reasonable to
assume that recognition of the broader context of a dispute was a
necessary part of reaching an amicable agreement.8 8
The awards themselves were more often highly conciliatory in tone,
showing an attempt to "save face" and delicately balance the interests of
both parties, providing something for each disputant. For example, in
1450 while arbitrating a dispute over ownership of the Tong Manor in
Shropshire, the two arbitrators, Ralph, lord Sudeley, and John Talbot,
awarded possession to Sir Richard Vernon, but insisted that the rival
claimant receive compensation of £60.89 In another title dispute in
Cheshire, the Breretons prevailed, but the opposing Mainwarings
received £56 6s. 8d. for releasing the property from their claim of title. 90
In the arbitration of a dispute over the Tylney estates in 1455, the award
assigned a life estate to one party and £116 plus reversion of the
inheritance to the other.9 ' At the end of the fifteenth century, lord
Dinham and the bishop of Durham devised an award, which included
two marriage alliances and a complex division of estates between rival
heirs who "departed well pleased" with the compromise solution.92
Because the award could be ignored, it is not surprising that arbitrators
strove to satisfy both parties with a bicentric solution instead of
producing a strictly unicentric solution as in court judgment.
This form of arbitral process, loveday arbitration, promoted love
over law. The clear theme was to reestablish amity and concord, as
reflected in the opening provision of a 1427 award in Shropshire that the
disputants "henceforth be good and loyal friends, 93 and in the record of
a libel case in York, which was referred "to the arbitrament of frend[es]
by whose mediat[i]on [the disputants] ... were made lovers and

88.
89.

Powell (1984), supra note 27, at 37.
These examples are from Carole Rawcliffe, The Great Lord as Peacekeeper:

Arbitration by English Noblemen in the Later Middle Ages, in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

IN BRITISH HISTORY 55 (J.A. Guy & H.G. Beale eds., Royal Historical Society Studies in
History Series No. 40, 1984). The conciliatory nature of the award has been noted by
several social historians. For more examples of reciprocal awards, see Powell (1984),
supra note 27, at 28-30.
90. Rawcliffe, supra note 89, at 55.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Powell (1984), supra note 27, at 28 (citations omitted).
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frend[es]. ' 94 Arbitration, however, could achieve true reconciliation only
when the parties had complete control over the process with a minimum
of coercion. The content of the process had to be consistent with
recognizable norms, usually those of the community.
Voluntary
submission, choice of arbitrators, acquiescence in the procedure, and
acceptance of the award (or a predetermined consequence for its nonacceptance) were vital to the success of the process, as the courts
provided no coercive pressures either to compel entry into the process or
to encourage compliance with the award. As a result, an effective
arbitration agreement was one entered into voluntarily, an effective
procedure was one which complied with the parties' expectations, and an
effective award was more often a compromise between their respective
interests. For these reasons, loveday arbitration was a conciliatory
process almost inseparable from mediation and perhaps merely a natural
variation or extension of it.
Such a process is far removed from modem adjudicative arbitration.
At best, it is imitative of judgment and adjudication while remaining a
conciliatory process. As such, it was a true alternative to adjudication in
the courts and favored by the general citizenry, leading a contemporary
observer of English society to note:
The English have always been more given to peaceableness and
industry than other people and rather than go so far as London and be
at so great charges with Attorneys and Lawyers, they will refer their
differences to the Arbitration of95 their Parish Priests... or to the
Arbitration of honest neighbours.
Nevertheless, loveday arbitration did not survive. What happened
to it, and how did arbitration become adjudicative? To some degree, the
answer to these questions lies in the decline of the social institutions
favoring love over law, the growing influence of law over arbitration,
and the dispute processing demands of an emerging mercantile
community.

94. Jane Hutchinson v. Jane Orton, BIHR Trans. C.P. 1625/2, as discussed in
Sharpe, "Such Disagreement betwyx Neighbours:" Litigation and Human Relations in
Early Modern England, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN
THE WEST 176 (John Bossy ed., 1983).
95. EDWARD CHAMBERLAYNE, MAGNAE ANGLIAE NOTITIA (12th ed. 1684) (25th ed.
of South Part, London 1718).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 108:4

The Dilemmas of a ConciliatoryProcess in an Adjudicative World
1.

The Decline of Love

By the fifteenth century, the institution of the loveday had come
under increasing criticism and was in serious decline.9 6 The potential for
abuse of the institution became apparent as the concept of individual
rights began to emerge.

John Wyclif complained of lovedays that "....

yet here many shall hold wrongs at lovedays, and bear down truth and
poor men in their rights, by color of lords kneeling in the chapel" 97 and
that "[g]reat men of this world debate and maintain debates at lovedays;
& who so may be stronger will have his will done, be it wrong be it
right., 98 According to Langland (circa 1330-1400), lovedays were more
than an opportunity for abuse by the powerful; they were immoral, a
corrupt inducement to settle out of court when the litigant's best interest
was to prosecute. 99
There are several examples of lovedays deteriorating into mob
scenes or violence between the parties. 0 0 In 1411 during a loveday
arbitrated by Sir William Gascoigne, then chief justice of the King's
Bench, one of the disputants, Robert Tyrwitt, also a justice on the King's
Bench, brought 500 armed followers to the appointed site of the
hearing. 0 1 The possibility of violence, which perhaps could have been
prevented by authoritative supervision, prompted Edward III to prohibit
the holding of lovedays in the city of London while he was in France by
decreeing, "that no one of the City, of whatsoever condition he be, shall
go out of this city, [for the purpose of] ...holding days of love...

within the City or without, in disturbance of the peace of our Lord the
King, or in affray of the people, and to the scandal of the City," and that
those who felt "themselves aggrieved" were to "shew their grievances
unto the officers of the City, and they will do them speedy right,

96.

See Clanchy, supra note 32, at 66-67 (illustrating the decline in frequency of

recorded lovedays in the court rolls of the Manor of Wakefield).
97.

JOHN WYCLIF, THE GRETE SENTENCE OF CuRs EXPOUNDED, III, 322, cap. xxi. I

have modernized the statement.
98. Of Servants and Lords, reprinted in

THE ENGLISH WORKS OF WYCLIF 234 (F.D.

Matthew ed., 1902).

99.

"And men lose through love of [bribery] what law might win them." WILLIAM

LANGLAND, 1 THE VISION OF WILLIAM CONCERNING PIERS THE PLOWMAN 76, B text, Passus

iii, line 158 (Walter W. Skeat ed., 1886); see also Bennett, supra note 40, at 364.
100. See Bennett, supra note 40, at 362.
101. 3 Rol. Parl. 649-50 (London 1767-77) (discussed in Bennett, supra note 40, at
360). A different version of this loveday or a completely different loveday involving the
same parties is discussed in Powell (1983), supra note 27, at 57-58.
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02
according as the law demands."'
It was becoming
Lovedays were losing official sanction.
undesirable for public officials, who previously were in great demand as
arbitrators at lovedays, to participate. In 1424, the mayor, sheriffs, and
aldermen of Norwich signed an indenture containing a provision that

"none of the... Aldermen shall be party ... in lovedaying...

or be

fine."' 3

By 1502, the
chosen.., as arbitrour ...on pain of 20 shillings
London sheriffs oath included that "ye shall be no loveday maker."'
Consistent with complaints about lovedays in general, abuses in
arbitration were being raised before the courts. In an action for trespass,
Bathe v. Jonet (1388), 105 the plaintiff claimed the defendants beat and
imprisoned him. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff was a villein
of Sir Matthew, that they were merely taking him back to his lord, and
that the plaintiff and Sir Matthew had submitted to arbitration "in respect
,06 In
of the same villeinage and of all other trespasses committed.
the grossly inequitable, alleged award, Sir Matthew was to make a
charter of manumission to the plaintiff in return for a thousand pounds
and a release of all trespasses. 107 The plaintiff pleaded before the court
and coercion during his
that the submission was made under duress
08
imprisonment and, therefore, was invalid. 1
An inherent weakness in all conciliatory processes is the potential
for a party with greater bargaining power, be it social, economic,
physical, or political, to extract unequal and less than voluntary
compromises from a weaker party, or for the community to coerce
conformity from an individual. Negotiation and mediation take place
before the backdrop of these realities. Political pressures and social
advantage are perhaps integral to the process. The success of the
loveday relied on individual acceptance of these realities and a
concomitant willingness to compromise rights and interests, like it or not.
Wyclif did not like it, implying that outcomes should be gauged against
102.

Bennett, supra note 40, at 362 (citing Letter Book E, fol. e xciv., as translated in

MEMORIALS OF LONDON AND LONDON LIFE IN THE XIITH, XIVTH, AND XVTH CENTURIES
173 (Henry Thomas Riley ed., London 1868)).
103. THE RECORDS OF THE CITY OF NORWICH 110 (W. Hudson & J.C. Tingey eds., 1906-

10).
104.

Bennett, supra note 40, at 363 (citing THE CUSTOMS OF LONDON, OTHERWISE
CALLED ARNOLD'S CHRONICLE 95 (London 1811)).
Y.B. 11 Rich. 2, reprintedin 5 AMES FOUNDATION 168 (1937).
Id.
Id.
108. Id. The parties were joined on the question of the submission to arbitration.
Whether the award was fair or not would not have been a problem except for the fact that
the courts encouraged settlement by treating arbitral awards as accord and satisfaction.
105.
106.
107.

Performance of the award, if pleaded and proved, would act to bar any subsequent court
action on the same issue. This case is discussed in Murray, supra note 54, at 204.
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some higher principles rather than the disputants' satisfaction. Langland
did not like it either, perceiving litigation as the wiser, if not more moral,
alternative.
Arguably, between the courts and lovedays at the time there was
little difference as to the potential for abuse.' 0 9 In a complicated and
extended dispute between John Bruyn and the residents of Bridgnorth
and their respective supporters in fifteenth century Shropshire, Bruyn's
indictment by a county court jury packed with his opponents clearly
reflected their bias. He fled to Ireland but returned when the political
winds shifted in his favor. The men of Bridgnorth then were forced into
an arbitration in which three of the four arbitrators had close connections
with Bruyn's patron. In turn, the award clearly reflected this bias.'l 0
Although in reality it may have come up short, in theory court
judgment was free of these biases and irrelevancies. Courts were
acquiring several layers of legitimacy thereby distinguishing litigation
from the arbitral process. They were sanctioned by the state and their
judgments enforced by the state. Courts were permanent bodies with
awe-inspiring ritual. Judges came from the upper class and in the great
majority of cases had not obtained their office from the largess of one of
the disputants before them. Judicial decisions were not visibly based on
prevailing, local social and political pressures but rather on a set of
relatively consistent legal principles. In appearance at least, courts were
less susceptible to abuses arising from lack of parity between the parties.
In contrast, loveday arbitration had only two layers of legitimacy:
whatever socio-economic conditions favored it and the voluntary consent
of the parties to participate. The social and economic conditions and the
accompanying attitudes and values that supported amicable agreement
over legal judgment were disappearing, as reflected by the loss of official
sanction. The possibility of coercing involuntary consent further eroded
legitimacy. If one were to be coerced into a dispute settlement forum,
then it might as well be in a forum that was less likely to be controlled by
one's opponents. Litigation seemed to gain legitimacy over arbitration
as communities and individuals became less interdependent and people
saw less mutual advantage in compromising or in being coerced into a
submission for the sake of relationships. The growing realization that
love was no longer necessarily greater than law is reflected in the attempt
to legitimize arbitration by cloaking it in the trappings of formal
litigation.

109. Rawcliffe, supra note 89, at 50.
110. For a more detailed description of this dispute, the arbitration, and cites to original
sources, see Powell (1984), supra note 27, at 31-32.
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2.

The Rise of Pseudo-Adjudicative Arbitration

The adjudicative model of dispute processing as expressed by
formal litigation in the King's Courts had a distinct advantage over
loveday arbitration: access by either party to the coercive powers of the
state. Arbitrators could not impose a solution when disputants were
unwilling to participate or compromise. On the other hand, courts could
coerce attendance or proceed without the permission of all the disputants.
A judge issued a unicentric decision which the court, as a permanent
body endowed with powers by the state, could enforce. An adversarial
procedure narrowed the disputed issues, and the application of a
consistent and rational body of substantive legal norms supported the
unicentric solutions and their enforcement. Today, as in the late Middle
Ages, if reconciliation is not one's primary motivation or if compromise
is anathema, conciliatory arbitration is a poor substitute for the courts,
which do not have to rely on the cooperation and consent of the parties.
Litigation, however, had distinct disadvantages. It was and is a
risky business because the disputants can neither control the procedure
nor limit the consequences of the outcome. Procedure is set by the court
and can be costly and time-consuming. Disputants could not choose
their judges nor dictate the time and place of hearing. Before modem
reforms, the technicalities of formal judicial procedure easily trapped
unwary and uninitiated litigants, leading to possible penalties,
amercements, non-suits, or renewed actions in other courts. The judicial
determination itself produced only one winner, could lead to immediate
imprisonment, and was unavoidable even if irrational or based on
unfamiliar or irrelevant norms. Even if one was willing to risk
adjudication in the courts, the courts were not always accessible. In local
courts, political and social influences may have discouraged claimants
from seeking relief, while in the central royal courts, the rule crudely
stated was "no writ, no remedy."
In order to obtain the advantages of court adjudication without
suffering the disadvantages, parties attempted to use arbitration and
litigation as a combined strategy. On one hand, some of this was purely
benign. For example, during the reign of Henry III, courts encouraged
the filing of suits for the mere purpose of recording the extrajudicial
settlement agreements."' The final concord or "chirograph" containing
the terms of the agreement was an indenture. 12 Awards could be
recorded as mere settlement agreements and, if not performed, sued upon

11.

See CIVIL PLEAS OF THE WILTSHIRE EYRE 1249, at 21-27 (M.T. Clanchy ed., 1971).

112.

In an action of novel disseisin, a final concord was not permissible so the parties

obtained license from the court to withdraw and then enrolled the agreement. Id.
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as indentures. Thus, law suits often were brought merely to have the
settlement recorded with some incentive for compliance, although a suit
on the indenture would yield only nominal damages.
On the other hand, the strategy could be an abusive tactic.
Lovedays presented an opportunity to gain an advantage in litigation,
raising technical issues as early as Bracton, who notes:
if after a default has been made a day of love be taken before
judgment... it seems thereby that the claimant tacitly renounces the
default, .. . if a day of love ought to be taken, it is expedient for the
claimant that he should make mention of the default; and that he
should take the day of love under such a protest, that if love should
not take him, a recourse to the default may be open to him.13
The tactical use of arbitration in combination with litigation forced
courts to make procedural decisions that favored one process over the
other. In Hardwick v. Wood,1 14 the plaintiff brought a writ of conspiracy
stating that the defendant had brought a writ of entry while the plea was
pending in arbitration, and that:
[t]hey agreed, by consent of them both, and by indenture made
between them, on a certain loveday, when they would submit
themselves to the arbitration of arbitrators. Yet, while the loveday
was pending, this same William came to Westminister, in our
absence, and recovered against us to the value, contrary to our
agreement and contrary to his own deed; ....

115

But the court adopted the defense theory, in the words of Spigurnel, J.:
Seeing that you cannot say that he hath recovered the land by false
allegation, for he hath recovered it by process of law, because you did
not keep the day which you had in Bench, but made default-for no
deed made in the country can extinguish in such case the jurisdiction
of the King's Court-this Court ruleth that you take naught by your
116
writ, but that you be in mercy for your false claim.
Thus the courts first enunciated the notion that arbitration proceedings
cannot be used to "oust the courts" of their jurisdiction. 1 7 For the
increasingly powerful centralized courts, the notion of supporting love
over law was shifting to validate legal proceedings over arbitral, and law
113. HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGMUS ET CONSUETUDTNIBUs ANGLIAE v, 319 ff (T.
Twiss ed., 1878-82) and (G. Woodbine ed., 1977).
114. Hardwick v. Wood (1312), Y.B. 5 Edw. 2, reprinted in 33 SELDON Soc'Y 214 (W.
Bolland ed., 1916).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Murray, supra note 54, at 203. Although a court would recognize an arbitral award
as a bar to further litigation of the same dispute if the award had been satisfied.
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was becoming more powerful than love.
By the fifteenth century, the courts were commonly used by the
landed classes as a sword of Damocles to encourage some form of
extrajudicial dispute resolution and, in the case of arbitrations, to
encourage submissions and compliance with the award." 8 This
combined use of litigation and arbitration has been aptly described as
using "war and diplomacy."" 9 A study of defamation cases in the
ecclesiastical courts at York during the Tudor period revealed that even
among the lower classes it was common to initiate a lawsuit with the aim
of achieving extrajudicial settlement.
The frequent recourse to
arbitration as a means of reaching this end was distinctive of the
period. 2 °
Arbitration was taking place so much in the shadow of litigation
that the characteristics of formal litigation could not help but influence
the manner in which arbitrations were conducted. Two examples of late
medieval arbitrations illustrate the trend toward imitating legal
proceedings.'21 In 1418, the Bishop of Ely and the abbey of Bury St.
122
Edmunds made an unsuccessful attempt at arbitrating their differences.
The parties made recognizances for £200 to observe the award of two
royal justices, with the chief justice named as an umpire. 23 Each side
was allowed to use three counsels to present their respective cases, and
the arbitrators had the parties submit all their evidence in writing prior to
the hearings, which were held during the regular law terms. 24 In 1399,
the Ladbroke manor dispute was concluded by an arbitration in which
the parties had entered into recognizances of £100 to observe the award
of two magnates, who referred the 25
case to four serjeants-at-law, who in
justices.
royal
seven
consulted
turn
Arbitration among and by the great magnates was particularly
influenced by the character of legal proceedings.' 26 Such arbitrations
were considerably more elaborate than the average loveday arbitration
118. For a discussion of this phenomena and several prominent examples, see Powell
(1983), supra note 27, at 52.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
Arnold
125.

Id.at 57.
Sharpe, supranote 94, at 185.
These examples come from Powell (1984), supra note 27, at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing MEMORIALS OF ST. EDMUND'S ABBEY 188-211 (Rolls Series, Thomas
ed., 1896)).
As described in Post, Courts, Councils and Arbitrators in the Ladbroke Manor

Dispute, 1382-1400, in MEDIEVAL LEGAL RECORDS EDITED IN MEMORY OF C.A.F.
MEEKINGS 303 (R.F. Hunnisett & J.B. Post eds., 1978).

126. See generally Rawcliffe, supra note 89; see also M.A. Hicks, Restraint, Mediation
and Private Justice: George, Duke of Clarence as "Good Lord," 4 J.LEGAL HIST. 56
(1983).
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and closely resembled a court of law. By the fourteenth century, most
lords had permanent bodies of professional lawyers and administrators
for whom " .. . a consistent incidental duty was the settlement of
disputes." 127 In this way, arbitration was acquiring an adjudicative face
while awards remained unenforceable in the courts, giving rise to an
interim pseudo-adjudicative form of arbitration.
3.

Adopting Adjudicative Characteristics: Life Imitating Art

Arbitration's acquisition of formal adjudicative characteristics
shifted the point of reference away from voluntary and consensual
amicable settlement toward judgment as was obtainable in the courts.
The differences between loveday and pseudo-adjudicative arbitration can
be traced through each important element of the process.
a.

The Agreement To Arbitrate

In loveday arbitration, the agreement to arbitrate was typically oral
and non-actionable. 128 Participation relied solely on the good will of the
parties, their mutual perception of arbitration being a better way to
resolve the dispute, and/or underlying social pressures. There were no
effective legal restraints on a party who either reneged on the agreement
by revoking an arbitrator's authority' 29 or refusing to comply with the
award.
In pseudo-adjudicative arbitration, the coercive power of the law
was harnessed to assure participation and compliance with the agreement
to refer to arbitration (a "reference") and the submission.' 30 References
and submissions were reduced to writing to avoid the "manifest
Inconveniency" of oral agreements which "may be revoked at Pleasure,
without any Inconveniency."' 13 1 Agreements to refer were drafted as
127.

Post, Equitable Resorts Before 1450, in LAW, LITIGANTS, AND THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 68, 72 (E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester eds., Royal Historical Society Studies in
History Series No. 36, London 1983).
128. By the seventeenth century, an action could be brought in assumpsit on an oral
arbitration agreement, but damages were nominal. See Newgate v. Degelder, 84 Eng. Rep.
7, 13, 16 (K.B. 1666).
129. "Revocation" refers to a party withdrawing the mandate of, or authority granted to,
the arbitrator to make an award. Judicial recognition of the freedom of a party to frustrate
the reference merely by withdrawing the authority of the arbitrator is usually traced to
Coke's dictum in Vynior's Case (1610), but Coke cites prior authority. See Y.B. 21 Hy. 6
Hil. fl. 14.
130. A distinction, now no longer valid, arose between a mere agreement to arbitrate,
which was called a reference or an agreement to refer, and an agreement to submit to the
award, which was called a submission and was a combination of the agreement to refer
and the appointment of arbitrators. Id.
131.

M. BACON, THE COMPLEAT ARBITRATOR; OR THE LAW OF AwARDs 4 (1st ed.
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actionable deeds or indentures,' 32 and submissions were secured by
bonds conditioned to be discharged upon the performance
mutual penal 33
of the award.1

b.

The Arbitrators

In loveday arbitration, parties respectively chose an equivalent
arbitrators were
Such 34
number of arbitrators, usually "friends."
negotiations.
arms-length
in
advocates
party
effectively
In pseudo-adjudicative arbitration with the penal bond enforcing
compliance, it perversely became more imperative for a party to appoint
arbitrators who would protect the appointing-party's interests from a
devastating award. With an equal number of party-appointed arbitrators,
stalemates were more inevitable. To overcome the problem of arbitrator
impasse, parties established the use of umpires and mutually-appointed
arbitrators. An umpire issued the award when the arbitrators reached an
impasse. Disputants never would have agreed on an umpire or single
arbitrator who was biased in the matter; therefore, instead of friends or
involved members of the community, it became important that such
persons be "indifferently chosen." In this way, umpires and arbitrators
took on the characteristics of judges, and not surprisingly, judges often
served as arbitrators and umpires.' 35 Sir Thomas More affirmed the more
adjudicative nature of the umpire by equating the role with that of a
judge and distinguishing it from that of a mere party-appointed arbitrator:
"I do daily bestow my time about law matters: some to plead, some to
to determine, some as an
hear, some as an arbitrator with my award ' 36
umpire or judge with my sentence to decide."'

London 1731) (3rd ed. London 1770).
132. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 419-20.
133. By the late sixteenth century, contractual concepts were being applied to arbitration
agreements. See Cook & Songate's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 708 (1588) (valid agreement must
have adequate consideration). But in the same case, the strict contractual rule was relaxed
by a finding that mere reciprocal promises to abide by the award were sufficient
consideration "because it was to avoid controversies and suits." Id. The courts construed
submissions as a form of private contract actionable for its revocation; however, specific
performance was not attainable, and actions for breach of contract yielded only nominal
damages. As a result, the threat of an action on the penal bond was the only practical
method of coercing compliance with the submission.
134. The remnants of this practice can be seen today in the use of "arbitrator/advocates."
See generally MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 15, at 10, 50, 152, 222 (discussing the present
status of arbitrator/advocates).
135. For examples, see Powell (1983), supra note 27, at 60 n.73.
136.

(1983).

ERIc WILLIAM IvEs, THE COMMON LAWYERS OF PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND 126
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The Conduct of the Reference

In loveday arbitration, the arbitrators proceeded as they wished or as
the parties demanded. Hearings and oral presentations were not required.
Indeed, the party-appointed arbitrators usually were from the community
and either already familiar with the substance of the dispute or fully
briefed by their appointing parties prior to devising an award. If there
was a hearing, the parties represented themselves, and informality was
the norm.
With the use of actionable deeds and penal bonds in pseudoadjudicative arbitration, the stakes were higher; therefore, the growing
tendency would have been to engage legal professionals. For example,
legal professionals were used to draft the deeds and bonds, and parties
sought more authoritative awards through the appointment of judges as
arbitrators and accordingly strengthened their positions through the use
of lawyers as advocates. Representing clients in arbitrations became a
routine part of lawyering in the late Middle Ages. 137 In practice, this
encouraged the adoption of the procedural characteristics of formal
litigation:
adversarial proceedings with arguments based on oral
presentations of proof and examinations of witnesses.
d.

The Award: From Bicentric to Unicentric

In loveday arbitration, awards gave something to both sides because
they relied on mutual acceptance for effective dispute resolution. Upon
the introduction of legal consequences for not performing in accordance
with an arbitral award, arbitrators were free to make awards with less
concern over party satisfaction. Awards no longer had to be conciliatory
in order to induce compliance; in fact, they could be completely
unicentric. If the losing party failed to comply with the award, he would
suffer the consequences of whatever legal obligation accompanied the
submission. The decline of bicentric awards is evidenced by the socalled "doctrine of mutuality," which probably had its origins in the
conciliatory nature of awards in loveday arbitration.' 38 It was noted
137. See generally id. at 126-30.
138. The degree to which bicentric awards declined in arbitration is reflected in the now
extinct doctrine of "mutuality." Simply stated, an award was void if, when awarding to the
advantage of one party, it failed to award an equivalent advantage to the other. See KYD,
supra note 15, at 147; H. ROLLE, ABRIDGMENT, at Arbitrement K. fl. 1-2 (London 1668).
The earliest statement of the doctrine is found in the Year Books, which rejects an award
that one party go free from all trespasses done to the other while not awarding that the other
party should do or pay anything. See Y.B. 20 Hy. 6, Hil. fl. 12. The authorities explain the
doctrine's origin differently. Holdsworth, relying on Kyd's treatise, believed that the
doctrine of mutuality was deduced from cases in which an award that was manifestly not to
the advantage of either party was invalid. 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 194. The

2004]

THE DEATH OF ADR

earlier that conciliatory awards were bicentric. In essence, the doctrine
of mutuality required facially bicentric awards, and thus was a remnant
of arbitration as a conciliatory process. When strictly construing the
doctrine, the courts were promoting reconciliation over judgment. Later,
as the courts began to require more "indifference" from arbitrators and
arbitration was cloaked in the characteristics of formal litigation, legal
rulings began eroding the doctrine of mutuality.' 39 By the midseventeenth century, when March attempted to explain the doctrine, its
only remnant was that if the arbitrator awarded mutual reciprocal acts
and one of the parties could not40perform, then the entire award was void
for want of intended mutuality.1
e.

The Award: Conformity with Substantive Legal Norms

In loveday arbitration, the award could be reached by application of
private or community norms, or simply through the arbitrators' own
notions of what was fair or just; arbitrators could "determine the
Controversie not according to the Law, but according to their Opinion
and Judgment as honest Men."' 4 1 In pseudo-adjudicative arbitration,
doctrine that an award is void if not advantageous to the parties is stated in Y.B. 9 Ed. 4,
Mich. fl. 30 per Choke. In some ways, this begs the question and does not explain how the
doctrine was stretched to require mutual, equivalent advantages. Kyd, who wrote closer to
the period in which the doctrine was applied, complained that the doctrine was illogical: "it
supposes that it is impossible that two parties who submit to arbitration not to have
committed mutual injuries,...." KYD, supra note 15, at 147. March, who wrote his
treatise 150 years before Kyd, explains the origin of mutuality as follows: "As Arbitrators
are indifferently elected, so the law intends.., that the arbitrators should be indifferent and
equally Judges between the parties, which they cannot be, if they do not give satisfaction to
both sides, and therefore in such a case, where the award is not mutually satisfactory, it is
void."

J.O. MARCH, ACTIONS FOR SLANDER: To WHCH Is ADDED, AWARDS AND

ARBITREMENTS 219 (London 1647) and (Supp. London 1648). March's logic fails,
however, because the law did not require "indifferently elected" arbitrators during the life of
the doctrine of mutuality, and it is not possible to have an imperative, the doctrine of
mutuality, originate from an appetitive, choosing indifferent arbitrators.
139. The courts first evaded mutuality by determining that the act to be done in
satisfaction of the doctrine could be nominal, i.e., "there must be something done by either
party to the other, commodious in appearance [sic] at the least." MARCH, supra note 138, at
219. Then courts began ruling that if the act to be done in the award was in satisfaction of
possible claims so that rights of action were released, then the requirement of mutuality was
satisfied and the award was valid. Y.B. 22 Hy. 6, Hil. fi. 10; Baspole's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
624, 625 (K.B. 1610); KYD, supra note 15, at 148, 150-152. But see Veale v. Wamer, 85
Eng. Rep. 468 (K.B. 1669) (indicating that the doctrine was not completely moribund).
Later they ruled that satisfaction was to be implied in all awards. KYD, supra note 15, at
152 (citing Thomlinson v. Arriskin, 92 Eng. Rep. 1096 (K.B. 1720)).
140. See Winch & Grave v. Sanders, 79 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1620); KYD, supra note
15, at 168; cf.JOHN COMYNS, SIR, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND, at Arbitrament E 14

n.u (5th ed. London 1822).
141. ARBITRIUM REDIvIVUM: OR THE LAW OF ARBITRATION; COLLECTED FROM THE
LAw-BOOKS BOTH ANCIENT AND MODERN, AND DEDUCED TO THESE TIMES: WHEREIN THE
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however, even if conformity with substantive legal norms was not
required, several conditions encouraged it. For example, judges or
lawyers acting as arbitrators would be more inclined to apply the same
law they applied in similar cases in the courts. Also, if a matter was
determined in the law courts under a distinct set of substantive legal
norms, application of the same set of norms to a similar matter in
arbitration helped legitimate the arbitral process.
The legal
authoritativeness of an award promoted compliance because it predicted
the probable outcome in the courts. So, pseudo-adjudicative arbitration
operated under the shadow of the law in the sense that it was informed by
the legal action for which it substituted.
f.

Summary

Of course, not all early and late medieval arbitrations fell into the
described patterns of loveday arbitration and pseudo-adjudicative
arbitration respectively, and various combinations of coercion and
degrees of formality probably existed throughout the entire period. From
the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, however, a gap developed between
informal arbitrations and formal, court-like arbitrations. Matters with a
distinctly communal nature, disputes threatening the community peace,
purely local disputes, disputes between neighbors or relatives, disputes
among the poor, or disputes that would not be recognized by a court
continued to be arbitrated in a conciliatory, informal manner by friends
and relatives and persons with local standing (usually parsons) as
arbitrators. Disputants initiated law suits to encourage submission to
arbitration, a more harmonious solution designed "to assist Mankind in
making them better Friends and Neighbours.
,,42 Here, the arbitral
process remained barely distinguishable from mediation.
Conversely, disputes among those who had access and familiarity
with the courts tended to be arbitrated in a formal manner imitative of
adjudication in the courts. Not surprisingly, it took some degree of
economic and political power to support such arbitrations. The parties
hired legal professionals as advocates and appointed authoritative
persons as arbitrators, and ultimately utilized the courts to induce
performance. Many disputants were seeking a less costly and less risky
method of obtaining authoritative, enforceable decisions and were less

WHOLE LEARNNG OF AWARDS OR ARBITREMENTS IS METHODICALLY TREATED.
WITH
SEVERAL FORMS OF SUBMISSIONS BY WAY OF COVENANTS AND BOND: As ALSO SEVERAL

FORMS OF ARBITREMENTS OR AWARDS, [by
1694); accord BACON, supra note 131, at 1.
142. BACON, supra note 131, at 2.

the author of Regula Placitandi] 2 (London
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interested in the restoration of amicable relations. 143 Here, the arbitral
process sometimes may have been difficult to distinguish from the
judicial process. At its heart, however, this manifestation of arbitration
was still conciliatory because parties voluntarily consented to refer and
chose their own "judges" who could apply customary law or equitable
principles. Additionally, the parties controlled procedure and devised
their own penalties for revoking a submission or refusing to comply with
an award. In spite of the adoption of many formal adjudicative
characteristics, the success of pseudo-adjudicative arbitration required
almost as much consent, cooperation, and willingness to compromise as
loveday arbitration.
4.

Arbitration and the Law: Close Encounters

a.

The Increasing Frequency of Contested Arbitrations

Arbitration in the communal tradition was weakened also by the
increasing recourse to the courts to enforce or contest the process.
Loveday arbitration did not always bring about a permanent agreement.
If a disputant eventually determined that the award was unacceptable, he
could always press his case in the courts. The Curia Regis Rolls note
that one case, circa 1207 A.D., had supposedly been resolved by the
arbitration of "friends" more than fifty years before. 144 One late fifteenth
century dispute was arbitrated four times, 145 and it was during this
46 Much of
century that evidence of arbitrations increased dramatically.
this can be attributed to court records of cases involving allegations of
unsatisfactory arbitrations or defenses of accord and satisfaction through
an award. Increasingly, arbitrated disputes were becoming the subjects
of lawsuits.
A typical example is Wage v. Melya (1420 A.D.), a suit for trespass
in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant "with swords, bows and
arrows, broke [her] close ...and depastured, trod down and wasted her
147
The
grass... with horses, bullocks, oxen, cows, pigs and sheep."'
defendant's attorney claimed that further proceedings should be barred
because the parties "reached a compromise through the mediation of
friends intervening between them that they would abide... by...
arbitration" of two arbitrators chosen on behalf of each, and that the
143.
144.
145.
146.
27.
147.

Powell (1984), supra note 27, at 38.
5 CuRiA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 78, at 59; see FLOWER, supra note 80, at 462.
For a description of this series of arbitrations, see IVES, supra note 136, at 127-28.
See Sharpe, supra note 94, at 185; see generally Powell (1983 & 1984), supra note
7 SELECT CASES

IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH,

supra note 82, at 257.
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arbitrators awarded the plaintiff a gallon of wine in satisfaction, which
she immediately accepted. 148 The described procedure typifies loveday
arbitration, but its informal and nuncupative nature made it vulnerable to
subsequent adjudication in the courts. The cases of the abbot's wen and
of the barber's thumb discussed earlier also center on whether or not the
loveday arbitrations described took place.
In this respect, pseudo-adjudicative arbitration fared no better as
disgruntled participants increasingly made their way to the courts to
enforce or to avoid enforcement of indentures and penal bonds.
References and submissions carried legal consequences which brought
these arbitrations within the shadow of the law, and courts had little
choice but to entertain suits on these matters.
Arguably, as arbitrations came to be contested more frequently in
the courts, they were causing more problems than they solved. This
phenomenon is revealed through the rapid but unsystematic expansion of
arbitration law.
By the sixteenth century, the law concerning
"arbitrements" had become a distinct topic in the Abridgments.149 The
seventeenth century witnessed the publication of three treatises on
arbitration arising not only from the increased use of the process, but also
from the growing body of law spurred by the evolution of its use. 150 One
of these treatises justifies its publication by observing that the law of
"Awards or Arbitrements" is "[a] learning of no less use and
consequence to all men .... for that submissions in Arbitrement were
never more in use then in these times. And this learning well observed,
would avoid multitudes of suits and contentions which daily arise
through the defects of Arbitrements."''
The author continues to observe
that "most men either have been or may be Arbitrators, or at least have
' 52
done, or may submit themselves to the Arbitration or others."'
A nation of arbitrators may be hyperbolic, but it is undeniable that
sixteenth and seventeenth century England was a land of litigants.
"[T]he medieval Englishman was incurably litigious,' ' 153 and persons of
all classes initiated "frivolous suites, of trifling trialls, which a Common

148.

Id.

149.

See,

e.g.,

BROOKE,

LA GRAUNDE

ABRIDGEMENT

COLLECT, Arbiterment or

Arbitrement, fl. 46-48 (London 1573); A. FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT
COLLECT, Arbitrement, fl. 51 (London 1565); ROLLE, supra note 138, at Arbitrement, 24268.
150. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 15, at 163-73 (entitled "Of Compromises and
Arbitrements"); MARCH, supra note 138, at 149-241; ARBrrRIUM REDVIwUM, supra note
141, at passim.
151. MARCH, supra note 138, at Title Page.
152. Id. at 149.
153. THE EARLIEST LINCOLNSHIRE ASSIZE ROLLS xvii (D.M. Stenton ed., Lincoln
Record Society Pub. xxii, 1926).
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Yeoman were ludge fitte enough to end in his chaire at home ....
The massive rise in the incidence of lawsuits starting around 1550 and
not declining until the late eighteenth century is well documented. 55 The
great majority of this litigation was initiated in the central courts, while
litigation generally declined in the local courts. 56 The reasons are many
and complex: social changes, economic growth, and changes in judicial
The courts were
procedure, e.g., the development of assumpsit.
easily abused,
process
legal
and
the
endemic;
were
delays
overwhelmed;
57 Much of this litigation went to arbitration
with juries often corrupted.1
before reaching judgment in the courts. The inefficiency and distrust
surrounding the courts made arbitration a popular alternative for several
centuries into the modern period. Most contemporary treatises on
arbitration emphasized "the great Trouble and frequent Expense of LawSuits' 58 and "the strict course and tedious ceremonies of Law Suits
to weary Suitors, and to dive somewhat
(which are wont most commonly
159
too deepe into their Purses)."'
Arbitration in this tradition was not, however, a popular alternative
to litigation for the same reasons that it was popular in the communal
tradition. Its raison d'Ytre was shifting; instead of conciliatory bicentric
solutions, parties were using pseudo-adjudicative arbitration to obtain
unicentric legal judgment as if from a court, but without the cost,
formalities, delays, and uncertainties inherent in litigation. Disputants
were choosing arbitration not as a better way to resolve their disputes,
but as a way to avoid the courts. Litigation was so bad that an agreement
to refer probably was relatively easy to extort. The commitment to refer
was in a sense less voluntary; consequently, there was less commitment
to the process and more dissatisfaction with the outcomes. As a result,
regardless of their shortcomings, the courts were called upon more and
more to determine the enforceability of submissions and awards. The
law conceptualized references and submissions as voluntary, revocable
obligations, and numerous, now seemingly irrational, technical rules
were established and strictly construed by the courts. By the end of the
seventeenth century, the degree of legal technicality posed innumerable

154. Sharpe, supra note 94, at 169 (quoting Samuell Garey, A Manuall for Magistrates:
Or a Lanterne for Lawyers: A Sermon Preached before ludges and lustices at Norwich
Assizes 1619, at 55 (London 1623), who also declared that "upon every occasion to go to
Law, is to be an Outlaw of God, whose whole Law is fulfilled in Love.").
155. See CHARLES.W. BROOKS, PETTYFOGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH:
THE "LOWER BRANCH" OF THE PROFESSION INEARLY MODERN ENGLAND 48-74 (1986).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 194.
158. ARBITRmUM REDIVIVUM, supra note 141, at A3.
159. MARCH, supra note 138, at 88.
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barriers to the effective use of arbitration as an adjudicative process. 160
The suggestion that these technical barriers manifested "hostility"
by the common law towards arbitration 161 is unfounded. There is no
evidence of a systematic, much less hostile, handling of arbitration
problems by the courts. Both the legal and the arbitral processes were in
considerable transition, and the courts merely were analyzing complaints
involving arbitration under legal standards familiar to them. The fact
that such technicalities were barriers to adjudicative arbitration reflects
the unsystematic approach of the courts, which probably was not
intended to transform arbitration into an adjudicative process enforceable
by the power of the state.
By implication, the courts were supporting out-of-court arbitration
in both its loveday and pseudo-adjudicative forms. Often, judges
themselves would recommend arbitration eventually, as indicated in one
treatise, which recommends "to do at first what the Judges, after several
Trials and Arguments, often advise at last, viz. to compromise or refer
the Matter;

,,162

The courts promoted arbitration by barring

subsequent litigation on a matter that had been arbitrated, awarded upon,
and satisfied, 163 and they provided remedies for the personal obligations
(typically bonds) entered into in connection with arbitration. Lord
Coke's decision in Vynior's Case164 is often cited as the epitome of
judicial hostility toward arbitration; 165 ironically, Coke found for the
plaintiff, who was claiming on a bond entered into to assure that the
160. See 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 187; see also PARKER, supra note 24, at 1214.
161. As implied by 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 187.
162. BACON, supra note 131, at Preface vi (emphasis in the original).
163. See Murray, supra note 54, at 202-05, in which the author cites several cases as
proof that this usage became clear by the fourteenth century. Anon. v. Anon. (1390), 13
Rich. II, VII Ames Foundation 104-105 (Plucknett ed., 1929); Anon. (1388), 12 Rich. II, I
Ames Foundation 37 (Deiser ed., 1914); Stalynburgh v. Daweson (1388), 12 Rich. If,I
Ames Foundation 159 (Deiser ed., 1914) (in a former suit, the defendant was charged with
assault, defendant pleads that it was submitted to arbitration; plaintiff denies that it was
submitted to arbitration and issue joined; petit jury found that they had submitted to
arbitration, which apparently was a complete bar because the plaintiff attempted to taint the
jury to upset the verdict).
164. 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B. 1610).
165. An interesting example is JULIus HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
THE LAW (1918). This is a revisionist historical attack on the decision by Lord Coke in
Vynior's Case, and other subsequent decisions, which were blamed by reformers for
impeding the development of modem statutory arbitration in the United States. Most of the
book is devoted to exposing "errors" in these common law decisions, particularly the
concept of revocability of an arbitrator's authority, and the folly of courts being restrained in
this area by stare decisis. Typical of the tone of proponents of arbitration at the time, such
unquestioning "pro-arbitration" attitudes caused a reaction among some legal scholars. For
an example of the reaction, see Philip G. Phillips, A GeneralIntroduction, 83 U. PENN. L.
REV. 119 (1934-35).
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66
defendant complied with the submission.1
Actually, by the seventeenth century, the courts were gradually
relaxing some of the strict technicalities that had caused problems in
arbitration practice.' 67 Except for an increase in lawsuits concerning
specific arbitrations, the arbitral process was aiding the courts by
diverting disputes from their dockets. Contradicting the notion of
judicial hostility, one contemporary treatise states:

Arbitrement is much esteemed and greatly favored by our Common
Law; the end thereof being privately to compose Differences between
Parties by the Judgement of honest Men; and to prevent the great
Trouble and frequent Expense of Law-Suits: This therefore being
rightly understood and practiced, may undoubtedly save our purses,
168
and procure much Peace and Tranquility amongst us: ....
But in the same breath, the author warns, "Awards must be
measured by the Rules of Law," and although the arbitrator is not tied to
legal "formalities" there are "numerous things" required to make an
can cause far
award effective; for this reason, "defective" arbitrators
69
more trouble than was hoped to have been avoided.
b.

The Trouble with Arbitrators

Considering the multitude of unsystematic technical rules, it was
probably quite easy to be a defective arbitrator by the seventeenth
century. These rules, though gradually relaxed, required the arbitrator to
stay within the strict bounds of the submission and issue an award that
conformed to certain formalities. 70 Otherwise, arbitrators were free to
conduct the proceedings and make whatever determination they liked,
and the courts would not intervene:
An arbitrator is an extrordinary judge... having cognisance by the
compromise of the parties, his power is larger than the power of any
ordinary or other extraordinary judge appointed by a magistrat, for an
arbitrator hath power to judge according to the compromise after his
own mind as well of the fact as of the law, not observing the forme of
law, but the other judges are tyed to a prescript forme limited to them
166. 77 Eng. Rep. 597.
167. For some examples, see 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 191-92. Compare
Martham v. Jemx, 80 Eng. Rep. 66, 67 (K.B. 1607) (strictly construing the award without
consideration of the intent of the arbitrators), with Squire v. Grevell, 87 Eng. Rep. 797, 798
(K.B. 1704) (interpreting the award so as to give effect to the intent of the arbitrators).
168. ARBrRIUM REDIVIVUM, supra note 141, at A3.
169. Id. at "To the Reader."
170. These formalities are the subject of the early treatises, which are addressed more
toward the lay arbitrator than to the legal profession. Examples include BACON, supra note
131 and ARBiTRaUM REDrVlVUM, supranote 141.
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by the law or magistrat of which they can only be executors.171
In addition to this unrestrained power, anyone could be an
' 172
arbitrator, including "infants, persons excommunicate or outlawed,"
and no degree of arbitrator bias, incompetence, dishonesty, or
unreasonableness would provoke the intervention of the common law
courts. 173 The prevailing judicial attitude was neatly summed up in the
beginning of the seventeenth century: "for every person must use his
own discretion in the choice of his judges, and being at liberty to chuse
whom he likes best, cannot afterwards object to the want of honesty or
' 74
understanding to them, or that they have not done him justice."'
The refusal of the courts to intervene in the conduct of the reference
left the arbitrator with unbridled power: "arbitrators are so called,
because they have an arbitrary power; for if they observe the
submission, and keep within due bounds, their sentences are definitive,
from which there lies no appeal.' 75
Arbitrary power such as this would not be acceptable in an
adjudicative process. Even in arbitration that was merely pseudoadjudicative, the prospect of arbitrary power caused considerable
concern. West warns against the hazards of choosing a "foole" as an
arbitrator 176 and advises the appointment of "indifferent arbitrators,"
void of malice and favor, to either of the parties, that they be not
notorious by outlarie, excommunication, or suspected of any
notorious crime, that they be neither irreligious nor covetous: For
albeit as it is said, an Arbitrator has absolute power, yet ought his
judgment or sentence to be sincere and incorrupt, according to right
and equity, without malice, flatterie, and every other vicious affection
or pertubation, which
may lead him away from the right path of
77
justice and equity. 1
Fifty years later, March advises that to avoid the "many unjust and undue
sentence in Arbitrations," arbitrators should be "indifferently
choosen,... men indifferent, just and upright, swayed neither with
favoure feare or affection to either party men likewise having sufficient
parts, competent understanding and knowledge on the matter or business
171.
172.
173.
Serjeant

WEST, supra note 15, at 164.

174.

WEST, supra note 15, at 164.

Id.
A common law court would not set aside an award for arbitrator misconduct. Per
Williams, Veale v. Warner, 85 E.R. 468, 469 n.3 (K.B. 1669).

175. JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY, "Arbitrator" (T.E. Tomlins ed., 10th ed. London 1797)
(translation of ROLLE, supra note 138, at 251) (emphasis in original).
176. WEST, supra note 15, at 164-67. West's delightful parable of a "foole's
arbitrement," however, ends with the foole making a wise and equitable award. Id.
177. Id. at 165.
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But March also warns that there is no law requiring
,,178
such qualifications, and "if they be not competent Judges, the fault is
theirs that chose them."'' 79 In a Supplement published the following year,
March summarizes:
referred...

[T]he Law seems more favourable to Arbitrements then other
Judgements, insomuch as by Arbitrators the strict course and tedious
ceremonies of Law Suits (which are wont most commonly to weary
Suitors, and to dive somewhat too deepe into their Purses) are cut off,
and shorter decisions by them are made, with little or no cost at all.

But.... lest this course prove as bad, if not worse then a Law Suit;
that there be honest, indifferent, and judicious Arbitrators chosen, not

only such as are just men, but such as are skillful and knowing in the
matters in controversy, that their ignorance may not make them erre,
and the parties suffer as much by their folly, as others no doubt have
done by their Arbitrators injustice and knavery; for unequall and

insufficient Arbitrements doe often cause tedious Suits, and those no
make choise of
small expense, so that this course which the people 180

for their cure, proves often worse then the rileafe; ....

March neatly summed up the problem of pseudo-adjudicative arbitration.
It was a process in limbo; having taken on adjudicative characteristics
and having been granted some tenuous coercive powers, there was no
balance of legitimating procedural standards and controls over possible
abuses. As arbitration moved toward adjudication, these standards and
controls became inevitable, both to the benefit and detriment of
adjudicative arbitration's staunchest supporter--commerce.
C. Commercial Demands on Arbitration
1.

Priorities in Commercial Dispute Processing

Starting in the Middle Ages, the emerging mercantile and trade
classes further eroded the use of arbitration as a conciliatory process by
their own institutionalization efforts to harness the process for their
needs. These were distinct communities with specific priorities in
dispute processing that varied little from those of modem commerce.
Foremost of these priorities were speed and economy. The delay and
cost of "defective" arbitrators, arbitrations, and awards and subsequent
encounters with the courts must have been extremely frustrating for these
communities. As some medieval fairs met only periodically and many
178.
179.

180.

MARCH, supra note 138, at 160.
Id.
MARCH (Supp. 1648), supra note

138, at 88.
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tradesmen were itinerant or from foreign countries, disputes often had to
be resolved on the spot. Unresolved disputes could delay transactions,
tie up assets, impair credit, and impede the flow of trade. As in all
commercial disputes, the cost of processing a dispute ideally should not
exceed the value of the goods or services involved; thus, economy in
dispute processing was served by a quick and simple procedure. Further
savings were 18 possible if the process did not require paid legal
professionals. 1

There is little economy in a process from which a disgruntled party
could walk away without complying with the outcome or could go to
another forum to press his case. For this reason, contentious commercial
disputes were best resolved through a binding and final determination.
In addition, most commercial disputes were over quality and value of
goods and services or over monies due on account, matters more
conducive to unicentric solutions. Reconciliation was important, but
only when the dispute was primarily non-economic or when the
relationship between the disputants was an important or continuing one,
e.g., disputants who were members of a guild that relied heavily on the
cooperation of its members, or disputants whose long-term commercial
relationship was vital. For such disputants, there was a mutual advantage
in compromise over judgment. Nevertheless, economy, the nature of the
disputes, and a diminished importance of reconciliation favored an
adjudicative process over a conciliatory process.
Another concern of considerable weight to the commercial
community was that disputes be resolved through the application of
prevailing commercial norms and trade custom by a tribunal that had
enough expertise in the disputed subject matter to reach a logical result
consistent with these norms. Commercial norms and trade custom
provided the predictability which was and still is so essential for
flourishing trade relationships. In the Middle Ages, the regular courts
were interested primarily in property disputes and breaches of the King's
peace. The "gap" between accepted trade practices and the Common
Law, which was devoid of mercantile custom, made those courts
inappropriate. 82 Judges who were ignorant of commercial norms
compounded the problem. The judicial process was not geared toward
the problems of trade: venue was difficult to obtain in international
181. This is not to say that commercial persons are always economically rational. Many
outwardly commercial disputes persist, despite economic irrationality, for reasons of policy
or personality. It should be noted that most commercial disputes, indeed most disputes
generally, were and are resolved through the direct negotiation of the parties.
182. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 18, at 631 (Pluncknett uses the example of bills of
exchange, which were common in sixteenth century commercial practice but were not
recognized in law until the late seventeenth century).
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trade, writs were limited, and procedure was too slow and often too
costly. The only advantage, albeit considerable, was the binding and
unicentric nature of court judgment.
2.

The Influence of Early Mercantile Tribunals

The inadequacies of conciliatory loveday arbitration and of
litigation in the regular courts led to the development of a set of special
commercial courts to satisfy the dispute resolution needs of the
commercial community: the courts of Fairs, which handled mostly
domestic trade; the courts of the Staple, which handled mostly foreign
commerce; and the guild (or "gild") tribunals, which processed disputes
within respective guilds.183 The courts of Fairs came to be known as
courts of "piepowder" and were presided over by the mayor, with lay
merchants attending the fair acting as judges. 184 The right to hold court
was incident to the franchise to hold a fair in a protected "burh." If the
court only sat occasionally, the proceedings were entered into the
ordinary plea rolls of the borough courts as if the former were a special
session of the latter.
Merchant expertise was coupled with the application of "fair law,"
which applied to all who traded, both domestic and foreign. Fair law
was in accord with then universal customs of merchants, and had no
reference to the courts of the realm; 185 as such it came to be known as the
Law Merchant. It contained many elements of civil law and remained
distinct from the common law. Coke noted that the courts of fairs were
courts of record and original jurisdiction' 86 in which judgment was
which even Bracton
unicentric and binding. Procedure was summary,
87
recognized as necessary for merchant cases. 1
The courts of the Staple were established for similar purposes. The
Statute of the Staple (1353)188 provided merchant courts for speedy

183. For a good summary of these courts, see 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 535.
184. Id. at 538 n.1.
185. Wolaver, supra note 24, at 136.
186. 4 Co. Inst. 271.
187. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 537 n.4 (citation omitted). Blackstone also
commented that these courts met the special needs of merchants:
The reason of their original institution seems to have been, to do justice
expeditiously among the variety of persons that resort from distant places to a
fair or market; since it is probable that no inferior court might be able to serve
its process, or execute its judgments, on both or either of the parties; and
therefore, unless this court had been erected the complain(an)t must necessarily
have resorted.., to some superior judicature.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *33.

188.

1353,27 Edw. 3 (Eng.).
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justice according to the law of the Staple, 189 required the application of
the Law Merchant in favor of common law,1 90 and granted jurisdiction to
the mayors or sheriffs,' 9' while precluding local courts, in eyre or assize,
from hearing merchant cases.192 Jurisdiction and procedure
were
193
designed so as not "to drive them to sue at the common law."'
Piepowder and staple courts flourished for a couple of centuries, but
by the latter half of the fifteenth century, these courts were in decline.
The emergence of chartered trading companies 194 and other changes in
95
the commercial practice, particularly the use of "forward" contracts,'
diminished the usefulness of the institution. The restriction of their
jurisdiction by statute in 1477,196 accompanied by the eventual
absorption of the Law Merchant by the common law, led to their almost
total collapse during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Another institution that provided commercial dispute processing
was the guild. Guilds were far from homogeneous institutions; generally
a guild was a non-voluntary institution that drew its right to exist from
royal charter and exercised regulatory powers over merchants,
tradesmen, and craftsmen who came within its purview. It was a part of
borough government, and although the evidence is scarce, it is
reasonably certain that guilds were self-regulatory organizations that
developed their own courts to which members came not voluntarily, but
by order and summons enforced by internal discipline. For example, a
typical provision provided:
Also they are agreed that if any dispute arise between any of the said
Brotherhood, that he who shall feel himself aggrieved shall complain
to the said Brotherhood so that the trespass may be redressed between
the parties without making a disturbance, and that no one shall
complain in any other place nor in any other manner; and if any one
be a rebel and will not be reformed by the Brotherhood, that he be
189. Id. at c. 2.
190. Id. at c. 8.
191. Id. at c. 21.
192. Id.atc. 5.
193. Id. at c. 20.
194. Charters of the new trading companies sometimes included the privilege that
merchant members could adjudicate disputes between themselves, as in the charter of the
African Company (1672), which gave power to establish a court consisting "of one person
learned in the civil laws and two merchants" to try cases "according to the rules of equity
and good conscience and according to the laws and customs of merchants." PARKER, supra
note 24, at 11.
195. In forward contracts, goods are sold "to arrive" on the basis of a description.
Auction sales, wherein goods are examined and sold on the spot, were in decline. See
Ferguson, The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes and the Legal System in Modern
England, 7 BRITISH J. OF L. & Soc'Y 141, 150 (1980).
196. 1477, 17 Edw. 4, c. 2 (Eng.).
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ousted from the Company forever.

197

The threat of ouster was a compelling reason to use the guild
tribunal and follow its dictates. This disciplinary power, combined with
original jurisdiction in some cases, allowed these tribunals to issue
binding, non-conciliatory judgments, which they could enforce. Thus,
for example, the charter of the Gild of Yarmouth provided: "At which
feast (Trinity) all private quarrels and emulations were heard and
ended.. ;,,'98 and the charter of Bridgewater stated: "for the promotion
of love and peace, have ordained that they will choose yearly two
Seneschals of their Gild and one bailiff to attend on them; such
Seneschals to have the power to punish those offending against these
ordinances."'1 99
Although the jurisdiction of guild tribunals was extremely limited
by definition, guildsmen had no other forum in which to resolve disputes
with fellow members until the sixteenth century. In 1504, an act of
parliament granted guildsmen the right to sue fellow members at law
without leave of the guild. 200 This loss of original jurisdiction and a
general decline in guild authority and disciplinary power during the
sixteenth century undercut the effectiveness of these tribunals and led to
their collapse.
The beginnings of "commercial arbitration" are often traced to the
1
medieval mercantile courts and guild tribunals. 2 If arbitration means an
informal procedure in accord with the customs of a trade for speedy and
simple determination, then these fora were arbitral tribunals; however, if
arbitration means voluntary submission to party-appointed arbitrators
instead of a state tribunal, then these were not arbitrations. Essentially
these tribunals were courts of law, extensions of the English legal system
that heard cases that were non-justiciable under the common law. With
respect to guild tribunals, Pollock and Maitland reply: "[T]hey entertain
actions of debt and covenant and trespass, and hardly dare we call such
assemblies mere courts of arbitration, for they can enforce their own
2 2
Thus, the process taking place in these courts and
decrees; ....
197.

Jones, The HistoricalDevelopment of Commercial Arbitrationin the United States,

12 MINN. L. REv. 240, 262 (1928) (quoting from JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE WORSHIPFUL
COMPANY OF THE DRAPERS OF LONDON (1200)).
198. Wolaver, supra note 24, at 134 (quoting 2 CHARLES GROSS, THE GILD MERCHANT:
A CONTRIBUTION TO BRITISH MUNICIPAL HISTORY 278 (1890)).
199. Id. at 23.
200. An Act Concerning Ordinances Made by Bodies Incorporate, 1504, 19 Hen. 7, c. 7,
s. 7 (Eng.).
201. See PARKER, supra note 24, at 6-8; KELLOR, supra note 87, at 1-5; Jones, supra
note 197, at 243-45; Mentschikoff, supra note 24, at 646; see also ALBERT CARTER, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 268 (1902).
202. 1 POLLACK & MAITLAND, supra note 15, at

667. With respect to these merchant
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tribunals was litigation. Guild and mercantile courts were examples of
judicial informalism, employing an informal process while concurrently
serving as direct extensions of the English judicial system by enforcing
their own judgments.
Nevertheless, these tribunals were important influences in the
development of arbitration. Through them, the commercial community
developed a tradition of self-regulation of disputes with a process that
met its priorities.
This experience and the ongoing priorities of
commercial dispute resolution encouraged the imposition of the more
important characteristics of the medieval commercial tribunals on the
arbitral process, i.e., informal speedy procedure and decision making by
experts in the disputed subject matter.
3.

Early Commercial Arbitration

One critic of the resurgence of arbitration in the twentieth century
concluded that "arbitration, as it is understood today, was unknown as a
policy or practice of the fair courts or gilds. 2 °3 In actuality, however,
arbitration was not unknown to the mercantile community, and although
the evidence is meager, some fair courts and guild tribunals and the
merchants and guildsmen who frequented those fora clearly used
arbitration as an alternative.
One of the earliest recorded examples of commercial arbitration
dates from 1287 in the Fair Court of St. Ives. In this dispute over the
proper measurement of cloth, the court record states: "Et partespetunt
diem ad concordandum usque in crastinum et ponunt se in omnibus in
arbitrioBartholomei de Acre. 204 This translates: "And the parties crave
a day to make concord on the morrow, and they submit themselves in all
things to the judgment of Bartholomew of Acre." The disputants
avoided a court decision and sought a "day of concord," as in a
loveday. 20 5 In fact, the word "Amor" is notated in the gloss. 20 6 It would
be unwise to infer too much about the arbitral process from this brief
record and notation which may simply be formulaic, but it is interesting
to speculate whether this is an example of communal arbitration in a
commercial context. The "Amor" in the gloss refers to the loveday
tribunals, Pollock and Maitland also commented, "there can hardly exist a body of men
permanently united by any common interest that will not make for itself a court ofjustice if
it be left for a few years to its own devices." Id.
203. Wolaver, supra note 24, at 137-38.
204. Records of the Fair Court of St. Ives (1287), reprinted in 1 SELECT CASES
CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT 1270-1638, at 23 (Charles Gross ed., Seldon Society No.
23, 1908).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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concept of amiable agreement, and, also consistent with reconciliation,
all matters were supposedly addressed rather than just the measurement
But consistent with commercial dispute processing
dispute.
requirements, the award, "Arbitrium," was entered on the record several
days later as if it were a judgment of the court.2 °7 One of the parties even
appears to have agreed to bear the amercements for both. 0 8
Reconciliation may have been a factor in the commercial use of
arbitration, but in some cases, the inadequacies of the merchant courts
themselves may have encouraged its use. For example, in Salterne v.
Evans (1579 A.D.),20 9 the City of Bristol Court of Staple suffered from
the same delays as the regular courts. After court delays of fifteen
months, the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute over a £40 debt.
Arbitration had advantages other than reconciliation or speed.
Courts could not easily reform commercial contracts so as to effectuate
the original purpose of the parties before an unanticipated change of
circumstance defeated the transaction, but arbitrators could. In Nicholas
Edward v. John atte Well (14th century), the buyer's complaint in this
action for defective goods describes an arbitration in detail.2" ° One
arbitrator was chosen to resolve this problem and "all other quarrels and
trespasses ever previously occurring" between them. 21 1 The complex
award, which essentially reformed the parties' contract, included a return
of some monies by the seller and a renegotiated note under which the
buyer would pay monies to the seller at specified intervals in the
future.2 12 In this respect, the conciliatory characteristic of bicentric
awards was useful in commercial dispute processing.
These examples show that arbitration was not unknown to the
merchant courts and those who used them. Perhaps the more dramatic
early examples of commercial arbitration occurred within the guild
tribunals, which were no longer an extension of the state judicial
mechanism after they lost original jurisdiction by statute in 1504.
Although guilds continued to enforce their ordinances into the

207.

Id.

Id.
Q.B. Roll, Mich. 22 & 23 Eliz. I, P.R.O. ref. K.B. 27/1275, m. 457ff, Court of
Piepowder, reprinted in A.K.R. KIRALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 249 (1957)
("both the plaintiff and the defendant submitted themselves by the mediation of friends to
the arbitration ordinance and judgment of... indifferent arbitrators elected by both parties
to arbitrate, adjudge and finally determine.., all matters in dispute between them.
Arbitrators awarded £10.17 and awarded that defendant should provide security to
plaintiff.").
208.
209.

210.

2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS FROM THE KING'S COURTS 1307-1399, supra note 82,

at 450-5 1.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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seventeenth century, 1 3 the effect on dispute resolution provisions was
immediate.
For example, Sir Thomas More drafted the following
ordinance for the barber surgeons of London in 1530:
Yff any matter of stryff or debate hereafter be betwene any p'son of
the said Crafts as God ffordende that noon of them shall made any
p'sute in the Comon Lawe but that he whiche ffyndeth hym aggreved
shall ffurst make his complaynt to the Masters-to the extent that
they shall 14ordre the said matter or cause of complaynt so made yff
2
they can.
In 1560, the Elizabethan Guild of the City of Exeter approved the
following ordinance:
Yf any debate or controversie about any accompt or otherwyse doo
happen betwene any of this Companye, That then the same variance
to be revealed to the Governe' and Consultes of the Companye, who
according to their discrecions may take further order therein for the
endying and appeasing of the same which yf they cannot redresse:
That then it shalbe215lawful for the saide parties to precede in wager
and tryall of Lawe.
In 1587, the charter of the Company of Clothworkers provided:
If any discord, strife or debate shall fortune to happen between one
householder and another of the said company-or between them or
any of their journeymen or apprentices or between any of the
aforesaid persons of the art or mystery of clothworkers which,
without prejudice of the laws of the realms, may be appeased by
good and wise men; that the said parties, before they move or attempt
by course of law any suit between them or against the other in that
behalf, shall first show their grief with the circumstance of the same
to the wardens of said mystery .... And if it shall seem to the masters
and wardens that the matter is difficult and beyond their reach to end
and determine the same for lack of better understanding of the laws
of the realm or the custom of clothiers, that then any of the said
parties may take their remedy one against the other without further
216
license to be obtained at the hands of the said warden.
Again, it is dangerous to speculate about dispute resolution in the
guilds, but these examples imply a subtle change in the nature of the
process used by the guild tribunal. The notion of arbitrators seeking to
"appease" the disputants is a more conciliatory characteristic, highly
213.

Jones, supranote 197, at 244.

214. Id. at 245.
215. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
216. Wolaver, supra note 24, at 134 (quoting Ordinance of Clothworkers, London, 29
Eliz. (1587)) (emphasis added).
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reminiscent of loveday arbitration. Guild tribunals lost their original
jurisdiction and no longer could depend on state-sanctioned coercive
power to enforce settlements. Instead, guilds had to rely on the threat of
internal discipline, if credible, and the good will of members. The
examples indicate that in order to retain some dispute processing power,
these late sixteenth century guilds opted for a form of conciliatory
arbitration as a condition precedent to suit.
Even before 1504, when guild arbitration was mandatory and
binding, actual practice may have tended toward conciliatory arbitration.
In craft guilds, master workmen labored in their homes, in which their
apprentices and even journeymen may have resided. Journeymen often
married into their former master's family and lived nearby. As a result,
the ordinances of craft guilds regulated aspects of the daily lives of and
relationships between masters, apprentices, journeymen, and their
families and servants.2 17 Craft guilds were composed of numerous
smaller, interdependent, often familial, communities which, like the
feudal agrarian
community, would have had a strong interest in
2 18
reconciliation.
Arbitration in its then current forms, conciliatory or pseudoadjudicative, may have functioned adequately when used by an internally
cohesive commercial group which either had the internal good will or
discipline necessary to support its use or when the parties saw a mutual
advantage in avoiding the courts. In many cases, however, the dispute
ended up in the very courts that merchants sought to avoid, and with
unfortunate consequences. For example, in the Salterne case referred to
above, when the matter finally was heard before the court, the plaintiff
denied he agreed to stand by the arbitral award and requested a jury to
determine whether he did. The jury determined that the plaintiff did not
agree to stand by the award in the form alleged by defendant. The
defendant appealed, the plaintiff defaulted, and by the time it was
resolved, the original delays in the Court of Staple must have appeared
relatively minor.2 19
For commerce, the advantages of arbitration were frustrated by its
lack of binding finality. The atte Well case described above made its
217. KELLOR, supra note 86, at 2.
218. Modem labor arbitration emerged at the end of the eighteenth century during the
industrial revolution with a similar conciliatory purpose and is probably the nearest
descendant of craft guild arbitration. See generally W. H. WATSON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS: INCLUDING THE ACT OF PARLIAMENT RELATING TO

ARBITRATIONS BETWEEN MASTERS AND WORKMEN; WITH AN APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS (3d

ed. London 1846).
219. KIRALFY, supra note 209, at 249. By implication, however, this case indicates that
the court would have enfored the award. Ultimately, the plaintiff did not contest the
defendant's appeal and the matter was reversed on default. Id.
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way to a court that was only equipped to make a unicentric award. Once
in court, the technicality of pleading further frustrated attempts by the
commercial community to employ arbitration. For example, in Veale v.
Warner (1669 A.D.), a subtle plea by defense counsel drove the plaintiff
to discontinue an action to enforce an award.22 °
The uncertainty of pleas was not the only technicality that frustrated
the commercial community's use of arbitration. In an early case (1281
A.D.), twenty-eight Italian merchants and the plaintiff submitted a case
of trespass to arbitration in England. The plaintiff later obtained what
could roughly be described as a lower court judgment based on the
award. On appeal, both the award and the lower court judgment based
on the award were quashed on legal questions, which included venue, an
award based on only one arbitrator's opinion, and an error of the lower
court in determining the plea.2 2' In a later case (1388 A.D.) involving a
wool transaction, the plaintiffs brought a writ of account against a
woman defendant. In a previous arbitration of this same dispute, the
award provided that the defendant pay two sacks of wool to the plaintiffs
and the plaintiffs in turn pay £22, which they did. The court refused to
enforce the
award because a writ of account was not valid against a
222
woman.

By the seventeenth century, the commercial community must have
become increasingly disenchanted with the dispute resolution processes
then available. Mercantile courts and guild tribunals were in decline,
loveday arbitration was more communal than commercial, and pseudoadjudicatory arbitration threatened to cost more time and money than
litigation because of the ease in which the losing party could avoid the
outcome or bring the matter back into the courts. The increasingly
centralized court system and irregular assizes were too slow, formal,
expensive, and inconvenient. The common law courts had established an
almost exclusive jurisdiction over commercial matters as a result of an
alliance with Parliament in the civil wars; 223 unfortunately, the judiciary

lacked expertise in the Law Merchant and in commercial matters
generally. 224 In addition, an irrational and unsystematic body of
220. 85 Eng. Rep. 468 (1669). The defense counsel was the reporter, Saunders, himself
whom the Chief Justice "reprehended... for pleading so subtlely on purpose to trick the
plaintiff...." Id. at 469.
221. Florence Merchant case (1281), reprinted in SELECTED CASES CONCERNING THE
LAW MERCHANT, supra note 204, at 36-39; cf Murray, supra note 54, at 199 (he submits

that this is the oldest case articulating the notion that there must be a justiciable controversy
(jurisdiction in this case) to have a valid proceeding).
222. Stammok v. Cherche (1388), Y.B. 12 Richard 2 (1388-89), reprinted in I Ames
Foundation 164 (Deiser ed., 1914).
223.

See PARKER, supra note 24, at 11.

224. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 149 ("during the latter half of the sixteenth
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arbitration law frustrated any effort to obtain whatever judicial relief was
available. For these reasons, the commercial community had a vested
interest in transforming arbitration into a more efficient adjudicative
process.
III. Arbitration as an Adjudicative Process
"Oh," said the Judge, in robe and fur,
"The matter in dispute
To arbitration pray referThis is a friendly suit."
W.S.Gilbert,Damon v. Pythias
A.

Transition to Adjudication: Institutionalizationof Court-Sponsored
Arbitration

In the late Middle Ages and early modem period, arbitration and the
courts were under pressure to adapt to fill the void in settling commercial
disputes. If the arbitral process and the judicial process were to serve the
interests of business, the former would have to become primarily
adjudicative, while the latter would have to shed clumsy formalities and
provide commercial expertise. Meanwhile, the commercial community
was finding it increasingly advantageous to initiate yet another form of
arbitration available under judicial auspices.
1.

The Arbitration of Pending Causes

Just as loveday arbitration served the community through
reconciliation, the arbitration of pending lawsuits served the courts by
supplementing the judicial process. 225 These arbitrations were "courtsponsored," providing courts with a method of expediting the resolution
of cases whenever judicial resources were scarce, disputants too
powerful, issues too sensitive, or subject matter unsuited for jury
determination or requiring specialized knowledge or expertise.
The oldest recorded evidence of arbitration as a distinct process in
post-Roman England is Anglo-Saxon and alludes to arbitrating pending
century there are many indications that the tribunal which gave the most satisfaction to the
merchants was the one in which they themselves had some share.").
225. The arbitration of pending causes should be distinguished from the use of
litigation together with out-of-court references. In the latter case, disputants may have
initiated litigation in order to force the other parties into arbitration or to enhance their
position in arbitration, or they may have initiated arbitration in order to avoid the
litigation. In the arbitration of pending causes, however, the courts either initiated or
directly encouraged arbitration under their auspices as an extension and variation of
judicial fact-finding to facilitate the litigation.
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cases under judicial auspices.2 26 In the Kentish laws of Aethelberht
(circa 602-03 A.D.), a form of arbitration was used to determine the
wergeld, the compensatory scheme for bodily injury. With respect to leg
injuries, the law provided a set rate of compensation for the injury itself;
however, it provided further: 227
"If he becomes lame, the settlement of the
matter may be left to friends.
In the same century, there is a much clearer reference to arbitration
in the Laws of Hlothhere and Eadric, Kings of Kent (circa 673-85), a
provision of which states:
If one man charges another, after the other has provided him with a
surety, then three days later they shall attempt to find an arbitrator,
unless the accuser prefers a longer delay. Within a week after the suit
has been decided by arbitration, the accused shall render justice to the
other and satisfy him with money, or with an oath, whichever he [the
accused] prefers. If, however, he is not willing to do this, then he
shall pay 100
shillings, without [giving] an oath, on the day of the
22 8
arbitration.

The use of surety in this example is a characteristic of pseudoadjudicative arbitration, but the power of one party to compel arbitration
by providing surety has the coercive character of judicial process. In
addition, the accused is encouraged to offer surety; otherwise, he must
pay a penalty to the Crown.229 Although the context is unclear (e.g., it is
not clear whether the arbitration was to take place within or without the
courts), it does appear to have been the policy of the Kings to supplement
legal judgment by requiring arbitration in certain pending cases.230
226. See Murray, supra note 54, at 194. But cf Sayre, supra note 22, at 597 ("There is
apparently no germ of arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon law ....).
227.

Aethelberht 65, reprinted in F.L. ATTENBOROUGH, THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST

ENGLISH KINGS 13 (1922). The word, "may," indicates a voluntary proceeding, but it
could have been conducted as part of the court proceedings. As this illustrates, it is
difficult to distinguish between jury determinations and arbitration proceedings in
pending cases during the early Anglo-Norman period; both involved a submission of
sorts: "[t]he summons of a jury ...is always in theory the outcome of consent and
submission." 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 623. "Friends" could be used

to describe the composition of a jury, id. at 623-24, as well as an arbitration tribunal. See
Murray, supra note 54, at 194 n.5. It would be difficult to determine how much the use
of juries and arbitration influenced one or the other; both were expressions of community
participation in dispute processing. If, however, one accepts Maitland's definition of a
jury as persons summoned by a public officer to make a determination, Aethelberht's
doom would imply the use of arbitrators rather than jurors. The use of "friends" also is
reminiscent of loveday arbitration. There is no reason that highly conciliatory arbitration
would not serve the court's need to have the pending cause resolved elsewhere.
228. Hlothhere & Eadric 10, translatedand reprintedin ATTENBOROUGH, supra note
227, at 13.
229. Id.
230. The disputants seem to have had some small measure of control over this process
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Improved legal record-keeping in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries reveals courts using voluntary submissions to arbitration in
pending cases as a direct extension of the judicial process merely by
making the arbitral award a judgment of the court. For example, in an
early Year Book case, a land dispute was referred to arbitration by the
disputants. The resulting award was simply given judicial effect by the
court.23 In Honesti v. Chartres (1291),232 the Exchequer Court used
arbitrators during the trial of a complex accounting action. Courtappointed auditors had reached an impasse,2 33 so the parties agreed on
two auditors who in turn were also unable to reconcile the accounts.
"[H]aving craved license of the Barons and Justices and having had it,"
the parties finally consented to join three merchants as arbitrators in
addition to the two auditors.23 4 They agreed to be bound by their
unanimous award or the award of the majority. The arbitrators produced
an award in favor of the plaintiff, and the court entered judgment on it.
Costace v. Forteneye (1389) 235 is an unusually detailed example of
the seemingly commonplace use of arbitrators to bring a judicial action
to fruition. In this case between merchants, the plaintiff sued for money
owed on an order of ten "tuns" of Gascony Wine (f57.18.4).236 The
defendant, an apprentice of a wine merchant named Mokkyng, had
refused delivery. The trial was set but the jurors did not appear. After
the trial was reset, the parties appeared and in open court on their "own
free and spontaneous wish" asked for arbitration by four members of the
Craft of Vintners to be chosen by Robert Herry, a Vintner.237 They were
so chosen and sworn in open court. The parties consented fully to
perform by the arbitrators' award, which was given to the Mayor by the
arbitrators and recited and recorded in open court. The defendant, who

because they could choose their own arbitrator and choose not to be bound by the award
but on forfeit of the surety.
231. Humphrey case (c. 1200), 4 CURIA REGIS ROLLS, supra note 78, at 237
(discussed in FLOWER, supra note 80, at 417). Interestingly, the award gave a third party
seisin of the close. By the seventeenth century, it became established that arbitrators could
not transfer ownership of realty by award. They could however award that one party must
convey to the other, but this was complicated by the fact that under the common law, courts
would only enforce monetary awards and not specific performance of the award.
232. 2 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT 53-62, 148-150 (Hall ed.,
Seldon Society No. 46, 1930).
233. The use of court-appointed auditors was a common aspect of the procedure for writ
of account. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 275-76
(2nd ed. 1981).
234. See id.
235. Court of the Chamber of Guildhall of London, London Corporation Records, Plea
and Memoranda Roll, ref. A29, m. 11, reprintedin KIRALFY, supra note 209, at 241.
236. See id.
237. Id.
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could not pay the award, was sent directly to prison by the court. 23 8
In Costace, the court used arbitration directly by giving immediate
effect to the award and enforcing it as a judgment of the court. Here,
arbitration relieved the court in two ways. First, it allowed the matter to
be determined by merchants with expertise in the area of dispute and
gathering of a fact-finding body
Law Merchant. Second, it allowed the 239
when assembling a jury proved difficult.
Legislative recognition of the judicial utility of the arbitration of
pending causes, particularly in commercial matters requiring specialized
knowledge, can be found in the Statute of Staples, 1353. This statute,
which authorized the establishment of Courts of Staples to resolve
commercial disputes according to the Law Merchant, 240 provided that in
disputes over the quality of or method of packing wool, the award of six
assessors was to be final on the court. 24 1 Even in the absence of statute,
some courts directly used arbitration in matters requiring specialized
appointed
knowledge. In 1424, the Mayor's Court of the City of London
242
claim.
malpractice
medical
a
determine
to
eight physicians
Any court faced with arcane issues, knotty accounting evidence,
questions of merchantability, or unfamiliar commercial custom
undoubtedly would be inclined to encourage parties to refer matters to
arbitration and suspend proceedings pending the arbitrators' awards.
Thus as commercial disputes became more common in the Courts of Star
Chamber and of Chancery, it became a practice of those courts to
encourage arbitration by suspending litigation.2 43 The fluidity of
Id.
See PLUcKNETT, supra note 18, at 160, 165; see also 3 SELECT CASES CONCERNING
THE LAW MERCHANT 16-18 (Hall ed., Seldon Society No. 49, 1932) (the plaintiff was in
prison for a debt he claimed he had paid. Although a jury was demanded, the parties turned
to four arbitrators and an umpire, an action which may have speeded the plaintiff's release).
240. 1353, 27 Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.) (established the courts), c. 8 (excluded the common
law in favor of the law merchant, so as not "to drive them to sue at the common law").
241. Id. at c. 24.
242. Reported in PARKER, supra note 24, at 8 (citing Rolls of the Mayor's Court of the
City of London).
243. See generally 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 130, 136, 139, 152. Many of the
arbitrations referred out of these courts involved transnational commerce. The King's
Council would often delegate the resolution of mercantile disputes to the Chancellor if they
touched on international issues or treaties. As the Court of Chancery emerged in the midfifteenth century, it inherited these cases. See ALAN HARDING, LAW COURTS OF MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 102 (1973).
The equity courts adopted the speed and informality characteristic of the mercantile
courts. In 1475, the Chancellor of the Star Chamber was quoted as saying: "This dispute
is brought by an alien merchant.., who has come to conduct his business here, and he
ought not to be held to await trial by 12 men and other solemnities of law of the land but
ought to be able to sue here from hour to hour and day to day for the speed of
merchants." Y.B. 13 Ed. 4, f.96, quoted in POTTER, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 160 (2d ed. 1943).
238.
239.
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equitable procedure allowed these courts to use litigation and arbitration
almost interchangeably as a single process of dispute resolution.244
A good example of this merger of the two processes can be found in
the Admiralty Court. Arbitration commonly was used in shipping cases
involving nautical skill or wage issues. Almost all marine insurance
disputes were heard by arbitrators. 4 In some cases where questions of
nautical skill were involved, the judge himself acted as arbitrator by
consent; more frequently "two or more civilians or experts acted as
'aimables [sic] compositeurs."' 246 Parties would execute a bond or enter
into recognisance in the court to execute the awards, 247 which the court
could incorporate directly into its judgments. In a collision suit,
Handcocke c. Payne (1539), the award finding the defendant negligent in
the collision is entered as the judgment of the court; in almost
conciliatory fashion the award was to be paid in installments. 248 In
Frebarne c. Pelyn (1540), a suit over seamen's wages, the court made
the judgment of the arbitrators its own, and the arbitrators determined
who would pay the court costs. 24 9 Notably, there are more examples of
the merger of the two processes and the related practice of referring
pending causes in local, secondary, and equity courts; in contrast, the
common law courts appear not to have embraced the practice until the
litigation boom of the sixteenth century.
2.

Court Control and the Tendency Toward Formal Adjudicative
Characteristics

Arguably, the interdependence of arbitration and litigation in the
referral of pending causes made such arbitrations take on formal
adjudicative characteristics. The arbitration of pending cases under
judicial auspices yielded awards which the courts converted directly into
judgments. As a result, such arbitrations were adjudicative rather than
conciliatory. Although consent to the referral technically was required,
the negative reality of court proceedings probably was encouragement
enough for most parties. Also, judges who wished to rid themselves of a
particularly complex factual dispute were in a position to pressure parties
to refer the matter to arbitration. Unlike arbitration in the communal
Powell (1983), supra note 26, at 66.
See SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES AD 1530-1707, at cxviii (C.T. Carr
ed., Seldon Society No. 28, 1913). Eventually, in response to a flood of litigation, a
standing committee was formed by legislation. 43 Eliz. c. 12 (Eng.).
246. 1 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY A.D. 1390-1404 and 1527-1545, at
xix (R.G. Marsden ed., Seldon Society No. 6, 1894).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 90.
249. Id. at 101.
244.

245.
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tradition or out-of-court pseudo-adjudicative arbitration, the parties had
little control over the process. The cause remained pending within the
jurisdiction of the court; once they submitted, parties could not revoke
the arbitrator's authority without the court's consent, willfully hinder the
arbitral proceedings, or refuse to abide by the award without exposing
themselves to penalties for contempt
just as if they had impeded judicial
250
judgment.
court
ignored
or
process
These arbitrations took place within and were a direct extension of
the judicial process. The court retained an inherent jurisdiction over the
process and, therefore, could exercise its discretion when converting the
award into a judgment and intervene in case of arbitrator error or
misconduct. 25 1 Such arbitrations, therefore, took place directly under the
courts' supervision and had to conform to judicial standards. The award
had to be one which the court would enter as a judgment, and because
the arbitrators could impose their award through the court, they could
issue unicentric, non-conciliatory awards conforming to the style of
judicial award. Theoretically, the arbitral procedure could have retained
many of the characteristics of conciliatory processes; while there is little
evidence of these proceedings, the interaction with the courts most
probably encouraged the use of lawyers and the adoption of formal
adjudicative characteristics.
3.

The Development of Rule-of-Court Reference Procedure and
Its Extension over Out-of-Court References

For the commercial community, court-sponsored arbitration met
many of its dispute processing needs. It was particularly conducive to
the resolution of commercial matters in which knowledgeable persons
were needed to determine the quality of goods or to apply customary
norms of merchants, both of which were beyond the ken of the courts. In
addition, it provided a more easily enforceable award. The procedure,
however, was unsystematic until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
when the common law and equity courts gradually developed a more
uniform procedure to regulate the mode of referring all or part of the
pending causes to arbitration. Under the uniform procedure, a judge in
chambers issued an order before trial or a judge at nisi prius issued an
order when the case was called; afterwards, either order was made a rule
of court. 2 52 This procedure, known as rule-of-court reference, was more
250. It was not until about 1670 that courts became more willing to use attachment as
the penalty, just as in contempt.
251. Equity courts would set aside mistakes of law or fact. See Corneford v. Geer, 23
Eng. Rep. 1058 (Ch.); accord BACON, supra note 131, at 8.
252. Contemporary case law and treatises are less than clear that this was the prevailing
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suited to commercial dispute processing needs2 53 and gave the
commercial community an adjudicative form of arbitration, but there
were distinct shortcomings. It was only available to parties who were
engaged in litigation and was entirely dependent on the discretion of the
court. Not all disputants wished to file suit, thereby increasing the costs
and risking court interference, merely to obtain a rule of court reference
to arbitration.
The solution was to make out-of-court submissions objects of ruleof-court references. Under continued pressure from the commercial
community and perhaps from overcrowded dockets, the courts began
granting requests to do so by the late seventeenth century. 54 The
practice appears to be clearly established by 1670.255 In Holford v.
Lawrence (1695),256 the court upheld both the power to refer extrajudicial submissions and the power of a judge at nisi prius to compel the
parties to abide by the award.
4.

The Arbitration Act of 1698

The need to make the practice of extending rule-of-court to out-ofcourt references became more pressing in 1697 upon the enactment of
the Statute Against Fines and Penalties.2 57 This legislation emasculated
the penalty bond upon which pseudo-adjudicative arbitration relied for
coercion and enforcement. The following year, Parliament passed "An

practice.

That this was the practice, however, is confirmed by later authority.

See 2

PETERSDOFF'S ABRIDGMENT 109 (London 1825); see also MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 15,

at 383 n.6. If the matter was referred at nisi prius, the jury could be disseized of the matter
by withdrawing one juror. Generally, a verdict could be taken by consent for the sum
claimed, with power to the arbitrators to vary the amount. If bail was involved, it was usual
to wait until the case was called at nisi prius and then take the verdict for the damages stated
in the declaration subject to the award; otherwise, the reference would operate as a discharge
of the bail.
253. Kyd notes the strong commercial influence on the development of this procedure:
When mercantile transactions came to be frequently the subject of discussion in
the courts, it was soon found that a judge and jury were very unfit to unravel a
long and intricate account, and it therefore became a practice, in cases of that
kind, and others which seemed to be proper for the same tribunal, to refer the
matter, by consent of the parties, under a rule of nisi prius, which afterwards
was made a rule of that court out of which the record proceeded, and
performance of the award was enforced by process of contempt.
KYD, supranote 15, at 10-11.
254. According to Kyd, "This practice does not appear to have begun before the reign
of Charles I1[late seventeenth century] for the reports of that period show, that it was not
before the latter end of that reign, that the courts granted their interference without
reluctance." Id. at 11; JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 175, at Awards II.
255. As shown by the case of Hide v. Petit, 22 Eng. Rep. 754 (Ch. 1670).
256. 88 Eng. Rep. 1182 (K.B. 1695).
257. 1697,8&9Wm. 3, ch. l(Eng.).
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Act for determining differences by arbitration" ("1698 Act"). 258
The growing dominance of the commercial community in the
development of arbitration is clear in this legislation.259 Of arbitrations
under the statute, Blackstone wrote, "[E]xperience having shown the
great use of these peaceable and domestic tribunals, especially settling
matters of account, and other mercantile transactions, which are difficult
and almost impossible to be adjusted
on a trial at law, the legislature has
260
now established the use of them.,
Essentially, Parliament established a more effective adjudicative use
of arbitration by increasing the possible level of coercion in out-of-court
references. The statute provided that if the parties expressly agreed on
the face of their arbitration agreement that the reference to arbitration be
made a rule of court, either party could apply to any court of record for
an order to make the reference a rule. The procedure was summary upon
production of the agreement before the court. A party who failed to
comply with the submission was liable for contempt of court.
According to Lord Mansfield a half century later, the effect of the
Act was "to put submissions to Arbitration in cases where there was no
cause depending, upon the same foot as those where there was a cause
depending. '26' The initiation of litigation was no longer required to
trigger the enforcement power of the courts. Out-of-court arbitration
obtained a status within the legal system other than that of mere personal
obligation assumed by the parties, and thereby became adjudicative. At
the same time, it came within the close scrutiny of the courts, as the Act
provided "any arbitration or umpirage procured by corruption or undue
means, shall be judged and esteemed void and of none effect, and
accordingly be set aside by any Court of Law or Equity.... ,262 The
attempt to "balance" court enforcement with court oversight as expressed
in the 1698 Act (respectively in paragraphs one and two) dominates the
theme of subsequent arbitration legislation and judicial opinion.
This problem of balance begs the question of control. When
258. 1698, 9 & 10 Will. 3, ch. 15 (Eng.).
259. The preamble of the act recites:
Whereas it hath been found by experience, that references made by rule of
Court have contributed much to the ease of the subject, in the determining of
controversies, because the parties become thereby obliged to submit to the
award of the arbitrators, under the penalty of imprisonment for their contempt,
in case they refuse submission: now for promoting trade, and rendering the
award of the arbitrators more effectual in all cases for the final determination of
controversies referred to them by merchants and traders, or others, concerning
matters of account of trade, or other matters, be it enacted ....
Id.
260.

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 17.

261.
262.

Lucus ex d. Markham v. Wilton, 97 Eng. Rep. 522 (K.B. 1759).
1698, 9 & 10 Will. 3, s. 2 (Eng.).
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enforcement depended on the goodwill and cooperation of the
participants, the parties were allowed complete control over the process
without court intervention. If courts were to be used to enforce the
process, to what extent should they be allowed to control the process?
The answer evolved over the next two centuries as parties voluntarily
and involuntarily relinquished control, which the courts assumed.
B. Party Control in Transition. Institutionalizationof Judicial Control
1.

Forms of Arbitration After the 1698 Act

After the 1698 Act, the law recognized three forms of arbitral
references: voluntary out-of-court references, references in pending
causes made a rule of court, and references out-of-court made a rule of
court under the 1698 Act. Prior to the 1698 Act, there were only two
distinct forms of arbitral references recognized by law. One form
encompassed the voluntary out-of-court references. For the courts, these
were in the nature of mere personal obligations, the legal consequences
of which flowed only from the agreement the parties had entered into.
Submissions could be oral or written, the procedure was irrelevant, and
arbitrators were free to do as they pleased within the boundaries of the
submission. For the parties, this form of arbitration was in their control.
They could adopt procedures that had either conciliatory or adjudicative
characteristics. They chose their own judges and applicable rules, legal
or customary. A party could revoke the authority of the arbitrator and
initiate a cause of action in court at any time during the pending
reference.
The other form of arbitration prior to the 1698 Act occurred in the
context of references during pending litigation. This form of arbitration
The
was an extension of the court's own adjudicative process.
submission was written and made a rule of court by consent of the
parties. The court retained jurisdiction over the cause and had inherent
jurisdiction over the arbitral process. Theoretically, the court could
intervene at any time, so arbitrator conduct, procedure, and awards had to
conform to the standards of the court. A party still could revoke an
arbitrator's authority during the reference or refuse to comply with the
award, but he would risk the ire of the court and possible contempt and
attachment proceedings.
The 1698 Act created the third form of arbitration, namely
submissions made a rule of court under the statute. It had the
characteristics of a submission made a rule of court in a pending action,
but the jurisdiction of the court and its power to intervene was limited to
that defined in the statute. Revocation of the submission after it was
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made a rule of court risked contempt and attachment proceedings. With
the coercive powers of the court behind the process, this form of
arbitration was more adjudicative than conciliatory.
2.

The Last Remnant of Conciliatory Arbitration: Power To
Revoke

These legal distinctions between types of references remained in
force fc almost two centuries. Toward the end of the first of these
centuries, Kyd complacently concluded his treatise: "Such is the general
System of the Law of Awards; a system which, in many instances, with
much difficulty purified from the unintelligible jargon of technical
argumentation, has been, in modem times, established on the principles
of sober reason and sound sense.... ,,263 There were problems, however.
The 1698 Act had a number of loopholes. It did not apply to a
submission that did not expressly provide that it be made a rule of court.
Because the agreement to have the award made a rule of court had to be
inserted in the submission, oral submissions were excluded.2 6 A mere
reference to arbitrate could be easily obstructed by a party who refused to
appoint an arbitrator. 265 If either party revoked the authority of the
arbitrator before the rule was applied for, the reference was terminated.
Although revoking the submission after it was made a rule risked
contempt proceedings, the revocation still brought the arbitral
proceedings to an end.266
As these problems illustrate, arbitration under the 1698 Act
occupied a "no man's land" between formal court proceedings and
conciliatory proceedings, to the extent that Kyd quoted a judge at nisi
prius as saying that he "never knew any good" to come from such
references.26 7 Although the 1698 Act was a major step in redefining
arbitration as an adjudicative rather than conciliatory process, it had not
transformed the process entirely. Subsequent legislation and judicial
decisions would merge the three forms of reference and continue to
erode conciliatory characteristics while imposing adjudicative
characteristics.
The primary conciliatory characteristic to come under attack was
consent, as expressed in revocation, voluntary submission, and control
over the proceedings.
"Revocation" is the power of a party to
unilaterally revoke the authority of the arbitrator during the reference.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

KYD,supra note 15, at 250-51.
See Ansell v. Evans, 101 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1796).
See Re Smith & Service & Nelson & Sons, 25 Q.B.D. 545 (1890).
Cf Aston v. George, 106 Eng. Rep. 411 (K.B. 1819).
KYD, supra note 15, at 155.
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Along with a voluntary, consensual submission, the power to revoke was
essential to the conciliatory nature of arbitration. By revoking the
arbitrator's authority, a party could effectively withdraw from and
terminate the process while preserving his position and interests in the
dispute.268 The power to revoke gave either party some power over the
procedure and the content of the award. If at any time a party felt the
arbitrators were conducting the proceedings unfairly or that the award
was not likely to be acceptable, he could withdraw from the proceedings
and settle or take his chances with the court. The 1698 Act left intact the
power to revoke a submission prior to the issuance of the award.
Unless the submission was made a rule of court, the remedies for
revocation remained as under the common law, i.e., an action to enforce
a bond or an action on an indenture if the submission or reference was
accompanied by either. Obtaining a rule of court for a submission was
not automatic; it had to be applied for at the expense of a party and at the
convenience of the court. Even if the submission had been made a rule
of court, revocation effectively terminated the reference albeit with some
risk of contempt of court proceedings; but it appears that the courts,
which had discretion over contempt proceedings, were generally hesitant
to impose such harsh measures. 269 The equity courts compounded this
problem by entertaining actions on matters for which the parties had
agreed to refer to arbitration.2 70 As a result, parties to arbitration
agreements who were reluctant to arbitrate had the freedom to initiate an
action in the courts instead.
By the end of the eighteenth century, revocation was perceived as a
flaw in the process. 271 The freedom to unilaterally revoke an arbitrator's
authority coupled with the ability to initiate an action in the courts
allowed recalcitrant parties to delay judgment and increase the costs of

268. The legal recognition of the power to revoke corresponded to recognizing the
power of parties to get up and walk out of any non-binding participatory process without
affecting their rights.
269. According to HOGG, supra note 23, at 4.
270. As late as 1743, Chancery opined that parties could validly waive recourse to
litigation through the use of an arbitration agreement. "Persons might certainly have made
such an agreement as would have ousted this court of jurisdiction." Wellington v.
Mackintosh, 26 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1743) (per Ld. Hardwicke). The common law courts
did not accept this view, and in 1746 it was stated as settled (but without authority cited)
that parties could not "oust the courts" of their jurisdiction. Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep.
532 (K.B. 1746).
271. KYD, supra note 15, at 155. Kyd noted that although the modem law of
arbitration had been "purified" from technicalities and "established" on reasoned
principles, the arbitral process itself "frequently becomes the instrument of the most
flagrant injustice, and the most serious oppression." Id. at 250-51. Although this is a
general attack on the corruptibility of arbitrators, it illustrates disillusionment with the
process.
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resolving the dispute. This left contemporary commentators to conclude
that the only subjects proper for arbitration are those for which the local
courts provided no adequate system of trial. 272 Until such time as
arbitration had the full coercive backing of the courts, it was an
ineffective adjudicative process except where there were deficiencies in
litigation or where it was clearly in the parties' mutual advantage to
arbitrate an end to the matter.2 73 The only thing that stood in the way of
arbitration becoming an effective adjudicative process was the power to
revoke.
3.

Eroding Consent: Legislative Reforms

Prodded by commerce, nineteenth century parliaments virtually
eliminated the power of revocation. Section 39 of the Civil Procedure
Act of 1833 ("1833 Act") provided that a party could not revoke an
arbitrator's authority without leave of court.274 As a practical matter, the
courts probably granted leave whenever a party showed good cause, such
as arbitrator misconduct in the proceedings, but no longer could a party
opt out in anticipation of an unfavorable award or because of frustration
over the proceedings.
The erosion of the power to revoke was
accompanied by an increase in the coercive powers available during the
process. Section 40 of the 1833 Act gave parties access to the courts to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence at
arbitration hearings. 275 Arbitrators could administer oaths to witnesses so
that false testimony would be peijury.2 76
Revocation was eliminated only in those references that came under
the 1698 Act. The authority of arbitrators in out-of-court references

272. Kyd goes on to make a very revealing statement about the state of arbitration in its
adjudicative limbo:
The only subjects, which are proper for arbitration, seem to be long and
intricate accounts; disputes of so trifling a nature, that it is of little importance
to the parties in whose favour the decision may be given, provided, at all
events, there be a decision; and questions on which the evidence is so
uncertain, that it is much better to have a decision, whether right or wrong, than
that the parties should be involved in continued litigation.
Id. at 251.
273. In response to Kyd's assessment, Holdsworth made the same observation by noting
that "more use might have been made of [arbitration], if the law relating to it had been more
satisfactory." 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 196.
274. 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 39 (Eng.). Leave had to be obtained from the court in
which the order to make the submission a rule of court was obtained. Id. The provision
applied to both 1698 Act references and references by order in a pending cause. Id. The
1833 Act was judicial reform legislation rather than arbitration legislation so it left the
structure of the 1698 Act intact.
275. Id. s. 40.
276. Id. s. 41.
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continued to be revocable after the 1833 Act. Both the 1833 and 1698
Act assumed that parties would endow the arbitral process with
adjudicative powers when desired by referring to arbitration under the
1698 Act. They had the option, however, of submitting to arbitration
without any dependence on the courts, and in fact the 1698 Act assumed
that all arbitrations were intended to be out-of-court references unless the
submission expressly provided that it could be made a rule of court. In
short, after 1833, parties could "contract in" the coercive powers of the
courts, thereby "contracting out" the power of revocation.
To some degree, the legal requirement of express consent to an
adjudicative form of arbitration recognized the existence and validity of a
conciliatory form of arbitration. This recognition came to an end with
the enactment of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 ("1854
Act"). 277 The 1854 Act reversed assumptions about consent by providing
that any written submission could be made a rule of court upon the
application of either party unless there was an express provision that it
was not intended to be made a rule of court.278 As a result, parties now
had to "contract out" the coercive powers of the court in order to retain
powers of revocation, and all submissions without an express provision
to the contrary became possible candidates for being made a rule of
court. Either party could make any submission irrevocable without
consent of the other by applying for an order. In addition, the 1854 Act
conferred on the courts discretion to stay legal proceedings brought in
breach of an agreement to refer, thereby reducing the ability of reluctant
parties to freely initiate litigation in the face of an arbitration
agreement.2 79
After 1854, any agreement to refer to arbitration was virtually
impossible to escape after the submission was made a rule of court. The
coercive powers of the court extended over all submissions, making the
distinctions between out-of-court and rule-of-court references less
important. The Arbitration Act of 1889 ("1889 Act") 280 took the next
logical step by making the rule-of-court procedure absolute and by
abolishing distinctions between all types of references. Under the Act,
any written submission automatically would have the same effect as if it
had been made a rule of court.281 The coercive powers of the court, now
277. 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125 (Eng.).
278. Id. s. 17.
279. Previously, a mere voluntary submission did not operate as a
if the reference was in progress, and the court had no inherent
proceedings. This problem was circumvented to some degree by
provision which made obtaining an award a condition precedent to a
v. Avery, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L. 1856).
280. 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49 (Eng.).
281. Id. s. 1.

bar to an action, even
power to stay such
validating a contract
right of action. Scott
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available without having to apply for a rule, were supported by a new
summary procedure for enforcing the agreement to refer. 282
By
abolishing the distinction between types of references, and between
agreements to refer and submissions, all written agreements to arbitrate
(not just pending references) were irrevocable without leave of court.
The court or a party now could appoint an arbitrator when an opposing
party obstructed the arbitration by refusing to appoint.283 In essence,
parties could no longer "contract out" the coercive powers of the court,
and all arbitration became court-sponsored arbitration.284
With respect to the erosion of the power of revocation and related
assumptions about consenting to an adjudicative process, subsequent
arbitration legislation does not vary considerably from the structure of
the 1889 Act. By the twentieth century, the erosion of conciliatory
elements and the concurrent extension of coercive power over the
process effectively had completely transformed arbitration from a
conciliatory into an adjudicative process.
C. CommercialInstitutionalizationand Erosion of Consent and
Control
At the same time legal institutions were transforming arbitration
from a conciliatory into an adjudicative process, the commercial
community was affecting a similar transformation through modifications
to its own institutions. In fact, legislative reform and the commercial
institutionalization of an adjudicative form of arbitration were
interdependent. Attempts by commerce to institutionalize arbitration
encouraged legislative reforms, while legislative reforms provided the
coercive powers necessary for successful institutionalization. Arguably,
the commercial institutionalization of arbitration running parallel to
legislative reforms had the more profound effect on the nature of the
process and its proliferation.
The publication of form agreements to refer to arbitration suggests
that commercial institutionalization had begun well before the nineteenth
century legislative reforms 285 and may have been ordinary business
282. Id. s. 12. This was much less cumbersome than the procedure to apply for
attachment.
283. Id. ss. 5-6.
284. Except for oral references.
285. Agreements to refer to arbitration were common in articles of partnership at the
end of the eighteenth century. See KYD, supra note 15, at 8. They also were found in
books containing some of the earliest examples of "form" or standardized contracts. A
seventeenth century form book contains a sample lease for a "brew-house" in which
questions of difference were to be referred to the arbitration of two members of the
Company of Brewers and two members of the Cloth Workers' Company. S. ROSENBAUM,
A REPORT ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION iN ENGLAND 13 (American Judicature Society
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practice in some circles, particularly among disputants who had
established trading relationships and saw a mutual advantage in avoiding
the courts-insurance and shipping, for example. The available evidence
tends to support this notion by favoring conciliatory forms of arbitration,
recommending arbitration agreements that had no provision to be made a
rule of court, and showing "the relatively limited impact of law and
lawyers ....,286 A more adjudicative form of arbitration may have been
practiced by exclusive, cohesive groups that could offer a credible nonjudicial sanction against revocation (such as expulsion from the group).
For other sectors of commerce, however, arbitration was neither
287
final nor binding enough to offer a credible adjudicative alternative.
This changed radically after the legislative reforms of the nineteenth
century opened the way for chambers of commerce and trade
associations to establish their own arbitration institutions.288 The primary
catalyst in the development of these institutions was the American Civil
War. The turmoil in the Confederacy caused so many cotton trading
disputes with the English cotton traders that the Liverpool Cotton
Association set up an arbitration committee to handle them. This
committee quickly grew in importance so as to handle all disputes arising
between members of the English Cotton Association. Other trades,
alerted to the success of this commercial forum, set up their own, starting
with the London markets, then the exchanges, and followed by the

Bullentin XII, 1916) (citing

THE COMPLETE CLERK AND SCRIVENER'S PRIDE

(London

1655)). An eighteenth century instruction manual on the customs of English merchants
discussed arbitration and provided a sample arbitration agreement. See THE COMPLEAT
CoMPTING HOUSE (5th ed. 1722) (as excerpted in 38 ARn. 8 (1971)). Otherwise, there is
scant evidence of voluntary out-of-court references to arbitration during the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, meaning either that the practice of arbitration was so much a part
of business practice that it raised little notice, or that arbitration was virtually non-existent.
As suggested in HARRY W. ARTHuRS, "WITHOUT THE LAW:" ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND
LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 64-65 (1985).

286. ARTHURS, supra note 285, at 64.
287. The easy revocation of the 1698 Act references and the "uncertain legal status of
arbitral tribunals" resulted in a "rarity of calls for arbitration." Id. at 66 n.71 (quoting
from Liverpool Chamber of Commerce Report of the Special Committee on Mercantile
Law Reform 22, 25 (circa 1850)).
288. After the demise of the medieval mercantile courts and guild tribunals and the loss
of commercial jurisdiction by the equity courts, the commercial community repeatedly and
unsuccessfully petitioned Parliament throughout the nineteenth century for the
establishment of special courts or "tribunals of commerce" for the resolution of commercial
disputes. For a discussion on the "tribunals of commerce" movement, see generally
Ferguson, supra note 195. The regular courts were anathema to commerce, particularly
after Parliament relaxed the special qualifications for jurors in commercial cases. Before
1870, special juries composed of "bankers, merchants or esquires" heard commercial cases.
But the Juries Act of 1870 relaxed the qualifications for special jurors to the chagrin of
business. WILLIAM RODOLPH CORNISH, THE JURY 315 (1971).
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bodies. 2 8 9

Around the same time, the commodity
associations and the Chamber of Shipping began developing
290
standardized or form contracts containing arbitration clauses.
In parallel with developments in commodities trade and professional
associations, chambers of commerce were establishing their own courts
of arbitration. In 1881, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce formed a
Court of Arbitration in response to merchants complaining about
overcrowded court dockets, judges unacquainted with trade customs, and
summary disposals of cases by courts after considerable expense and no
resolution.2 9' In 1892, the London Chamber of Commerce resolved that
commercial cases be tried in "special courts with special judges," and
together with the Corporation of London established a private Chamber
of Arbitration, now well known as the London Court of Arbitration.292 In
connection with the activities of this arbitral institution and other groups
providing administrative services in arbitration, the Institute of
Arbitrators was founded in 1915 to promote and encourage the use of
arbitration.293 All these groups encouraged use of the process by
recommending and often providing form contracts containing
agreements to refer to arbitration.
While the legislative reforms of the nineteenth century created a
positive legal environment for the use of arbitration in commercial
disputes, the tribunals of commerce actually set up the machinery. The
results were dramatic. In 1844, the legal profession noted with some
alarm the increasing popularity of arbitration among the "agricultural,
mechanical and trading classes. 2 94 By 1890, it was reported that "the
commercial and mercantile business of the City of London had
practically left the Courts. 2 95 By the turn of the century, virtually all
trade and professional groups provided for arbitration, thereby keeping

289. ROSENBAUM, supra note 285, at 15.
290. See Ferguson, supra note 195, at 150. Form contracts emerged with the decline of
auction sales and the growth of forward sales, whereby goods were sold to arrive on the
basis of a description.
291. This Court of Arbitration was modeled after the French Tribunaux de
Commerce, with a well-known local solicitor appointed as registrar. 71 L. TIMES 358
(London 1881). Manchester and Liverpool first attempted to set up such courts as early as
1865, but without success, because the internal arbitral tribunals of the commodity
exchanges appeared to meet the need. 41 L. TIMES 42-43 (London 1865).
292. 27 L.J. 634 (London 1892); see B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, IN SEARCH OF
JUSTICE 87 (1968).
293. The Institute of Arbitrators was incorporated in 1925 and obtained a royal charter
in 1979, and is now known as the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators ("CIArb").
294. 3 L. TIMEs 211 (London 1844); see also ABLE-SMITH & STEVENS, supra note 292,
at 39.
295. ABLE-SMITH & STEVENS, supra note 292, at 87 n.5.
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most commercial litigation out of the courts.
Clearly, the institutionalized machinery of arbitration made such an
increase in arbitration possible; however, it also had a considerable effect
on the conciliatory nature of the process by diminishing party consent
and control in three areas: the agreement to arbitrate, control over
procedure, and choice of arbitrators. This was accomplished through the
coercive influence of commercial organizations over members and the
growing use of form contracts. The effect of coercion on arbitration was
observed in 1916 by Samuel Rosenbaum, an American lawyer studying
the possible adoption of English commercial arbitration law and practice
by the United States. He noted that the Liverpool Cotton Association
Arbitration Committee grew so powerful because "the disciplinary
powers of the Association were sufficient to make parties feel they were
better advised to submit if they wished to continue doing business in that
market."2' 97 Subsequently, other commercial bodies adopted the same
tactic so that, in the absence of judicial coercion, they could coerce both
reference and submission through internal trade discipline. By 1916, it

was a generally accepted practice that ".

.

. pressure is brought to bear on

persons unwilling to arbitrate by the trade associations, which will
suspend their298privileges from members who do not submit to the rules for
arbitration.
For the most part, such coercion culminated when members agreed
to utilize the organization's form contracts containing arbitration clauses.
Some commercial organizations took the next logical coercive step.
to
Chambers of commerce persuaded their members to sign agreements 299
tribunals,
submit to the jurisdiction of chamber-organized arbitration
and rules requiring arbitration of disputes among members were
becoming more common in the by-laws of commercial organizations.
For example, during the nineteenth century, the London Stock Exchange
forbade recourse to the courts by one member against another; an
internal committee issued arbitral awards, conformity to which was
coerced by the threat of suspension or expulsion. 300 Rosenbaum
concluded that the power to discipline by expulsion from the exchanges
was so coercive that such arbitrations were "compulsory" and therefore

296. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 285, at 15 ("first the trade associations, then the
exchanges, then the professions... architects, engineers, estate agents... set up domestic
tribunals; by 1916, there [was] not a trade or professional organization in England that [did]
not provide some means for the arbitration of disputes . .
297. Id. at 14.
298. Id. at 8.
299. See 71 L. TIMES 358 (London 1881).
300.

See E. VICTOR MORGAN & W.A. THOMAS, THE STOCK EXCHANGE: ITS HISTORY

AND FUNCTIONS 64, 147-48 (2d ed. 1969).
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1
of no interest in his study.30
It is difficult, however, to see how Rosenbaum made the distinction
between the oxymoronic "compulsory arbitration" of certain exchanges
and arbitration that took place when a party was coerced into using a
form contract containing an arbitration clause. In 1916, he noted that
because "every influential merchant or broker in any particular line is a
member of the association in his trade, it is practically impossible to buy
or sell goods of any kind in any bulk in the London market without using
one of tie contract forms insisted on by the trade associations. 3 °2 If one
had to deal with members of the trade associations, form contracts made
arbitration the only game in town.
By the twentieth century, arbitration clauses were in "every
contract-form used, 30 3 subtly affecting consensual references and
submissions. Agreements to arbitrate contained in such contracts were
agreements to arbitrate future unidentified disputes. Disputes arising in
the future had long been the subject of agreements to arbitrate.30 4 Even
when entered into voluntarily, the element of "informed" consent was
already reduced because the parties were agreeing to arbitrate unknown
conflicts. With voluntary out-of-court conciliatory arbitration, this loss
of informed consent was mitigated by the ease of withdrawing from the
process or initiating a cause of action in the courts after the dispute arose
in spite of the arbitration agreement. By the latter half of the nineteenth
century, however, legislation had made withdrawal from the process or
the initiation of court actions in the face of a valid arbitration agreement
considerably more difficult. Form contracts had bound parties to
arbitrate the unknown.
The effects of form contracts on control over procedure and choice
of arbitrator were less than subtle. Different arbitral institutions were
developing their own sets of procedural rules, often reflecting custom or
commercial expediency in their respective fields of endeavor. Such rules

ROSENBAUM, supra note 285, at 15.
302. Id. at 16.
303. Id. at 7.
304. One of the earliest examples is a 1248 case in which the plaintiff complained that
the defendants' wives attacked and beat him; defendants stated that the plaintiff had insulted
their husbands in some manner; they made accord "concordati" to submit future complaints
of any offences to the judgment of six lawful men. 1 SELECT PLEAS IN MANORIAL AND
OTHER SEIGNORIAL COURTS 18 (F.W. Maitland ed., Seldon Society No. 2, 1889).
In addition to the examples of early form agreements, Kyd indicates that agreements
to arbitrate future disputes were common in articles of partnership. See KYD, supra note
15, at 8. English law made no distinction between agreements to refer existing disputes
and agreements to refer future disputes. For all of the nineteenth century, law in the
United States (relying on English precedent) did distinguish between submissions of
future and existing disputes. The resulting contradiction was the central theme of Sayre's
article in 1927. See Sayre, supra note 22.

301.
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could not only dictate the character of the proceedings, they could also
determine or severely limit the parties' freedom to determine the identity
of the arbitrator.3 °5 Valid agreements to arbitrate could incorporate rules
by reference and merely refer to such rules without necessarily detailing
them within the agreement. 30 6 Blind acceptance locked a party into
procedures not necessarily to his advantage.
The most frequent procedural provision found in association form
contracts addressed the manner of arbitrator appointment and often
provided the names and number of arbitrators. It was not uncommon,
however, for the rules of the association and the arbitration clause to
empower the leaders of a particular association as the appointing
authority.3 0 7 In his study, Rosenbaum recognized that choice of
arbitrators was vital to a conciliatory process: "so that they are more
likely to abide by their award than if the case had been heard 3by
them. 08
arbitrators imposed upon the parties rather than selected by

305. It was of course true as it is today that the parties can adopt their own rules or, in
some cases, vary institutional rules by agreement, but it is easier to accept a set of rules
rather than attempt to tailor make rules for each situation.
306. An example of a simple, broad clause is that of the Corn Exchange at the turn of
the century: "Goods sold ex ship to arrive to be taken without refusal, but any dispute
arising out of this contract to be settled by arbitration in the usual manner, as per rules of
the London Corn Trade Association." The association had a complete set of procedural
rules that were incorporated into the contract. The assumption was that everyone knew
the rules, or could go look them up. The clause for the London Oil and Tallow Trades'
Association (Form No. 6, 1915, for Linseed Oil in barrels, clause 11) referred to
arbitration under a set of rules which were to be found on the back of the contract form.
In the arbitration clause from the Refiners' Beet Contract of the Sugar Association of
London, non-members of the association were expressly bound as any members: "This
contract is subject to the rules of the Sugar Association of London, as fully as if the same
had been expressly inserted herein, notwithstanding either or both of the parties to it be
not a member or members (as the case may be) of the Association." ROSENBAUM, supra
note 285, at 16-17. Several associations had detailed arbitration clauses containing
complete directions for procedure instead of incorporating a set of procedural rules by
reference. By the turn of the century, most forms relied on the procedural regulations, or
what there were of them, contained in the 1889 Act.
307.

See, e.g., INST. OF GAS ENG'R & SOC'Y OF BRITISH GAS INDUS., STANDARD

CLAUSES OF CONTRACT (on file with author):
All or any differences or disputes or doubts or disagreements or questions that
may arise out of or in connection with the contract, . . . shall be referred to the
arbitration of both the President of the Institution . . . and the President of the
Society... for the time being respectively either for determination by them or
by such person or persons as they may appoint and in such manner as both the
Presidents may think best or direct.
Id. at 18. Most of the professional organizations, the Royal Institute of British Architects,
the Auctioneers' and Estate Agents' Institution, the Institute of Chartered Accountants, and
the various engineers' associations, required their members to specify in the contract that
the president of the association shall appoint the arbitrator(s).
308. Id. at 24 (parties could choose their own arbitrators in the Corn Trade, Oil Seed
Trade, and Oil and Tallow Trade).
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Many associations provided that the parties could choose their
arbitrators; however, it was not uncommon for the choice to be restricted
30 9
to an approved list of arbitrators.
The extent to which commercial organizations could limit the
freedom of parties to choose their arbitrators through form contracts and
institutional rules was a function of the organizations' disciplinary
powers, the reputation of their arbitrators, and the comparative advantage
of their arbitral forum over litigation in the courts. This is illustrated by
the initial failure of the London Court of Arbitration. Under the Rules of
the London Court of Arbitration at the turn of the century, disputants
were effectively cut off from liberty of choice of arbitrators. Rule 9(b)
provided that "[t]he Arbitration Committee may nominate, appoint, or
select any arbitrator, arbitrators, or umpire in any submission to
arbitration under these rules. 3 a0 Rule 22 stated that the parties may
agree in selecting an arbitrator but that "the Arbitration Committee will
at their discretion appoint such arbitrator, arbitrators, or umpire, but shall
not be bound so to do... ,,311 Rosenbaum noted that this very feature,
allowing the London Court of Arbitration to appoint arbitrators and
dispose of cases pretty much as it saw fit, held no advantage over the
Commercial List of the High Court and wrecked the scheme because, as
Rosenbaum reflected, "the whole appeal to arbitration lies in the personal
3 2
relation between the parties and the tribunal., 1
Inevitably, however, the commercial institutionalization of
arbitration was helping to create a rather impersonal body of professional
arbitrators. In turn, these arbitrators helped perpetuate a tradition of
arbitration and establish customary procedures within their respective
trades.3 13 Under the strict letter of the law, arbitrators could conduct the
proceedings pretty much as they saw fit, but practice varied among
various trade associations. Most trade association arbitration at the turn
of the century was conducted by experts in the trade who used a variety
of procedures. Some arbitrations were documents only, some oral only,
some were a combination of documents and oral presentations, and in the
309. Id. For example, in arbitration under the auspices of the Timber Trade Federation
of the United Kingdom, the appointment of arbitrators referred to an official list of
arbitrators published by the Association, listing the grades of wood that each individual was
proficient to judge. Id. at 18.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 40-46. As a result of this early failure, the London Court of Arbitration
shifted its emphasis to supporting a whole community of arbitrators and directing its efforts
toward legislative reform in arbitration law and procedure. Later, the Court would reemerge
to handle the growing number of arbitrations which fell outside the ambit of the trade
associations' tribunals.
313. Id. at 12.
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case14of "quality" of goods arbitrations, there was no formal hearing at
all.

3

In some industries, however, the identity of the arbitrators was
having a considerable impact on the formality of the process.
Rosenbaum notes that even at the turn of the century, arbitrations on
building contracts, insurance claims, and maritime disputes were usually
held before a celebrated King's Council, who if not actually a judge, was
certainly in line for appointment. Barristers and solicitors active in these
areas formed a reputation for expertise and were popular arbitrators,
while the use of legal counsel became increasingly common in all the
trades. As a result, maritime, building, and insurance arbitrations
contained all the formalities and complications of formal litigation in the
3 15

courts.

Although many arbitrations were indistinguishable from litigation,
commercial organizations made special efforts to keep their arbitrations
insulated from the regular courts. Trade associations deterred appeals
from awards by providing a right of appeal to an association Appeals
Board.316 This tactic successfully kept the courts at bay,3 17 but not
Most associations actively
without some degree of coercion.
appeals or the "stating of cases" by imposing a
discouraged the taking of
31 8
high fee on the movant.
By all accounts, the commercial institutionalization of arbitration
was a success both within and without trade associations. In 1905, the
Law Times reported that "[i]n most agreements entered into between
parties nowadays, relative to commercial transactions, we find the
introduction of an arbitration clause. 3 19 Whether through choice or
coercion, businessmen abandoned the courts, leading the King's
Remembrancer to point out in the introductory summary of the 1913
Civil Judicial Statistics Report that the steady decline in litigation in the
High Court was directly attributable to the increase in commercial
314. Id. at 27-28.
315. Id.
316. These Boards of Appeal were constituted in various ways: some were permanent
(rubber, rice, cotton, and hemp), some were selected by the President of the association
from a larger Appeals Committee (corn, oil seed, oil, and tallow), and in some instances,
the President of the association would appoint a board to match the specific dispute
(Dried Fruit Trade Association, necessary because of the variety of lines included in the
association). Id. at 24.
317. By 1916, the Oil Seed Association was hearing 5,000 to 6,000 arbitrations a
year, of which only 1% were internally appealed, and perhaps one case per year was
appealed to a court. Id. at 30.
318. Id. In the case of the London Sugar Association, disputants could not appoint their
own arbitrators, and an executive committee, the Council, would hear all arbitrations in the
first instance without any right of appeal. Id.
319. 118 L. TIMES 426 (London 1905).
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arbitration. 320 These institutional developments secured arbitration a
place in commercial dispute processing, but the result was a diminution
of voluntary consent and procedural control, thereby also securing
arbitration a place close to litigation at the adjudicative end of the dispute
processing spectrum.
D. Judicial Oversight: Arbitratorsand Process in Transition
The economic coercion associated with the commercial
institutionalization of adjudicative arbitration raises political and social
questions similar to those which inspired Wyclif and Langland to attack
the communal institutionalization of conciliatory loveday arbitration.
However, long before the 1900s and in parallel with the increase in
coercion and the concomitant diminishment of revocation and consent,
the courts began to impose controls over arbitrators and the conduct of
the proceedings.
1.

Reining in the Arbitrators: Natural Justice

As previously discussed, arbitrators had almost unlimited discretion
and power in the conduct of the proceedings and the determination of the
award in out-of-court references. The only restraints were those the
parties themselves imposed. The courts would not intervene, reasoning
that the parties had chosen to resolve the matter outside the courts and
must be content to suffer whatever dissatisfaction that process had
caused: "Neither natural or legal disabilities do hinder any one from
being an arbitrator. If they are incompetent judges, the fault is in those
that chuse them." 32 1 The only grounds for refusing to enforce an award
were those arising from the nature of arbitration as mere personal
obligation, and courts reviewed awards only in the jurisdictional sense,
i.e., whether the arbitrators were acting within the submission, or in other
words, within limits determined by the parties.
When disgruntled parties brought questions of arbitrator integrity,
behavior, and case management before the courts after the 1698 Act, the
courts began using their new statutory power 322 or their inherent
jurisdiction over references of pending causes to impose more control
over the actions and powers of arbitrators. At first, the courts were

320. Civil Judicial Statistics Report, Parliamentary Papers Cd. 7267 (1913) (Sir John
Macdonell).
321. 3 VINER's ABRIDGEMENT 41 (2d ed. London 1791) (emphasis in original).
322. That act provided "any arbitration or umpirage procured by corruption or undue
means, shall be judged and esteemed void and of none effect, and accordingly be set aside
by any court of law or equity .. " 1698, 9 & 10 Will. 3,s.2 (Eng.).
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internally divided and reluctant to intervene,3 23 and it was a relatively
easy matter for the courts to avoid the issue by merely giving the
complaining party leave to revoke; however, by the early nineteenth
century, courts were showing a reluctance to grant parties leave to
revoke324 and a preference for relying on the statutory or inherent powers
to set aside awards on the basis of arbitrator "misconduct."
Court intervention appears to have been inevitable considering the
expansion of the arbitrator's coercive power and the erosion of consent.
The growth in arbitrator power and the decline in party consent and
control were matched by a growth in the courts' supervisory powers. As
the process became adjudicative, problems with arbitrators became a
legitimate concern of the enforcing courts. As one nineteenth century
lawyer reflected, "lawyers know,. . . [when] references are coerced...
[i]t consequently becomes necessary to look a little to the character of the
arbitrators to whom causes.., are sent." 325 Initially, the courts turned to
natural justice to address arbitrator misconduct. Natural justice consists
of several principles primarily concerned with the impartial application
of substantive legal rules.326 The two primary principles are that a
decision maker be impartial and that the parties have a fair hearing.327

323. In Morris v. Reynolds, 92 Eng. Rep. 73 (K.B. 1703), Holt, C.J., stated the
traditional view opposing setting aside on the basis of arbitrator mismanagement "as
contrary to all practice [that he experienced] which was that in such a case the integrity of
the arbitrators [whom the parties by consent had chosen] shall never be arraigned, no more
than the integrity of any Judge." In their dissenting opinion, Powell, Powys, and Gould, JJ.,
stressed that it would be "abominable, to give countenance to such proceedings.., because
they abused the office of Judge." Id.
324. This was exemplified by the statement of one court: "To induce us to grant leave to
revoke, a very strong case should be made out; and with the alternative remedies
provided.., by statute, this general power of revocation is seldom, if ever, invoked."
James v. Attwood, 7 Scott 841, 843 (1839) (per Tindal, C.J.).
325. 3 L. MAG. 432, 427 (London 1830). This was said in the context of a debate over a
proposal for compulsory arbitration in which an opponent feared that judges would abuse
such a system of reference "with considerable celerity" as the evening began to close in. Id.
326. See PETER STEIN & JOHN SHAND, LEGAL VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY 59-74, 78
(1974). See generally P. JACKSON, NATURAL JUSTICE (1973); H.H. MARSHALL, NATURAL
JUSTICE (1954). The phrase itself, "natural justice," first occurs in connection with judicial
procedure in the judgment of Pratt, C.J., in R. v. University of Cambridge (1723). In that
case, the Court of the King's Bench restored to Dr. Bentley the degree of Doctor of
Divinity, which had been improperly suspended by the University Vice-Chancellor's court
in a proceeding at which Bentley was given no opportunity of defending himself. The Chief
Justice commented, "This court will relieve him if he has been proceeded against and
degraded without being heard, which is contrary to natural justice." 92 Eng. Rep. 370, 378
(K.B. 1723). The basic concept underlying natural justice predates the case of Dr. Bentley
and can be traced back to the Bible, "Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the
poor or favoritism to the great, but judge your neighbor fairly." Leviticus 19:15.
327. See Golding, Dispute Settling and Justice, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 106 (1975),
reprintedin R.M. COVER & O.M. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 113 (1979).
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The Arbitrators: Impartiality

A corollary to the principle of impartiality is that a person should
not be a judge in his own cause. This principle was stated first in the
Year Books 328 and clearly reasserted in the early seventeenth century by
Coke 329 and Hobart. 330 But the principle was not applicable to arbitrators
prior to the 1698 Act. 33 ' According to the court in Matthew v. Ollerton
(1693),332 if a party to arbitration agrees to refer the matter to the
opposing party, he cannot object to the subsequent award claiming that
the arbitrator was a judge in his own cause. 333 The basis of the Ollerton
decision allowing a party to be judge in his own cause rested on the
consensual character of the obligation to abide by the award; thus by
choosing the other as arbitrator, one must be bound by such consent.33 4
It was also consistent with the method of selecting arbitrators in
conciliatory arbitration.
A consensual element of pre-1698 Act
arbitration was that a disputant might choose his own arbitrator who
could be either himself or a friend.
After the 1698 Act, the courts began to erode this consensual
element by responding to allegations of bias among arbitrators. The
courts quickly established that a party who had an interest in the outcome
could not be an arbitrator because of the probable bias. 335 Although the
328. Y.B. 38 Ed. III Trin. 15; Y.B. 8 Hy. VI Hil. 19-20; Y.B. 21 Ed. VI Mich. fl. 6
(473) per Baker.
329. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610); Earl of Derby's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1390 (K.B. 1614). The concept is the basis on which Coke proclaimed the supremacy
of the common law courts over courts of royal prerogative.
330. Day v. Savadge, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (K.B. 1615) ("Even an Act of Parliament
made against natural equity as to make a man judge in his own cause is void in itself....").
331. Except in the case of assignment of arbitral powers. See Glover v. Barrie, 91 Eng.
Rep. 67 (1615) (a party is not to be made a judge in his own cause by award).
332. 87 Eng. Rep. 362 (1693).
333. In that action of debt on an arbitration award (the debt resulted from a penal
bond entered into in connection with the submission), the plaintiff, a party to the
arbitration, had made the award himself Id. The defendant complained that such an
award would be contrary to the well-established legal maxim that a party cannot be judge
in his own case. Id. Dolben, J., refused to set it aside, recalling the case of Serjeant
Hards and the Archbishop's horse. Id. In that case according to Dolben, the serjeant
took a horse from the steward of the archbishop of Canterbury, and the archbishop
brought an action. Id. The serjeant by rule of court referred it to the archbishop to set the
price of the horse, which he did. Id. Then the serjeant moved the court to set aside the
award because the submission was to the plaintiff himself. Id. The motion was denied
by Lord Hale with per totam curiam. Id.
334. Accord PARKER, supra note 24, at 15.
335. See BACON, supra note 131, at 8. Bias can be inferred from an arbitrator's
relationship with the parties or his relationship with the subject matter. See generally
MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 15, at 214-21. Four years after the 1698 Act, an award was
set aside because one of the parties was alleged to have offered "great award" to the
arbitrator. Parkers v. Burroughs, 1 Eng. Rep. 275 (H.L. 1702). The arbitrator, a Dr. Titus
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1698 Act did not specifically grant the courts the power to intervene in
cases of bias, the shift in arbitration law recognizing the courts' role in
enforcing an adjudicative form of arbitration gave the courts the rationale
needed to apply this principle of natural justice. This eroded the
conciliatory concept of using "friends" as arbitrators and was making the
appointment of persons "indifferent" a legal requirement.
This caused considerable conflict in those cases in which the
arbitrator was an employee of one of the parties or appointed by a party
as an arbitrator/advocate. By the late eighteenth century, it had already
become a common practice in construction contracts to provide for the
resolution of disputes by one of the parties to the contract, the
builder/owner, or his architect, engineer, or surveyor.336 The courts did
not approve of this practice, but partially on the rationale that the
opposing parties were aware or should have been aware of the possibility
of bias, and chose not to interfere unless actual bias was demonstrated.337
By the beginning of the twentieth century, there were concerns over
whether the courts were failing to intervene enough in appointments that
smacked of bias or undue party influence: ".... arbitrators are only too
often selected as partisans or advocates who are not likely to agree and
perhaps are not intended to do so... ,,338 These concerns led to s.14(1)
of the Arbitration Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), 33 9 which codified the power
of the courts to give relief where the arbitrator was not impartial and
provided that courts could not refuse an application for leave to revoke a
submission or stay an arbitration on the basis that the party knew or
should have known at the time he agreed to the clause that the arbitrator

Oates, was apparently notorious. My thanks to Steward Boyd, Q.C., for directing me to this
case. In another case, the claimant under an arbitration clause in a fire insurance policy
allegedly assigned his claim to the arbitrator he appointed. The award in his favor was set
aside. Blanchard v. The Sun Fire Office, 6 T.L.R. 365 (1890). The courts also determined
that impartiality was best assured when the parties made conscious decisions on who should
or should not be an arbitrator or umpire. In Harris v. Mitchell (1704), the Court of Equity
set aside the award of an umpire chosen by throw of cross and pile by the two arbitrators
who failed to agree on the award, on the basis that the selection of the umpire was to be
made by election or choice; the court noted that this choice "depends on the will and
understanding" and that "it is distrusting of God's Providence to leave such matters to
chance." 23 Eng. Rep. 911 (Ch. 1704).
336. Macassey, Arbitratorsas Judges in Their Own Cause, 19 ARB. J. 101, 102 (1953).
A sample clause in a railway construction contract (circa 1850) reads: "All questions
matters or things touching or concerning the contract shall be decided by the engineer in his
sole and absolute discretion and his decision shall be final and binding." Id.
337. See Jackson v. Barry Railway Co., 68 L.T. 472 (C.A. 1893); Bristol Corp. v. John
Aird & Co., 108 L.T. 434 (H.L. 1913).
338. Report of the Committee on the Law of Arbitration, Cmd. 2817 (MacKinnon
Report) & 35 (HMSO Mar. 1927) (on file with author).
339. Arbitration Act, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 14 (Eng.).
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340

might not be capable of impartiality.
Restrictions on arbitrator bias were in conflict with the practice of
using arbitrator/advocates. Arbitrator/advocates are a remnant of a time
when friends were appointed as arbitrators to act for their appointing
party when determining the award and are, as one authority points out,
34
"the most striking feature of English commercial arbitration." '
Eventually, the courts determined that such arbitrators also should be
held to the impartiality standard.342
b.

The Conduct of the Reference: A Fair Hearing

Lack of partiality was not always easy to prove. Because the courts
had determined that an arbitrator could not be disqualified on a mere
suspicion of bias or circumstances suggesting a possibility of bias, the
burden of proof was substantial.34 3 Bias could be inferred, however,
from violations of the second primary principle of natural justice, the
right to a fair hearing. This principle has several corollaries as well. One
corollary-that each party should be given fair notice of the
proceedings-was recognized immediately for submissions under the
1698 Act. 344 Eventually, other corollaries were found applicable to
arbitration, including that the arbitrator should hear the argument and
evidence of both sides, 345 that the arbitrator should hear a party only in
the presence of the other party,346 and that each party should be given a
fair opportunity
to respond to the arguments and evidence of the other
34 7

party.
340.

Re-enacted as s. 24(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27 (Eng.).

341.

MUSTILL & BoYD,supranote 15, at 222. Such arbitrators are particularly common

in shipping disputes where the forum may be inconvenient to the parties and additional
attorneys acting as lawyer/advocates seems superfluous.
342. An arbitrator appointed to act for one of the parties is not justified in being an
advocate for that party, but should act impartially. Roff v. British & French Chemical Mfg.
Co. & Gibson, 2 K.B. 677 (1918).
343. Bright v. River Plate Construction Co., 2 Ch. 835 (1900).
344. In Anon., 91 Eng. Rep. 66 (K.B. 1698), Holt, C.J. held that awards made in rule of
court arbitrations "shall not be set aside except where there has been some irregularity, as
want of notice in the meeting." But cf Tittenson v. Peat (1747), 26 Eng. Rep. 1105, 1106
(Ch. 1747) (no requirement of notice, but it is unclear whether this was a voluntary out-ofcourt submission).
345. See Phipps v. Ingram, 3 Dowl. 669 (1835) (the refusal of an arbitrator to examine a
witness is sufficient misconduct to set aside the award). But see Braddick v. Thompson,
103 Eng. Rep. 374, 375 (K.B. 1807) (reflecting what perhaps was an earlier doctrine that
such relief was only available in equity).
346. Nevertheless, an arbitrator can proceed ex parte after giving fair notice.
Fetherstone v. Cooper, 32 Eng. Rep. 526 (Ch. 1803).
347. In Morris v. Reynolds, 92 Eng. Rep. 73 (K.B. 1703), the court granted a motion to
set aside an award by submission made rule of court at nisi prius because the arbitrators
refused to hear the defendant after having heard the plaintiff.
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The handling of evidence by arbitrators was a particular problem
because the courts considered the proper receipt of evidence essential to
a fair hearing.348 In addition, they had determined that arbitrators were
bound by the law of England, and therefore had to apply the same rules
of evidence governing the courts of law. 349 Under this logic, if an
arbitrator admitted inadmissible evidence, he committed an appealable
error of law. 350 By the twentieth century, the courts still endorsed this
requirement, but were reluctant to set aside or remit awards on the basis
of an error in its application. 351 Eventually the courts compromised by
expressly or implicitly allowing the parties to "contract out" application
of the strict rules of evidence or to waive application of the rules by
failure to object; 352 otherwise, they assumed that the arbitration would
proceed using this formal trait of litigation.
Strictly construed, the 1698 Act did not empower courts to
intervene in the conduct of the hearing, but by liberally interpreting the
1698 Act phrase, "corruption or other undue means" to cover any general
mishandling of the reference that raised concerns over natural justice, the
courts implied, if not expressed, a preference for procedures more in
conformity with those used by the courts themselves. Subsequent
legislation recognized the courts' ultimate control over arbitral
procedure. 353 In this way, arbitral procedure was forced to conform to, if
not imitate, formal adjudicative procedure of litigation and shed any
procedural remnant of conciliatory process.
c.

The Award: Reasoned Application of Legal Rules

One striking characteristic of litigation is that a court must make
reasoned judgments based upon the application of substantive legal
348. See Anon., 2 Chit. 44 (1814) (reviewing evidence without notice to the parties and
out of the presence of the parties will invalidate an award).
349. A.-G. v. Davision, M'Cle. & Yo., 148 Eng. Rep. 366, 369 (Ex. 1825).
350. Technically this would not be "misconduct" per se but rather a mistake of law.
351. In Re Enoch & Zaretsky Bock & Co., 1 K.B. 327 (1910), Farwell, LJ, reasoned:
"If all that is meant-as I think-is that the Court will not be extreme to mark anything
done amiss in respect of the reception of evidence unless substantial injustice results...
then I should agree. It is plain that the Courts do allow considerable latitude, in practice at
any rate, to the reception of evidence by the umpire, but to say as a general proposition that
they are not bound by the rules of evidence appears to me to be entirely misleading and
likely to lead to a very great injustice."
352. For a brief discussion of, and citations to, cases in this ambiguous area, see
MUSTILL & BOYD, supranote 15, at 310-11 n.2-3.
353. The 1889 Act changed the word "corruption" to "if the arbitrator misconducted
himself," thereby inferring a power to intervene in the case of any "technical" or
procedural misconduct. 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. s. 11 (Eng.). The 1934 Act took this the next
step by referring to the arbitrator or umpire "misconducting himself or the proceedings."
1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, s. 15 (Eng.).
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principles. 354 Prior to the 1698 Act, arbitrators in out-of-court references
were free to ignore substantive legal principles and could determine the
matter based on personal conceptions of justice or as conscience dictated.
Perhaps even more distressing to the legal profession and judiciary was
the freedom of arbitrators to make a decision contrary to common law
principles or to apply and create a separate set of applicable norms. The
courts, however, would not interfere, holding to the position that
"[a]rbitrators are judges of the parties' own choosing, and therefore
[parties] cannot object against an award as an unreasonable judgment, or
355
as a judgment against law."
Strictly construing the 1698 Act, the courts applied this principle of
non-intervention to references under the Act for several decades after its
passage.356 But as arbitration gained enforcement and coercive powers
through the legal system, the courts, perhaps in fear of the possible
development of an aberrant set of legal norms, assumed a limited
jurisdiction to intervene on matters of law. The intervention took two
forms: courts could set aside awards for errors of law on the face of the
award, or they could assume control over legal issues in arbitration
through the use of the "special case."
It is not altogether clear how the courts rationalized the expansion
of their jurisdiction to set aside awards for facial errors of law.357 The
354. Arguably, this is another maxim of natural justice. Corollaries are that the terms of
the settlement should be supported by reasons and that the reasons should refer to the
arguments and evidence presented. See Golding, supranote 327, at 113.
355. Medcalfe v. Johnson, 26 Eng. Rep. 42, 43 (Ch. 1737) (per Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke).
356. In 1720, the whole court ruled that there was nothing in the statute of 1698 to
allow setting aside an award "but manifest corruption in the arbitrators. We will not
unravel the matter, and examine into the justice and reasonableness of what is awarded."
Anderson v. Coxeter, 93 Eng. Rep. 534 (1720).
357. Various suggestions as to the rationale are summarized in MUSTILL & BOYD,supra
note 15, at 389 n. 16. See PARKER, supra note 24, at 13 (disputants sought the assistance of
the courts in enforcing arbitrations and this was part of the price that the courts extracted).
Another modem authority traces it to the procedure associated with the eighteenth
century Writ of Certiorari used by the common law courts to bring lower tribunal
decisions before the King's Bench to be quashed "for error of fact or law upon [their]
face."
Lord Hacking, Where We Are Now: Trends and Developments Since the
ArbitrationAct 1979, 2 J. INT'L ARB. 7, 8 (1985). This would assume that the courts made
no distinction between arbitral and lower judicial tribunals. Older authority suggests that
the practice of setting aside awards for mistakes on points of law or fact was already
established in the courts of equity, BACON, supra note 131, at 8. "It can no longer be said
that 'the only ground to impeach an award is collusion or gross misbehaviour in the
arbitrators."' Id. This explanation for an origin makes sense considering the amount of
court-sponsored arbitration in the equity courts. The earliest case articulating the
jurisdiction is from the court of Chancery in 1715, in which the Lord Chancellor stated, "if
it appear that the arbitrators went upon plain mistake, either as to the law or in matter of
fact, the same is an error appearing in the body of the award and sufficient to set it aside."
Comeford v. Geer, 23 Eng. Rep. 1058 (Ch. 1715). By 1759, Lord Mansfield articulated the
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practice of setting aside awards when arbitrators actually admitted they
had erred in the application of the law was well established, but there
continued to be some doubt as to the power to set aside awards for
unadmitted mistakes of law. 358 Any doubts were resolved in Kent v.
Elstob (1802), in which the party seeking to sustain the award admitted
the mistake of law but argued that "an award was not impeachable on the
ground that the arbitrator had not decided according to the strict rule of
law" even though a practice had emerged of setting aside awards when
the arbitrator "meant to decide according to law and was mistaken in his
notion of it."'359 The judges ruled that they could review and set aside an

award for mistake of law, provided that the mistake was apparent on the
face of the award, or from a written statement of reasons given at the
time of the award by the arbitrator. 360 At this point in the development of
arbitration in England, the common law and arbitration were integrated.
In theory, awards had to reflect the same legal reasoning found in legal
judgment.
In part, the courts' intervention when errors of law appeared on the
face of the award prompted the development of the second mode of

position of the King's Bench: "the Court will not enter at all into the merits of the matter
referred to arbitration, but only take into consideration such legal objections as appear on
the face of the award and such as go to the misbehaviour of the Arbitrators." Lucus ex d.
Markham v. Wilton, 97 Eng. Rep. 522 (K.B. 1759). In an ambiguous statement in his
Commentaries, Bk. 1II, referring to the 1698 statute, Blackstone observed "it is now become
a considerable part of the business of the superior Courts to set aside such awards when
partially or illegally made: or to enforce their execution, when legal .. "
358. In Morgan v. Mather, 30 Eng. Rep. 500 (Ch. 1792), Lord Commissioner Wilson
attempted to clarify the distinctions and the source of authority:
It would be a melancholy thing, if, because we differed from the arbitrators in
point of fact, we should set aside awards. The only grounds for that are, first,
that the arbitrators have awarded what was out of their power; secondly,
corruption, or that they have proceeded contrary to the principles of natural
justice, though there is no corruption, as if without reason they will not hear a
witness; thirdly, that they have proceeded upon mere mistake, which they
themselves admit. I am of the opinion that, when anything is submitted to
arbitration, the arbitrators cannot award contrary to law; as that is beyond their
power: for the parties intend to submit to them only the legal consequences of
their transactions and engagements.
Id. at 502. According to Parker, these remarks show that some doubt as to setting aside
awards for mistake of law persisted until the end of the eighteenth century. PARKER,
supra note 24, at 18. See Anderson v. Darcy, 34 Eng. Rep. 386 (Ch. 1812).
359. 102 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B. 1802).
360. Id. This was affirmed in Hodgkinson v. Fernie, 140 Eng. Rep. 712 (C.P. 1857)
(note dissent by Williams, J. at 717). The situation in the early nineteenth century was
summarized rather confusingly as follows: "The doctrine of the courts is that on a question
of fact within the province of the arbitrators, no court of law or equity has cognizance of the
matter by way of appeal; that where matters of law and fact are referred, the award is final
and conclusive if the arbitrator is silent as to the law; if a question of law solely ... no court
will interfere even though erroneous." 6 L. MAG. 395 (London 1831).
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judicial intervention over the content of an award-the special, stated,
and consultive cases. The threat and reality of having an award
challenged for an error of law probably caused much consternation
among arbitrators, many of whom were not lawyers. In order to protect
their awards from being set aside for an error of law, arbitrators resorted
to not giving reasoned awards or giving their reasons outside the
award. 36 1 Apparently, this practice did not suit parties who were to be
bound by the award, and as a result, they began to jointly ask the
arbitrator to issue a reasoned award 362 or to require a reasoned award in
the submission. 363 This made arbitration extremely inefficient because if
the court did find an error of law it could set it aside but could not correct
the award or remit the award to the arbitrator for correction; as a result,
the entire arbitration would have to be repeated.
To mitigate this problem, arbitrators developed a practice of issuing
alternative awards which would take into effect an adverse decision by
the court on a point of law. Eventually this practice was refined,
allowing arbitrators to reserve points of law and to refer them to the
opinion of the court. 36 Section 5 of the 1854 Act codified the practice
by giving the arbitrator the power, in the absence of an express provision
to the contrary, to state the whole or part of his award in the form of a
special case by which that portion was subject to the opinion of the court.
Prior to the 1854 Act, the parties could "contract in" the power or duty to
state a case, but now they could only "contract out" the power to state a
case.
The special case allowed the court to substitute its award for that of
the arbitrator but could only be used in the context of a final award and
could not be used to intervene on matters of law during the pending
reference. Section 19 of the 1889 Act empowered the arbitrator to state a
consultative case in a pending reference outside the confines of the
award. Furthermore, the court could now direct the arbitrator to state a
consultative case. Section 9 of the 1934 Act 365 reduced the special and
consultative cases to the same footing so that an arbitrator had the power
and the duty to do either if directed by the court.

361. Hacking, supra note 357, at 9.
362. Or to have the arbitrator state the award so that on its face it contained everything
necessary to enable a court to set it aside if an error of law could be detected. See Re Webb,
129 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P. 1818); see also Anderson v. Fuller, 150 Eng. Rep. 1540 (Ex.
1838).
363. The submission would require that the arbitrator state his reasons on the face of the
award and that failure to do so could be deemed misconduct under the 1698 Act. See
Sherry v. Oke, 3 Dowl. 349 (1835).
364. See generally MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 15, at 390.
365. 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, s. 9 (Eng.).
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In Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt & Co.,366 the Court of Appeal held
that a clause purporting to prohibit the parties from applying to the
arbitrator or the court for a special case was contrary to public policy and
invalid as purporting to oust the jurisdiction of the court. The courts
would not tolerate another adjudicative process ignoring the law of the
land. Scrutton, L.J., stated most eloquently: "There must be no Alsatia
in England where the King's writ does not run." 367 Parties were now no
longer free to "contract out" of the application of English law,368 and
arbitrators could no longer determine matters "at their will and pleasure"
and "according to their Opinion and Judgment as honest men. 3 69
2.

Nature of Resulting Process

By the twentieth century, the courts had lost most commercial
litigation to arbitral tribunals, but in effect, they had virtually "absorbed"
arbitration as a lower tribunal,3 7 ° thereby achieving an uneasy resolution
to concerns over abuses in the arbitral process and the threat of alien
legal norms. This had the perhaps unintended effect of inhibiting the
innate flexibility of arbitration. Before the nineteenth century reforms,
arbitrators could conduct the reference without regard to the formalized
adversarial proceedings in a court. 3 7 1 This had been recognized as a
strength of the arbitral process,372 a strength that was soon forgotten as
the courts, not without valid reasons, imposed their own standards over
the proceedings. 373 Neither the courts nor the statutes gave specific
guidance as to what was the "correct" procedure for conducting the
reference other than a general adherence to the principles of natural
justice and application of rules of evidence. Faced with the task of
observing principles of natural justice and the application of the law,
arbitrators were inclined to look to the courts for a model. As English
courts applied natural justice and law and maintained supervisory powers
366. 2 K.B. 478 (1922).
367. Id. at 488.
368. As a consequence, all ordinary legal defenses are available in arbitration; for
example, the defense that a claim is time-barred by statute. In international transactions, the
agreement could specify application of the law of another country.
369. Attributes of seventeenth century arbitration described in ARBrrRftJM
REDIVIVRUM, supranote 141, at 2.
370. See PARKER, supra note 24, at 19.
371. An arbitrator is not bound by a rule of practice adopted by the courts of law for
general convenience. Re Badger, 106 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1819).
372. An arbitrator on a general reference of all matters may go further than the court to
do complete justice and may relieve against a harsh right, which in a court of justice would
prevail. Knox v. Symmonds, 29 Eng. Rep. 582 (Ch. 1791).
373. An arbitrator is a judge selected by the parties, but like other judges he is bound to
observe the ordinary rules which are laid down for the administration of justice. Re Haigh
v. Haigh, 45 Eng. Rep. 838, 842 (1861) (per L.JJ. Turner) (physical infirmity of arbitrator).
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over the arbitration and award, it followed that arbitrator conduct and
procedure should be measured by English conventions of judicial
deportment and procedure.37 4
One of the most prominent characteristics of English courts was the
formal adversarial presentation, including passive judges, the seeking of
particulars (and eventually, various forms of discovery), formal hearings
with opening and closing arguments and lengthy recitations of
documentary evidence into the record, and the oral examination and
cross-examination of witnesses. There was and is no legal requirement
that arbitral proceedings be adversarial, except to the extent necessary to
satisfy principles of natural justice. In fact, the 1889 Act expressly
granted inquisitorial powers to arbitrators. 375 Thus, the arbitrator was not
required to be passive like a judge; 376 however, it became customary, if
not prudent, in practice for the arbitrator to assume a judicial demeanor
as in adversarial litigation.
It is impossible to establish whether this shift in the nature of the
conduct of the proceedings from informal and conciliatory to formal,
adversarial, and adjudicative is attributable also to the legal profession's
increasing participation and influence over the process or the ingrained
cultural habits of a litigious society. Nevertheless, by the mid-twentieth
century, arbitration had assumed most of the characteristics of formal
adversarial adjudication in a court of law. Arbitrators were considered
"lay judges" and expected to perform in the same fashion as their
"professional" brethren. It is important to stress that this was more a
matter of practice and custom than a requirement.
There were
exceptions; for example, at the turn of the century, most trade association
arbitration remained informal because it involved the quantity and
quality of goods and rarely raised legal issues that would invite judicial
scrutiny. 377 By the 1950s, however, a considerable number of trade
association arbitrations had become "technical" arbitrations, i.e., those
involving issues other than quality and condition, and consequently
started generating a significant proportion of special cases in the
374. ARTHURS, supra note 285, at 67.
375. Clause (f) of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act 1889, recodified as s. 12(1)
of the 1950 Act, provides: "The parties to the reference ... shall ... submit to be examined
by the arbitrators or umpire.., and shall produce before the arbitrators or umpire all books
[documentary evidence].., and do all other things which during the proceedings on the
reference the arbitrators or umpire may require."
376. One limitation of the extent of an arbitrator's inquisitorial powers may be with
respect to the power of arbitrators to unilaterally call a witness. "It is certainly not the law
that a judge, or any person in a judicial position such as an arbitrator, has any power to call
witnesses to fact against the will of either of the parties." Re Enoch & Zaretsky Bock &
Co., 1 K.B. 327 (1910) (remarks of Lord Moulton).
377. See ROSENBAUM, supra note 285, at 27-28.
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Maritime, building, and insurance arbitrations already
courts.37 8
resembled formal litigation by the twentieth century. 379 A 1946
handbook for arbitrators states that although "[t]he procedure at the
hearing rests with the arbitrator, and depends ... upon the nature of the
case... [it] is usually that of an action... in a Court of Law." 380 It
proceeds to define arbitration as:
a judicial inquiry conducted for special reasons before a tribunal
other than one of the King's Courts. Its findings should be such as
the Court may deem fit to confirm. In its conduct no laxity should be
permitted; and although a certain freedom should be given ... these
must be checked in an3y desire to dominate justice or legal precedent
by their own opinions.
This statement continued to be valid for the rest of the century.3 82 In fact,
by the 1980s, even the most well-established treatise could distinguish
arbitration from formal adjudication in only one way: "arbitrations differ
,,383 In
from legal proceedings proper only in the choice of tribunal.
freedom
a
limited
was
arbitration
short, the only remnant of conciliatory
to choose the decision maker.
IV.

Concluding Post-Mortem

By the end of the seventeenth century, the term "loveday" and the
institution it described had fallen completely out of use. The last
reference to lovedays in the legal literature dates to 1694 and is
significant because it clearly links modem arbitration with the medieval
loveday. The author of Arbitrium Redivivium notes that "sometime in
the Saxon or Old English, [arbitrement] was called a Love-Day, because
of the Quiet and Tranquility that would follow the ending of the
Conciliatory arbitration was losing its institutional
controversie."
support, had been overshadowed by political process, and failed to meet
the needs of its potentially greatest user, the commercial community.
Loveday arbitration faded from the scene, but ironically, arbitration was
being "brought back to life" as an adjudicative rather than conciliatory
process.
378.
(1952).
379.
380.
(2d ed.
381.

See Ellenbogen, English Arbitration Practice, 17 L. &

CoNTEMP.

PROB. 656, 668

See ROSENBAUM, supra note 285, at 27-28.
W.T. CRESWELL, HANDBOOK OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATIONS 60
1946).
Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
382. See GILL, THE LAW OF ARBITRATION 4 (Enid A. Marshall ed., 1983) (repeating the
statement almost verbatim).
383. RUSSELL ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION 1 (Anthony Walton & Mary Vitoria eds.,
20th ed. 1982).
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From "love and law" as opposite and contradictory processes in the
resolution of disputes in the Middle Ages, arbitration in England had
become virtually the same process as litigation by the twentieth century.
Arbitration had the innate flexibility to be conducted as either an
informal conciliatory process or a formal adjudicative process, but much
of that flexibility was lost through legislation, commercial
institutionalization, judicial decisions, and the shifting dispute processing
priorities of a changing society. Cooperative, consensual use of the
process declined as legislation gave it coercive powers and as
institutionalization made it virtually mandatory. The courts and the legal
profession reshaped it in the image of the process they knew bestformal litigation. As a form of ADR, English arbitration was all but
dead.384 It had become a judicial proceeding by a lower tribunal
completely subservient to the courts. In a sense, arbitral tribunals had
become what their use sought to avoid-courts. The cause of death was
isomorphism.
Will contemporary mediation in the United States suffer the same
fate? 385 There are some striking symptoms as mediation's dominant
384. I qualify the statement because during the last two decades there have been
attempts to reform arbitral practice in England and better differentiate it from litigation in
the courts. By 1979, a debate over whether the close tie between the courts and
arbitration was damaging London's reputation as an international arbitral center came to
a head. Reformers identified the case stated procedure as the culprit threatening dire
economic consequences for the City. The Arbitration Act, 1979 ("1979 Act"), c. 42, was
the compromise between those who wished to preserve the close relationship with
English law and the courts and those who wished to distance arbitration from judicial
oversight.
By repealing s. 21 of the 1950 Act, the 1979 Act abolished the case stated and
special case procedures. In addition, it removed from the court the power to set aside or
remit an award for an error of fact or law on the face of the award. In its place, the
parties were granted a limited right of appeal to the court on questions of law, provided
all parties concur in the appeal or, alternatively, by leave of court. Id. at s. 2. The
fundamental change was the right of the parties to exclude the right of appeal by a valid
exclusion agreement. Id. at s. 3. This reversed the "oust the courts" doctrine; whereas
before the 1979 Act, one could not oust the courts by agreement, under the 1979 act one
can "contract out" of judicial review. This is devolution-a return of consensual power
to the parties and a reduction in judicial oversight. The element of consent in arbitration
was stressed in Bremer Vulkan Schifflbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping
Corp., A.C. 909 (H.L. 1981), and Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. BTP Tioxide Ltd., A.C. 724
(H.L. 1982).
385. American commercial arbitration is suffering the more blatant case of
isomorphism, having acquired many of the characteristics of formal adjudication.
Currently, the most dangerous threat to any conciliatory remnant is the use of the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard to vacate arbitral awards. By expanding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, particularly in the boilerplate of contracts
between parties of less than equal bargaining power, the courts have reduced drastically
the degree of party consent necessary for the process to remain conciliatory. In order for
such arbitrations to maintain their legitimacy, courts and legislatures are forcing arbitral
decision making into conformity with the application of legal norms. See Halligan v.
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raison d'tre clearly becomes the settlement of court cases rather than
reconciliation and the resolution of conflict. Lacking strong alternative
social institutions that promote reconciliation, mediation has had mixed
success at best in surviving independently of the legal system and
commercial community. Legal, social, and political observers have
criticized the promotion of compromise and settlement through
mediation.3 86 The commercial community has adopted and promoted
mediation to serve its interests in efficiency and court-avoidance.
Professional associations of mediators have developed standards of
conduct and toyed with qualifications. Much mediation is quasiadjudicative, bearing certain adjudicative characteristics 387 such as
opening statements, the use of retired judges as mediators in elite
cases, 388 and the use of lawyers as advocates. Judgment by the mediator
is so common that we have the term "evaluative mediation," and there is
on-going discussion as to whether mediating actually constitutes the
practice of law.3 89
Court-referred mediation has grown so much that it constitutes the
bulk of mediation practice. 390 Indeed, the institutionalization of courtPiper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating an award for manifest disregard
of the law and evidence). In addition, arbitrators and arbitration service providers are
making their procedures more imitative of the courts to provide more protection of
individual rights and avoid litigation over the legitimacy of the process. See Robert A.
Baruch Bush, SubstitutingMediationfor Arbitration: The Growing Market for Evaluative
Mediation, and What It Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 111, 119-22
(2002) (making that point and arguing further that the trend actually has created the
market for evaluative mediation).
386. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (elites
use conciliatory processes to maintain power); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that ADR and settlement undermine the purpose of a
civil litigation system when dealing with cases of unequal bargaining power and other
cases requiring judicial involvement); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991) (arguing that mediation may be an even
more dangerous and oppressive process for women than adversarial litigation); Laura
Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practiceof Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the
Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1 (1993) (the
emphasis on achieving short-term peace and harmony undermines justice concerns).
387. See Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite: " Procedural and Evidentiary
Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998)
(identifying some of the judicially-imitative characteristics).
388. See Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927
(2002).
389. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 57 (1996); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who
Mediate Are Not PracticingLaw, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 74
(1996); Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
15 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 94 (1997).
390. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in CourtConnected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
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connected mediation over the last two decades is one of the most striking
events in the short life of the modem ADR movement. Concerns over
the effects of institutionalization by the courts were articulated relatively
early 391 and continue to be the topic of much discussion. 392 Despite the
well-meaning efforts of mediation proponents to preserve the notion of
party control and consent as a core value,39 3 control and consent have
been eroded by the court's imposition of the process, thereby requiring
legitimating characteristics. In the typical court-connected mediation,
the parties sign a written mediation agreement after a formal explanation
of the process. Instead of choosing friends, parties must choose
mediators from an approved list. Those mediators have been trained in a
particular way by approved trainers and must adhere to standards of
conduct promulgated by the courts. Failure to participate may result in
court-imposed sanctions. The procedures are more likely to be dictated
by the court rules and the mediators than by the parties. Instead of a
conciliatory outcome reconciling the parties and based on private norms,
it is more likely that any settlement will be more in conformity with
would happen in litigation,
substantive legal norms and estimates of what
394
mediator.
the
by
provided
often
are
which
Because the public's exposure to mediation is mostly through courtconnected mediation, the customs and practices of mediation in that
context will be viewed as most legitimate and likely will dominate public
perception. Such mediation is less flexible and less conciliatory than that
originally envisioned and promoted by many of the founders of the
REV. 1, 23-27 (2001); Dorothy J. Della Noce, Mediation Theory and Policy: The Legacy
of the Pound Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 545, 547 (2002).
391. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, PursuingSettlement in an Adversary Culture:
A Tale ofInnovation Co-opted or the "Law ofADR, " 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
392. See Symposium, Dispute Resolution and Capitulation to the Routine: Is There a
Way Out?, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2003); see also Joseph P. Folger, "Mediation Goes
Mainstream "-Taking the Conference Theme Challenge, 3 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 3
(2002) (suggesting that court-connected institutionalization of mediation has proved
threatening to the core values of the process).
393. Party control and consent is labeled "self-determination" in the emerging ethical
standards for the field. See Welsh, supra note 390, at 3-4, 15-21. In light of the coercive
nature of evaluative mediation, Professor Welsh goes as far as analogizing evaluative
mediation with judicial settlement conferences. Id. at 25-27, 59-78. Whether party
control over process and outcome is as important as the procedural justice elements of
voice and recognition are addressed in Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in
Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J.
Disp. RESOL. 179.
394. Possible litigation outcomes form one part of a party's BATNA, which stands
for "Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement." See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic
Barriersto Dispute Resolution: A Comparisonof Bilateraland MultilateralNegotiations,
8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (citing ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETrING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97 (2d ed.1983)). For a more extensive
definition of BATNA, see DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 55.
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modem ADR movement. Ultimately, my conclusion matches that of
Deborah Hensler: if mediation is to survive as a conciliatory ADR
process, it must "liberate itself from the courts; ' 3 9 5 otherwise, it simply
capitulates to an adjudicative routine. As the tale of English arbitration
illustrates, a conciliatory process will not survive within the context of
the courts and the legal culture of adjudication-such institutionalization
leads to deadly isomorphism.

395. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 (2003).
Whether mediation will thrive outside the institutional support of the courts is another
question entirely.

